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Abstract
The concept of journalism as a profession has arguably been fraught and contested
throughout its existence. Ideologically, it is founded on a claim to norms and a code of ethics,
but in the past, news media also held material control over mass communication through
broadcast and print which were largely inaccessible to most citizens.
The Internet and social media has created a news environment where professional journalists
and their work exist side-by-side with non-journalists. In this space, acts of journalism also
can be and are carried out by non-journalists. Through the new news distribution channels
offered by social media, non-journalists are potentially able to disseminate their texts to wide
audiences. In practice this means that journalism is no longer exclusively the domain of the
journalist, and has led to the adoption of collaboration as a journalistic convention that
presents opportunities but also serious challenges and risks for the professional community.
My research aims to contribute to the news discourse concerning emerging professional
practices in networked journalism with a focus on how journalistic authority is reasserted
within a collaborative news environment. Rather than looking at networked journalism as
primarily participatory, this research explores collaborative newswork as a means to carry out
professional boundary work and to articulate this to audiences. I argue that the act of
collaboration in newswork at times becomes a quasi-ideological project to protect journalism
as a profession that lays claim to ethics, norms and routines.
The research comprises three case studies of news stories covered by the BBC World Service
and the English-language services of France 24 and Al Jazeera. Using quantitative and
qualitative analysis methods, they explore how social media was mobilised in the newswork.
The aim was to explore how sourcing practices affected the power relationships between
primary and secondary definers, and how journalists create and articulate professional
boundaries in collaborative newswork. These research findings were triangulated with
interviews with social media editors at the three news organisations.
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1. Introduction
The Internet has arguably thrown professional journalism into crisis not only by undermining
its commercial business model, with dwindling revenue plaguing much of the industry, but by
creating an environment that contests the notion of professionalism in journalism. Journalists
as a professional community have had their exclusivity as news producers challenged in ways
that have not only opened a space for non-professionals in newswork but that also in some
ways come to rely on them. Collaborating with non-journalists has become an important part
of almost all facets of journalism be it on breaking news, societal issues, or human rights
abuses. A set of social newsgathering guidelines adopted by the members of the European
Broadcasting Union illustrate the extent to which news organisations acknowledge the need
to adapt to this deprofessionalisation of newswork.

[It] is recognised that in order to provide a news service that is universal, relevant, and
trusted the news content cannot just be restricted to that which is provided by
professional news organisations and must include content from individuals, groups
and entities who are witnessing and filming news events of interest. (EBU 2018)

With the new interdependence with non-journalists in the production of newswork, journalists
have had to find new ways to assert and demonstrate their authority. This authority may be
asserted in the form that interaction and collaboration take or in the news texts produced from
interactive newswork. Therefore, network journalism can arguably be viewed not only as a
relatively new approach to newswork with the aim to include non-journalists in the process of
news production, but, paradoxically, as a means by which journalists conduct professional
boundary work. This research seeks to investigate how three elite mainstream news
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organisations -- BBC World Service, France 24 English, and Al Jazeera English -- mobilise
collaboration through social media, and the role that boundary work plays in collaborative
newswork.

In the early noughties, there was optimism about the democratic potential of what Jenkins
dubbed “convergence culture” (2006, p. 2). Jenkins argues that barriers would be broken
down between professionalism and amateurism in newswork, wresting control from power
elites about who got to speak to a mass audience. An interconnected digital world was seen as
blurring the lines between media production and consumption. As individuals participated in
an electronic agora, they become “produsers” (Bruns 2006, p. 276) of news content of their
own. Much was made of the supposed empowerment of news consumers, who were
described by Jay Rosen (2006) as “the people formerly known as the audience” and Dan
Gillmor (2004) simply as the “former audience”. As interconnectedness of news consumers
became a prerequisite for the distribution of news products, news consumers were no longer
reduced to the silent passive masses on the receiving end of a predominantly one-way mass
media. Exploring how the professional identity of journalists fits with convergence culture,
Deuze (2008) advocated for the opportunities that interactivity and hybridity could present in
fostering participation, inclusion, and higher standards in journalism. And yet, already then
he cautioned about “the tendency of institutions to adapt to innovation and change in ways to
primarily reproduce that what came before” (ibid., p. 112). At the end of his paper he
concluded that journalists were “likely to respond nostalgically and defensively to disruptive
change” while “media management tend to interpret such changes primarily in terms of their
potential to ‘depopulate’ the profession” (ibid., p. 118). It is fair to say that the early euphoria
from a section of academics, who predicted a democratising effect on the news media, has
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since been tempered. Research explored in the following chapter has pointed towards
professionals normalising the way in which they mobilise social media for newsgathering and
reporting. But perhaps more poignantly, as concepts such as ‘convergence’ and ‘hybridity’
have faded into the past, they have been replaced with an intense focus on what journalism is
and how it sets itself apart.

As I will discuss in the literature review, challenges to the notion of professionalism in the
context of journalism have been present throughout its existence, and journalists have tried in
a number of ways to claim the right to authority through their own interpretive community.
From an industry perspective, the need to define journalism as the occupation of a
professional community is today more pressing than ever. As a result, recent years have seen
academia return to issues of professional journalism, such as in Carlson and Lewis’s seminal
work Boundaries of Journalism (2015). Boundary work has assumed an important role in
professional newswork, given the need to defend journalism as a profession at a time when
many acts of journalism can and are carried out by ordinary members of the public. My own
research will argue that at times boundary work is the core meaning and pursuit of
collaborative newswork, making news production a sort of discursive, quasi-ideological
project to protect journalism as a profession.

At the same time as news organisations are formalising the integration of interactivity and
collaboration in professional routines and practices of the mainstream news media, the value
of the information shared by non-professionals, and the digital spaces in which they do this,
have come under intense scrutiny. The alternative news environment of social media
platforms, where audiences are concerned, have been heavily criticised both in the
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mainstream news media as well as in academia. A technological determinism argues that the
algorithms of social media platforms and search engines have led to ‘echo chambers’ and
‘filter bubbles’ that encase audiences in their own prejudices. This alleged balkanization in
public opinion is perceived as anti-democratic (Piore 2018; Wells 2018) because, in the main,
democracy is understood as striving for consensus. Moreover, the ability for anyone to
publish has allegedly led to an epidemic of ‘fake news’ and ‘misinformation’ published by
malignant actors and spurred on by algorithms. Therefore, the alternative news environment
is perceived as a threat to deliberative democracy (Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. 2016), which
(it is implied) must be upheld by the values of professional journalism. However, to what
extent these fears are justified is debated. Evidence on ‘filter bubbles’ and ‘echo chambers’ is
not clear cut. For one, the phenomenon is difficult to measure empirically (Knight 2017;
Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. 2016). Where attempts have been made, the automated
personalisation of news content by algorithms has not been found to be the main driver in
creating ‘information cocoons’. Rather, self-selection is that driver (Bakshy et al. 2015). This
poses a much greater question about how much the human factor is undermining the
deliberative democracy that news media strives to facilitate, or how news organisations can
remedy this. But even the extent to which deliberate selection by individuals achieves filter
bubbles is disputed (Hazard Owen 2018; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. 2016). Nevertheless, the
extent to which filter bubbles and misinformation are considered a threat to public discourse
was made clear in a keynote address by Emily Bell (2018) at the ‘News Assembly’ of the
European Broadcasting Union. Bell called for public service media to engage in “collective
bargaining” with social media companies, that would see them threaten to leave these
platforms if they did not address these issues. There is no doubt that Bell believed in the
moral impetus for such a call to arms, but as she was speaking in front of an audience of more
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than 100 editors from legacy news media, it was evident that what was also at stake was
professional authority to define what is acceptable public discourse, and how such discourse
should be conducted.

The widespread access to the Internet has dramatically lowered barriers to publishing and
broadcasting, and social media have had a prominent role to play in this. Designed as
conduits for information among the networks, or communities, of users these platforms host,
they are a powerful tool for news distribution. More importantly though, they are a tool that
has become decoupled from professional journalism. For better or worse, social media create
a news environment that is outside the control of professional news media and can never be
fully shaped by them. As audiences increasingly seek out information and upload their own
original news content in this alternative new environment, professional news media must
participate in it or risk becoming irrelevant. Unlike in the past, the media industry no longer
controls the distribution channels, leaving journalists and non-journalists to both exist side by
side in the same space. Non-journalists also report, comment, adapt and edit a stream of
information that is constantly transformed by each new addition and alteration. In doing so
they often seek to influence, debate or respond to the news coverage of professional
mainstream journalism, which in most cases still informs the majority of this information
stream.

As a practitioner specialised in social media newsgathering, my main area of interest is in
how news organisations and my colleagues grapple with the collaborative nature of
newswork today. Having joined social media news agency Storyful in 2011, I was involved in
a small startup in Dublin that went on to be at the forefront of defining interactive
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newsgathering as a professional practice. Over the subsequent seven years, I witnessed this
new practice transform newsgathering in the industry. More importantly though, news media
over time mobilised to define how collaboration with non-journalists takes place. In 2018, I
took on a role as editor for the EVN Social Newswire at the European Broadcasting Union,
where I have been involved in building a similar newsgathering service for public service
media. The large volume of scholarly work that exists on networked journalism gives the
impression that today’s news media is plugged into social media and online communities in a
sophisticated and well-established way. Yet, at industry level my experience is that for most
journalists social media is still far more unfamiliar terrain than one might imagine. Although
the idea of collaborative newswork is largely accepted – albeit sometimes grudgingly – the
opportunities that this presents in newswork require journalists to rethink their role in a way
that can appear paradoxical. This is especially true for those who have worked in this industry
for more than half a decade.

The expertise that I gathered in my work were based around applying journalistic practices
such as discovering and sourcing social media material that was of importance to news
audiences, setting professional best practice for verification of this type of material, and
contextualising it. Therefore, my professional work involves a strong gatekeeping
component with regard to sourcing, selecting and framing social media texts based on a
journalistic logic. I have been in the role of the journalist that manages collaborative
newswork, and, therefore, also have first-hand experience of its limitations within the
professional news environment. Throughout my career, I have witnessed (and participated in)
what I perceive as a normalisation of collaboration and a rhetoric concerning the
professionalisation of the practices around it.
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Journalists’ claim to an exclusive professional community has arguably always relied on their
role as experts in relaying information to non-experts (Carlson 2015, pp. 8-9). They translate
information from elites, and probe them on behalf of their audiences but also act as stand-in
citizens under the guise of being the everyman. They consider it their role to uncover and
report news and opinions from one group of citizens for another. In the past, there was limited
scope for non-journalists to publish outside the mainstream news media, but as this limitation
crumbles away, journalists are forced “to confront how it is they differ from other social
actors – if at all” (ibid., p. 9). Where Deuze (2008) urged news media to embrace
collaboration, journalists remain resistant, which, I argue, is down to the lack of a shared
discursive language and conception about their place in today’s news environment. As the
mechanisms by which the professional community previously functioned – that is, almost
exclusive access to mass media – have become less ubiquitous, it has become apparent that
the ideological discourse around the profession that was taken for granted is in fact weak and
easily contested. Unable to return to a time where the technology for mass communication is
in the hand of the media industry alone, it can be argued that professional journalism now
relies more than ever on a robust ideological raison d’etre.

Hujanen (2016) explores the radical transition that journalists have been asked to make from
a discursive perspective. On the one hand, the discourse of professional journalism creates
clear boundaries that grant journalists the exclusive right to produce journalism. Based on the
premise of autonomy, the journalist is “represented as gatekeeper towards economic and
political spheres of influence and citizens” (ibid., p. 878). Today, this role of authority is
being challenged not just by practical realities but, arguably, also ideologically. Meanwhile,
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the discourse of citizen debate gives a physical expression of democracy, and acts as a
sub-discourse to professional journalism. The term ‘Fourth estate’ is characterised as a pillar
of democracy, and deemed essential to inform and facilitate public discourse. As social media
created an alternate news environment, a news discourse centred around interactivity between
journalists and non-journalists emerged, where audiences “provided an additional workforce
to pursue better journalism” (ibid., p. 876). Accepting the interdependence on non-journalists
in newswork, journalists share their professional knowledge with amateurs and incorporate
them into their logic of professional journalism. However, I believe, traditional journalistic
conventions are central to shaping this interactivity as journalists ‘initiate’ the amateurs in
order to integrate them into their work. In fact, as collaboration is adopted as a new
convention, it can be mobilised and managed to offset the risks that non-journalists pose to
the notion of professionalism. By problematising the inclusion of non-journalists and then
integrating them into professionalism, existing conventions are made visible in a way that
was previously not explicit. Therefore collaborative newswork should not necessarily be
explored as a means to fostering greater inclusion or better journalism, but perhaps as a way
to carry out professional boundary work.

The Guardian’s editor-in-chief Katharine Viner offered an illustration of the ambiguous
relationship professional journalism has with the opportunities and challenges posed by
extra-media voices and non-journalists to publish and broadcast. Giving the A.N. Smith
Lecture in Journalism at the University of Melbourne in 2013, Viner made a strong case for a
mutual and reciprocal relationship between professional journalists and news audiences that
appears to be underpinned by the ideology of convergence culture. Quoting a Tow Center for
Digital Journalism essay on post-industrial journalism, she framed mainstream media’s new
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role as bringing together professional journalists and citizens as equals. While stressing that
“there is more a need than ever for the journalist as a ‘truth-teller, sense-maker, explainer’”
(Viner 2013) she argued for a much more fluid and reciprocal relationship with news
audiences. For example, she criticised those journalists on Twitter who choose to set
themselves apart from others with the blue tick of personal verification, to lend their words a
greater air of authority. With the two-way flow of information, she argued, journalists have to
be prepared to climb into the pit with everyone else.

What if we were to embrace the ecosystem of the web and combined established
journalistic techniques with new ways of finding, telling and communicating stories?
Opened ourselves up? Put the people formerly known as the audience at the heart of
everything? Combined the elite and the street… and the tweet?
Not gut instinct or data: both.
Not the phone or Twitter: both.
Not neutral journalists or politicised journalists: both.
Not original reporting or verification,
journalists or bloggers,
journalists or activists,
journalists or readers.
The future of journalism, with humility, is all of the above. (ibid.)

A few years later and, while still stressing the importance of working with citizens in a
mutual and reciprocal manner through technology, Viner shifted emphasis on the need to
fight for a “strong journalistic culture” (Viner, 2016) and traditional news values. She
described the open forum of the Internet where all information is seen as of equal value, as
having created a struggle that involves the “diminishing status of truth”. At the centre of her
argument lies the assertion that shared norms for finding truth have been lost but are essential
for an environment where public consensus can be built. In her view professional journalism
must be preserved and reinvigorated in order for it to deliver a public service. This shift took

14

place in the space of just three years and coincided with other evidence of an ideological
shift from the idea of convergence during this period with the publication of Carlson and
Lewis’ (2015) work on professional boundary-formation in journalism.

In Viner’s 2016 ‘Long Read’ feature, journalism is seen to serve a deliberative democracy
that must facilitate debate that strives for consensus, and the only way to achieve this is
through a shared way of looking at the world. It is a view that is common to mainstream news
media and is underpinned by the idea of the Habermasian public sphere (Habermas 2003),
where citizens engage in a rational debate to seek the truth. In journalistic terms this
translates into news routines that follow established methods that are presented as natural and
which audiences have been trained to read in certain ways. It can be argued that as it became
apparent that non-journalists published without deferring to these same rules, the journalistic
profession recognised their threat. So within a few short years, the rhetorical embrace of the
levelling of hierarchies turned into a stark warning about the alleged dangers this posed to
democracy and audiences were called on to accept the authoritativeness of journalists. But if
professional journalism sees it as its role to build consensus through a shared way of seeing,
then journalists are not likely to deviate significantly from how they construct news as a
community.

The research presented here deals with how news organisations have adapted their routines
and processes to integrate social media news content, and how their journalists position
themselves in this interaction. It investigates the use of interactive newsgathering and
collaborative newswork by journalists across three elite international news organisations that
are on the one hand similar in their global reach, and on the other emerged from different
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media cultures. These are the BBC World Service, and the English-language services of
France 24 and Al Jazeera. I examine the sourcing and gatekeeping routines exclusively with
regard to information sought through social media, with the aim to explore how these affect
power relationships between sources and journalists. The research was conducted through the
analysis of three separate case studies between summer 2015 and the end of 2016. All of
them comprised news events that had a strong social media component and were headline
news across all three news organisations. These were the Greek referendum during the
economic crisis, coverage of the EU migrant crisis, and coverage of the final battle for
Aleppo. All three stories were at or near the top of the news agenda across the three news
organisations during the period examined, generating numerous news texts, which relied on
social media-sourced content. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis of these texts was
conducted to investigate what social media-sourced content was used and how it was
presented. In addition, I interviewed social media editors at the organisations to triangulate
some of the findings and test them against the editors’ own rationale for collaborative
newswork. These are presented in a chapter broken down by themes addressed in the
interviews, including the outlet’s formalised approach to the use of social media,
agenda-setting, differences among social media platforms, verification processes, and the
editors’ attitude towards professional guidelines for collaborative newswork.

When I set out to do this research, it was not my intention to explore boundary work in
networked journalism, but rather to explore citizen participation in mainstream news media.
However, as the findings began to present themselves, it soon became apparent that the issue
at stake for the news organisations was their justification and continued relevance in this
drastically changed news environment. Professional boundary work became the common
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thread that tied the data together and, therefore, presented itself as the inevitable theoretical
framework to underpin the discussion of my research. Firstly, the data from the case studies
was examined with consideration to each news organisation’s own cultural logic. This meant
considering if and how the norms of that media culture were applied to collaborative
newswork. Secondly, the spread of news organisations had the effect of revealing a range of
evidence about the consequences of collaborative newswork with regards to whether it was
binding the global professional community together or diffusing it. I hope the findings
presented here will contribute to understanding of journalists have been adapting their
routines, practices and professional discourse to offset the challenges posed by
non-journalists’ ability to carry out own journalistic work. Specifically, it approaches the
collaborative newswork not necessarily as a means to foster participation but to carry out
professional boundary work.
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2. Literature Review

This chapter provides an overview of some of the key ideas that have evolved in
understanding news production, dissemination and consumption in a networked news
environment. It aims to explore two often separately treated areas of media research: the
news environment of social media platforms, and the news environment and rationale of
legacy news media. A separation of these two areas – both in research and theory – can have
the effect of downplaying the journalist’s participation in the first as well as the second. It is
my aim to bridge this gap by bringing two different logics together; that of the professional
news environment on the one hand, and that of the user-driven, collaborative news
environment of social networks on the other. By combining different methodological
approaches, I aim to investigating how traditional news media and journalists deal with the
disruption caused by the demands for interactivity with users.

The need to assert authority in order to preserve the idea of professionalism in journalism is
discussed through boundary work, which forms the theoretical framework of this research.
This section discusses journalists’ claim to their own interpretive community and the
mechanisms by which they define their boundaries, before further delving into the evolution
of the role of the journalist, and different conceptions of what a journalist’s responsibility to
the public are. In Chapter 3, I explore the media models relevant to the news organisations
investigated in this research and examine the online news strategies defined by each of the
organisations in order to help contextualise the research. The specific media culture of a news
organisation can be assumed to be a contributing factor in how journalists at each
18

organisation might define professionalism. Therefore, they might affect the way that
journalists perform boundary work.

Much of networked journalism among mainstream news media is based on a heavy reliance
on Twitter as a newsgathering tool. Therefore, the following literature review also entails a
discussion of how the microblog functions as a social network. It investigates how
information is shared by users; how networks of users interact with each other; and how
communication differs from the one-to-many broadcasting style of traditional news outlets. It
then goes on to discuss some of the factors contributing to the emergence of elite users in the
blogosphere and how this can be applied to social media platforms relied on for
newsgathering in the research. An overview of historical media traditions seeks to explain the
roles of news organisations in the research and the considerations, responsibilities and
obligations of their journalists in that context. The following sections discuss the discourse
surrounding ‘ambient journalism’ and ‘affective news streams’, which envisioned the
journalist in the role of ‘gatewatcher’ rather than gatekeeper. I aim to show how greater
egalitarianism and plurality in newswork, which often accompanied these concepts in the
early 2000s, is balanced with the reality of a saturated news environment and attention
scarcity among audiences. The difficulties faced by non-journalists in achieving visibility
through social media, are covered by the literature review to return to mainstream news
media as playing an enduring role in providing a public sphere. It is this continued reliance
on mainstream news media in shaping news discourse that prompted me to focus the research
on the interactive and collaborative nature of today’s professional newswork.
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Drawing boundaries around journalism
As journalists face huge challenges through the widespread availability of technology that
enables almost anyone to record, publish and broadcast, boundary work has become integral
to protecting it as a profession. Ascribing professionalism to journalism in the classic sense is
fraught, however, given that there is no definitive path of entry into the profession – such as
through a particular education or license to practice. Nevertheless, journalists have long
sought to build their own “interpretive communities” that strive for “internal cohesion and the
right to enforce its own exclusivity” (Carlson 2015, p. 8). Journalistic professionalism,
articulated through a set of norms and routines is the mechanism that legitimises journalists
as exclusive providers of knowledge and meaning. (Carlson 2017) Integral to this is the
understanding that the activities of journalists are a public service, typically couched in the
belief that journalism is essential to democracy.

Online news production must perhaps be studied separately to other types of news production
as it comes with its own culture as Deuze (2009) has argued. In it the journalist has taken on a
greater role as “individual meaning makers” and the hierarchical structures of more
traditional news formats gives “way to new practices and ways of working under the
influence of current social and technological trends” (p. 84). However, as this text is already
10 years old, and online news has become ubiquitous, I argue that these practices and routines
now form a core part of the newswork overall. While Deuze discusses the “individualization
of labour” (p. 90) -- meaning the precariousness of journalism through individualised
contracts and multi-skilling, where workers are expected to act as entrepreneurs -- he argues
that these types of journalists are no longer initiated into the profession in the conventional
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apprentice model but rather form their understanding of a professional community in a way
that is more removed from the traditional newsroom. This is an important argument to this
research in that it acknowledges the precarity of the journalist as a wage labourer amid the
break-down of traditional ways of socializing young journalists, and the emergence of new
ways of forming and articulating boundary work in order to lay claim to an interpretive
community. Therefore, I argue that precarity in a collaborative news environment and new
articulations of boundary work may be interlinked, and may lead journalists to perform
boundary work as a type of self-promotion. Moreover, the fear of loss of livelihood feeds
directly into how boundary work is performed, perhaps putting survival of the profession
above the more esoteric norms and conventions of journalism. As such boundary work may
be taking place, particularly in relation to factors that are seen as a threat to the exclusivity
and authority of professional journalists rather than all aspects of practices such as sourcing
and agenda-setting equally.

Perhaps provocatively, Hanitzsch and Vos say journalism has “no ‘true’ essence” (Hanitzsch
& Vos 2017, p. 127). They argue it is an institution that is shaped by the discourse of internal
and external actors, and that defines normative roles and ideas which evolve and drastically
change over time. Moreover, norms differ according to location and context. For example,
research on climate change journalism showed Philippine news media to deviate from norms
embodied in Western news media (Evans 2016). Therefore, professional ideals of journalism
are a site of struggle for authority in shaping this discourse while the community is primarily
held together by its functioning as an institution. However, a growing trend of
universalisation of norms was observed in the early 2000s (Hafez 2002). And many Western
normative ideas about journalism have resonated with professional communities in other
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societies, especially in regards to truth-telling, objectivity and independence (Pintak &
Ginges 2009). In fact, I believe, the nature of networked journalism has contributed to a
transnational journalism culture that is yet to be fully understood. It has prompted new
analytical models to study how norms are shared or not in this culture (Hellmueller et al.
2017). This research analyses news texts from organisations from different media systems or
cultures (discussed in Chapter 3), attempting to explore differences and similarities in the
news output of networked journalism through empirical and textual analysis. Deuze and
Witschge (2017) argue that to understand present-day journalism requires looking “beyond
boundaries” (p. 177). Journalists often carry out newswork away from the newsroom (the
former locus of professional journalism) which, nevertheless, continues to define the
perception of what journalism looks like. Journalists today are often entrepreneurs without
the security of permanence at an organisation, collaborating with non-journalists in
newswork, and are required to constantly adapt their skills in a permanently evolving and
changing news environment. Despite the extreme precarity they face, journalists continue to
adapt in what may only be described as dogged devotion to a set of ideals and values they
attach to their work. It is argued here that this normative ideology fostered in journalism is
perhaps the most persistent form of boundary work there is. It is consistently underpinned
with public discourse about a range of professional norms and routines that takes place not
only inside the professional community but is increasingly expressed outwards by journalists.
This makes a case for further exploring boundary work not only as a set of pseudo-norms,
which only have the appearance of normative behaviour and ideas, but as a persistent
coherence to professional journalism. However, it appears that what those norms and
practices are remains difficult to pin down in any definitive way. The hybrid nature of
networked journalism (Bruns 2006; Bruns & Highfield, 2012; Chadwick 2011a; Hermida
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2010a; Papacharissi 2015) has undermined the very concept of newswork as a professional
occupation in academia. With so many actors involved in newswork, the questions, ‘What is
journalism?’ and ‘Who is a journalist?’ seem to become increasingly impossible to answer.
Yet Witschge et al. (2018) argue “the norms that govern journalism practices and theories
transcend the interactions between actors in a way that deserves more scholarly attention:
they are powerful in structuring relationships because they are shared references that connect
present, current practices with ideals, old and new” (p. 5). However, today’s news
environment has also arguably given rise to new normative behaviour and ideas, perhaps
belying the notion of norms that remain constant and transcendental. For example, the
long-standing norm of objectivity has been contested through the emergence of transparency
as a “discursively constructed” journalistic norm (Vos & Craft 2017, p. 1514). The authors
argue that transparency has not been presented as an additional norm but is inherently placed
in opposition to objectivity. This arguably suggests a fundamental shift in normative ideas
taking place and suggests boundary work can be explored as a set of shifting and maleable
norms and practices.

At a time where the news media no longer holds the monopoly on speaking to a mass
audience “[t]he survival of journalism as an occupation depends on its credibility, which is
gained through the collective behavior of its practitioners” (Singer 2015, p. 22). Certainly,
among the major news organisations studied here a significant crossover in norms can be
reasonably assumed due to the arguably disproportional influence of Western news media on
the global news flow. However, the extent to which boundary work is performed in a
monolithic way is debatable as different logics are coming up against each other. Earlier, I
referred to how journalists themselves have begun to play a greater role in defining practices
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away from the newsroom. However, this is not to say that control over what is published and
how does not still often rest with news organisations and therefore with the institutions of
journalism. And Deuze also maintains that institutions continue to play a central role. For
example, Palmer (2015) describes how two freelance war correspondents were delegitimized
by American news networks, when their reports did not match the dominant narrative on the
conflicts they reported. The cases described by her describe a conflict between the boundary
work of the reporters, which was found in practices and values such as to bear witness and
speak truth to power, while the networks ultimately distanced themselves from the journalists,
describing them as freelancers (in other words, outside the trusted circle of professional staff),
and even framed them as potential activists (falling foul of the journalistic norm of
impartiality). So the boundary work of specific journalists was not paramount but secondary
to what was admissible as news reporting for the news organisations. However, I believe that
Singer’s argument that journalism is increasingly dependent on collective behaviour warrants
exploration, specifically in how this ties in with journalists interdependence with news
organisations. My point is that between the claim by the institutions of journalism to be able
to define the parametres of boundary work in order to maintain their dominance in a much
more diversified news environment, and the more self-directed approach to defining practices
and routines by a workforce in precarious employment, a space may be opened up where
boundary work is driven by survival rather than ideals. Pivotally, I suggest that survival and
ideals may not necessarily be as interlinked as Singer suggests.

Carlson (2015) draws on Gieryn (1983) to describe the three types of boundary work
journalists collectively carry out – expansion, expulsion, and protection of autonomy – and
the three areas that these are enacted upon – participants, practices, and professionalism

24

(2015, p. 9). For example, expansion can mean widening access to journalism to
non-journalists, incorporating new news production routines, and extending journalism to
new types of media. Expulsion may mean expelling actors, practices or values that are
considered deviant. Protection of autonomy refers to the ability to keep out actors that may
conflict with the values and practices of the profession, such as public relations professionals,
management, and to define the accepted practices of the profession. Since digital media
assumed a prominent role in news in the early 2000s, journalists have been increasingly
expressing the importance of their work through professional norms. One of the
characteristics of this discourse is an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy, that seeks to discredit the
authoritativeness of the non-journalist information producers through these norms (Singer
2015). However, what shape this dichotomy takes and to what extent it excludes
non-journalists from newswork sanctioned by professionals is continually changing as
journalists try to find ways to include information produced by non-professionals. Networked
journalism, that is the collaboration between journalists and citizens (Jarvis 2006), is still
governed by a hierarchy of influence, as Reese and Shoemaker (2016) argue. In the context of
this research, networked journalism may be better understood as collaboration between
journalists and extra-media actors. Van der Haak et al. (2012) describes it as “networks of
various professionals and citizens collaborating, corroborating, correcting, and ultimately
distilling the essence of the story that will be told” (p. 2927).

Although the news environment has been restructured, hierarchical power is in many places
reasserting itself through the relationships formed between actors in these networks (Reese &
Shoemaker 2016). Therefore, networks do not necessarily undermine hierarchy as
“relationships are still conditioned by larger systemic factors” (ibid., p. 406). For example,
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while journalists are joining networks that collaborate on news production, their participation
in these relationships is shaped by their understanding of their role as journalists. As
journalists are resorting to employing non-journalists in news production, their
“‘second-order’ newswork still maintains a professional ethos, distant from the eyewitness
field-reporting professionals have always valorized, yet still holding that ethos as an
aspiration” (ibid., p. 400). Their networks are shaped by the relationships they seek out and
nurture, but also how they interact with different actors in it and what position they take. One
study found journalists would apply their professional norms and roles, as providers of
information, and agenda-setters and gatekeepers of public discourse, to their use of Twitter
hashtags (Enli & Simonsen 2018). Journalists were found to take considerable initiative in
producing original content for Twitter and took a lead in shaping discourse in their own
networks. Their use of hashtags was mainly designed to propel their original newswork to
audiences beyond their immediate follower network.

Although impartiality (if understood in terms of not opining) has in many places lost
importance as a professional norm, as a value it continues to be of utmost relevance in almost
all journalistic work that incorporates social media news content and is most evident in the
practice of verification. Verification of social media-sourced material, especially videos or
photos, is often presented as only relaying the hard facts about this type of material. It
involves determining bias of a source, verifying claims made by the producer and
determining authenticity (Middleton 2016), all suggesting a strong emphasis on impartiality.
To a great extent journalists continue to lay claim to exclusivity as news providers through
promising reliability, accuracy and authenticity (Hermida 2015). In a real-time 24/7 news
environment this can present huge challenges. Therefore, routines are being adapted to
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networked journalism that can withstand inaccuracies. Verification becomes a quest for
reliable information, with accuracy as its end goal. Trust in the journalist is primarily fostered
through transparency. The journalist is a “trusted professional who is transparent about how a
news story comes together, with accounts and rumors contested, denied or verified in
collaboration with the public” (ibid., p. 47).The hot button issue of what was first referred to
as ‘fake news’ -- and more recently ‘misinformation, or ‘disinformation’ -- has been used
extensively for boundary work as mainstream news media has problematised misinformation
through deviant practices in news production by non-journalists, framing it as a threat to the
proper functioning of democratic societies1. Misinformation has dominated industry
conferences and been used to leverage the emergence of new specialist journalistic roles
focused on sourcing and verifying social media news content2. Tech giants such as Facebook
and Google have come under heavy criticism for enabling the spread of so-called
‘misinformation’ and research has looked at how news outlets have tried to label Facebook as
a news organisation, drawing it into the boundaries of journalism, in order to then criticise it
as deviant (Johnson & Kelling 2017).

Despite the disruption that social media as publishing platforms have caused, journalists’
persisting ability to define professional boundaries is shown in the way that sources’ continue

1

In Western societies, almost all journalistic roles are typically framed by the normative ideology that

journalism facilitates democracy (Carlson 2017; Christians et al. 2010; Haak et al. 2012) though this
has been argued to be too limiting to understanding journalism in the 21st century (Josephi 2013).
2

Three examples of companies or news departments specialised in sourcing and authenticating social

media content are social media news agency Storyful, the BBC’s UGC Hub, and the European
Broadcasting Union’s Eurovision Social Newswire.
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to struggle for the attention of journalists. They do this through long-established means, such
as press releases, press conferences, easily appropriated multimedia material and availability
to answer questions for journalists (Domingo & Le Cam 2015). In other words, actors
looking for publicity continue to speak to journalists in the ‘language’ most likely to grant
them access to their institutions, and deem representation in the mainstream news media as
important. This can be argued to show that professional journalism continues to be seen as a
vital medium to reach the wider public, while other channels are considered less influential.
Nevertheless, these practices have also come to be coupled with news production that takes
place outside the mainstream news media such as on social networking sites. In addition to
this alternative news production, popularity on social media can feed back into the
mainstream news narrative.

While boundary work is core to ring-fencing journalism as an occupation, journalists also
engage in straightforward self-promotion by cultivating their social media personas. Research
shows that journalists’ Twitter activity mixes private and professional information, which
means boundaries between what are deemed sanctioned professional practices and
non-professional practices blur (Molyneux et al. 2018). And this too, I argue, can be
understood as evidence of a kind of boundary work, albeit one that is not based on
professional norms per se, but on celebrity status. Journalists perceive themselves as
professionals engaging in public relations activity with their audience, where they create a
more personal feel and look to engage audiences, while at the same time their occupation
plays an important role in their image-building. This is to say that the act of branding shows
they understand themselves as members of an exclusive professional community and engage
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in some form of self-promotion that always implicitly has their professional work at the
centre of their social media persona.

This section has attempted to provide an overview of the concept of professionalism in
journalism and how this may be defined. I argue that the norms and routines that govern the
professional community are very fluid. However, this does not prevent the use of a range of
practices by which boundary work is conducted to produce an ‘othering’ of non-journalists.
Perhaps the most enduring form of boundary work is the ideology of journalists as an
autonomous interpretive communities that defines its own standards. This community is in
part centred around the idea of the newsroom although for many journalists it is arguably
more of a nostalgic concept than a lived reality, perhaps contributing to the formation of a
type of imagined community.

The journalist

To explore some contrasting perceptions of an ideal of the journalist, theorist Geraldine
Muhlmann (2010) has referenced Charles Baudelaire and Walter Benjamin to offer differing
views of the personas that embody the journalist. I want to describe these as they reveal some
of the discursive and ideological conflicts at the heart of journalism, and also add to the
historical context that runs through the profession. This section is attempting to contextualise
the boundaries, norms and values that journalism claims to give it authority and legitimacy.

First, the notion of the impartial observer, typically conceived of as a cornerstone of good
journalism (Kovach & Rosenstiel 2007), is eloquently described, as Muhlmann suggests, in
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Baudelaire’s 1864 essay ‘The Painter of Modern Life’. In describing the ‘perfect flâneur’,
Baudelaire seeks to sketch out the characteristics of an artist who is able to distill the essence
of contemporary life in their work.

For the perfect flâneur, for the passionate spectator, it is an immense joy to set up
house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and flow of movement, in the midst
of the fugitive and the infinite. To be away from home and yet to feel oneself
everywhere at home; to see the world, to be at the centre of the world, and yet to
remain hidden from the world – such are a few of the slightest pleasures of these
independent, passionate, impartial natures which the tongue can but clumsily define.
(Baudelaire 1995, p. 9)
Applied to the journalist, Baudelaire describes a person, who both actively participates in the
world, but through a lense of disinterest. Far from being ‘blasé’ though, he has an enthusiasm
for what he observes and is driven by the desire to condense it to its most essential
characteristic and elements.

He is looking for the quality that you must allow me to call ‘modernity’ for I have no
better word to express the idea I have in mind. He makes it his business to extract
from fashion whatever element it may contain of poetry within history, to distill the
eternal from the transitory. (ibid., p. 12)
Once applied to social media, the designation of the journalist as a disinterested observer
might envisage them as seeking to “separate the noise from the news of social conversations”
(Little 2015), as the founder of social media news agency worded it. The aim is not to
represent the full array of voices in all their conversations, but to capture that which is
considered newsworthy by the journalist. Through monitoring and engaging with users on
social media platforms, the networked journalist filters information from the multitude of
voices competing for attention and seeks to make sense of them. This suggests that if done in
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the vein of the ‘perfect flâneur’, they participate in this space by being at the centre of it
while also acting as a spectator. In short, there is an independence of spirit. This kind of
sense-making can be seen in action on many journalist’s Twitter streams, as they pick out
information, contextualise and comment on it. At the same time, there is also a collaborative
sensemaking taking place between journalists, laying bare an interdependence between them
to share knowledge and sources in order to arrive at a version of the truth. Journalists are
bound together in a way that runs counter to the independence and remove that Baudelaire
describes.

Baudelaire makes it clear that the character he describes is not indifferent but a ‘moral’
person3; someone who seeks to reveal a fundamental truth. His essay reveals an idealised
view of what an observer of the world should be. Therefore, he preempted an important
quality found in the professionalisation of journalism in the first half of the 20th century that
elevated the quest for objectivity. This professionalization created prestige for journalists as
reporting began to be seen as a quasi scientific pursuit with well-defined techniques and
methods, deemed to arrive at a truthful and comprehensive version of events. The claim to
objective reporting, for example, illustrates the desire to legitimize journalism in a scientific
manner. It was not the journalist who was required to be objective in their view but rather the
aim was for him or her to apply objective methods to reporting (Kovach & Rosenstiel 2007,
p. 88).

3

“The dandy is blasé or pretends to be so, for reasons of policy and caste. Monsieur G. has a horror of

blasé people” (ibid., p. 9). Baudelaire goes on to compare this idealised character to a philosopher,
hampered by his distaste for the abstract.
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German critic Walter Benjamin argued that this aim for disinterest and remove is precisely
what prevents the press from challenging power relations in society. As a Marxist, he argued
that the intellectual bourgeois writer at best only feigns allegiance with the working class.
Unless he is prepared to convert his words into actions, the writer is described as parasitic,
benefiting from the hegemonic order that sustains existing conditions.

For we are confronted with the fact […] that the bourgeois apparatus of production
and publication is capable of assimilating, indeed of propagating, an astonishing
amount of revolutionary themes without ever seriously putting into question its own
continued existence or that of the class which owns it. (Benjamin 1998, p. 94)
Benjamin outlines an alternative to this in his description of the ‘operative writer’, who,
through his work, actively counters the conditions he denounces. “His mission is not to
report, but to struggle; he does not play the role of spectator, but actively intervenes. He
defines his task through the statement he makes about his activity” (ibid., p. 88).
Unsurprisingly then, Benjamin disagrees with the professionalisation of journalism that he
argues turns it into an exclusive club. Instead, he lauds the press that breaks down the “the
distinction between author and public” and where “authority to write is no longer founded in
the specialist training but in a polytechnical one, and so becomes common property” (ibid. p.
90). More than 60 years after Benjamin’s death, the Internet has finally produced the means
by which this deprofessionalisation in mass communication is a genuine possibility.
Professionalism today is the dividing line drawn between journalists and non-journalists,
designed to elevate the journalists’ voice above others, giving it a claim to authority in and of
itself, rather than those who previously laid claim to this status. Therefore, the journalist is
also engaged in a struggle that is mainly focused on the interests of his own group;
professional journalists.
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Reverting back to the claims of impartiality and objectivity, Glasser and Marken (2005)
elaborate on the way by which professonalisation of journalism has structurally limited
diversity in the news media, without denying access to any particular group. They write that
“professionalisation means standardization, it accounts not for differences among individuals
but for what individuals have in common” (ibid., p. 270). Therefore, a byproduct of common
professional codes, norms and routines is the reinforcement of a universal process to arrive at
the Truth that tends to underscore rather than challenge the status quo. With journalists
required to remove themselves from their reporting and apply standardized norms they are
limited in how they can account for differences and alternative views, undermining efforts to
diversify the voices that are heard.

The recent and long overdue move to diversify American newsrooms [...] rests on the
premise that different kinds of people, experiencing the world, in different ways, will
bring to the newsroom new and different interests. But this runs foul of the premise of
professionalism, which in the United States posits a disinterested newsroom whose
staffers must steer clear of even the appearance of partiality. (ibid., p. 271)
Stuart Hall et al. (1978) discuss how professional routines structurally allow power elites to
maintain their hold on how news is framed. It provides a reference point for exploring how
these practices have changed or stayed the same in networked journalism. Hall et al. argue
that professional ideology and routines “give rise to the practice of ensuring that media
statements are, wherever possible, grounded in 'objective' and 'authoritative' statements from
'accredited' sources. This means constantly turning to accredited representatives of major
social institutions “ (ibid., p. 58) While some of these sources are called upon for their
representativeness, others – specifically the ‘expert’ – are granted an elevated accredited
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status precisely because they represents noone and, it is assumed, have a total disinterested in
the information and views they provide.

These two aspects of news production – the practical pressures of constantly working
against the clock and the professional demands of impartiality and objectivity –
combine to produce a systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those
in powerful and privileged institutional positions. The media thus tend, faithfully and
impartially, to reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in society's
institutional order. (ibid., p. 58)
These are the sources that Hall et al, describe as ‘primary definers’ of news events. Rather
than journalists defining the news agenda, it is these voices that are given the opportunity to
frame news. Therefore, the news media is in fact the ‘secondary definer’, mainly facilitating
such sources’ access to a mass audience.

The media, then, do not simply 'create' the news; nor do they simply transmit the
ideology of the 'ruling class' in a conspiratorial fashion. Indeed, we have suggested
that, in a critical sense, the media are frequently not the 'primary definers' of news
events at all; but their structured relationship to power has the effect of making them
play a crucial but secondary role in reproducing the definitions of those who have
privileged access, as of right, to the media as 'accredited sources'. From this point of
view, in the moment of news production, the media stand in a position of structured
subordination to the primary definers. (ibid., p. 59)
This crucial distinction between secondary and primary definers is what this research
attempts to explore by analysing whether these roles have shifted through the engagement
and reliance on social media by mainstream news media. As elites and major institutions
arguably no longer rely on the media to proliferate their message how is professional
journalism adapting to a news environment where their exclusive right to mediate these
messages and its position, even as a secondary definer, is threatened? Moreover, has the
ability to becoming a ‘primary definer’ by unaccredited extra-media voices been broadened
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through the use of social media in the case studies under investigation in this research? Some
research (Reich 2015) has shown no substantial increase in the use of ordinary citizen sources
in news coverage over the last decade overall. One question posed by this research asks
whether social media sources reflect a departure from the norm that may indicate an
increased share of ordinary citizens in journalistic sources with an increased reliance social
media, as was anticipated by some theorists (Allan 2013; Bruns 2010; Gillmor 2004; Rosen
2006). As eyewitnesses to news events, and citizen journalists or activists are able to share
their own texts on social media, have these types of sources also been able to set and frame
the news agenda? Whereas, primary source, such as eyewitnesses, were called upon to give
accounts of what they saw when a news event unfolded, they were less likely to define how
this news event was framed. Allan (2013) has argued this power imbalance has changed with
the autonomy of non-elites to publish and share their own material. Therefore, what evidence
is there that ordinary citizen voices have been able to assume the role of primary definer in
the coverage of the news events studied here?

First, though, it is important to define who might constitute sources who are not typical
primary and secondary definers as Hall et al. defined them — meaning accredited routine
sources and the media. For the purpose of this study, these are ordinary citizen sources,
though this is not an entirely unproblematic term. Afterall, journalists are also ordinary
citizens, as are many individuals that for the purpose of news coverage could be deemed
authoritative and accredited. One study of journalistic sources (Reich 2015), defined these as
typically ‘non-elite’ and comprising private people without any “organizational affiliation, or
[...] regardless of such affiliation” (p. 2413). This suggests that anyone speaking in a private
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capacity, rather than as a representative or professional, may be deemed an ordinary citizen
source.

While this may be a starting point for a definition it is not truly fit for purpose for the hybrid
nature of how many interact on social media, often mixing the private with the professional
and public. Firstly, journalists as well as some accredited sources are often careful to state
that their social media activity reflects their own views and not those of their organisation.
Moreover, journalists and news organisations are often ambiguous about whether they view
their or their employees’ social media activity, respectively, as professional or private conduct
(Plunkett 2012; Posetti 2009). This could then mean that such users are expressing
themselves within a personal capacity and as private people. However, their identity as
journalists, experts, spokesperson, etc, and their professional affiliation, also frequently
means that they are acting at least partly in a professional context, which is implicitly
understood and taken for granted by their followers.

Since all social media activity involves some kind of publishing or broadcasting to a public,
ordinary citizen sources involve an element of the amateur that should be incorporated in the
definition of citizen sources for the purpose of this research. Bowman and Willis (2003, p. 9)
describe citizen journalism as “the act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role
in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and information.”
Therefore, their social media activity is not only performed in a private capacity but at times
resulting from a personal or collective cause rather than a professional interest. Amateurism
is often mentioned alongside citizen journalism (Allan 2013; Johnson & John III 2017;
Schmieder 2015) as a defining characteristic. Stebbins (1977) seminal work The Amateur:
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Two Sociological Definitions ties the amateur into a professional-amateur-public system.
Here, the amateur is guided by professional norms, skills and techniques, that he tries to
acquire without necessarily aiming to become a professional. “[As] a special member of the
public, [he] knows better than the run-of-the-mill member what constitutes a creditable
performance or product” (ibid., p. 587). However, unlike the professional, he does not
receive the majority of his income from this pursuit. As does the professional, though, the
amateur also aims to serve the public rather than just himself.

Where Reich’s definition is very broad, Stibbens’ definition would clearly only account for a
very small fraction of social media users, who publish and broadcast as dedicated amateur or
citizen-journalists. Ordinary citizen sources incorporate both of these definitions to varying
degrees. In one study discussing amateur photographs in news coverage (Schmieder 2015),
an interviewee working in the professional news media, argued that there needs to be
“intentionality around the notion of photojournalism” (p. 589). Many ordinary citizens using
social media clearly do not intend to produce journalism with their social media activity.
Rather, they may unintentionally, spontaneously or sporadically perform “acts of journalism”,
as Allan (2013) describes it. Others show an ongoing commitment to producing journalistic
work as non-professionals, therefore echoing Stibbens’ idea of amateurs. Therefore, there are
different types of ordinary citizen sources with varying perceptions of themselves in relation
to professionals. This is important to bear in mind when analysing ordinary citizen sources.
For example, it poses questions around the relationships professionals build with
citizen-journalists and other ordinary citizen sources. Do they treat them differently; concede
more authority to the output of the one or the other? Schmieder (2015) argues that amateur
photographs are ‘visual quotes’, much in the same way that eyewitnesses to news events
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would provide quotes. Those who produce them are treated primarily as sources, creating a
hierarchy that casts professionals in a more authoritative role.

What is Twitter and how does it work?

The quality of offline social networks is often measured in terms of how reciprocal
relationships are between its members. For example, in social networks in organisations, trust
and collaboration is characterised by high levels of reciprocity (Kilduff and Tsai 2003)
Reciprocity has also been a popular subject of research in online social networks. While
power law distribution, meaning the tendency to follow popular users, was applied to the
blogosphere in Shirky’s seminal work (2003) Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality,
complementary, and at times contradicting, research made the case for applying social
exchange theory to online social networks (Faraj and Johnson 2010; Surma 2016). In this
conception, networks gain sustainability not through preferential attachment to popular users
but when users enter reciprocal relationships with one another based on two-way
communication.

Although Twitter has changed substantially over time towards a personalised
algorithm-driven feed that grants different levels of exposure to different users, this was not
always the case. Today, not just popular users’ original tweets are given greater prominence,
but also their retweets and likes as the Twitter algorithm edits one’s feed. But at the time of
writing the flow of tweets by the users one was following was still displayed only

38

chronologically.4 In the present version of Twitter, the development of networks that is based
purely on self-driven social exchange is undermined by focusing users’ attention on a
selection of popular users they are following. It also prompts users to follow accounts that
other users they are connected with follow. Therefore, it is arguably trying to engineer a
cohesive social network based on a) reciprocity, and b) transitivity. High reciprocity is where
“two people tend to be symmetric”, while high transitivity is where “ties between three
people tend to be complete” (Kilduff and Tsai 2003, p. 32). For example, when Twitter user A
follows Twitter user B and vice versa the relationship can be described as reciprocal, while
transitivity means that Twitter user A will follow Twitter user C because C is followed by B.
This forms a network of Twitter users that is shaped by each others relationships. While these
structural changes on Twitter are recent, the literature discussed here shows how algorithms
may be contributing to the formation of specific networks but are at best only accelerating the
way that networks already formed previously.

The definition of Twitter as a social network rather than a new iteration of one-way
communication mimicking mass media was explored in a relatively early study (Kwak et al.
2010) examining the microblog’s structures and most popular users. A research question
posed was whether Twitter could be defined as a social network if reciprocity was a required
core characteristic. By crawling the entire microblog with its 41.7 millions users at the time,
the study found a notably low level of reciprocity. 77.9% of user pairs with any link between
them were connected one-way, while just over a fifth ( 22.1%) of users had a reciprocal
relationship. The authors argued that Twitter retains some of the core characteristics of

4

However, ‘promoted tweets’, meaning advertising, had already become a feature of Twitter

timelines.
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traditional mass communication, allowing for its most popular users – mass media and
celebrities – to adapt it to their needs for a distribution platform. A Twitter user may gather
followers without ever following any of them back, and many of the most popular users
rarely responded to comments directed at them, leading the authors to argue that the ability to
speak to a wide audience, without necessarily engaging in a reciprocal relationship, favours
Twitter as a one-to-many platform. A user can choose to follow particular accounts, like
channels, to received their content but has no guarantee of being listened to or seen by those
behind those accounts.

Nevertheless, the nature of how content is spread on Twitter suggests a deeper engagement
than the passive consumption of a TV programme. An important feature of the microblog is
its retweet function that encourages sharing content from other users, while the @ mentions
are an open invitation to comment and engage in conversations. The ability to retweet set
Twitter apart from traditional news media in a very fundamental way as it is the function that
allows tweets to be spread far beyond the followers of the original author. The so-called
‘million follower fallacy’ (Avnit 2009) illustrates that up to a point there is no straight
correlation between the popularity of a Twitter user, measured in follower count, and their
influence.

Up to about 1,000 followers, the average number of additional recipients is not
affected by the number of followers of the tweet source. That is, no matter how many
followers a user has, the tweet is likely to reach a certain number of audience, once
the user’s tweet starts spreading via retweets. This illustrates the power of retweeting.
That is, the mechanism of retweet has given every user the power to spread
information broadly. (Kwak et al. 2010, p. 598)
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While the study found that the potential overall audience a tweet reaches once it is retweeted
is not influenced by the number of followers the tweet’s source has, this was only true for
sources with fewer than 1,000 followers. Nevertheless, the study also compiles a ranking of
the most popular accounts in terms of followers and the most retweeted accounts and found
relatively little overlap. This finding was echoed by another contemporary study (Cha et al.
2010), indicating factors other than popularity affecting retweets. In this research, the number
of followers of the users most highly retweeted is still far larger than that of the average user.
So, while the size of the following of an account may not be the sole indicator of the
likelihood of being retweeted, it does still play a significant role in increasing the chances of
amplification through retweets. One conclusion drawn by Kwak et al (2010) is that users’
behaviour around what to amplify and spread “shows the rise of alternative media in Twitter”
5

- meaning that media we may consider ‘alternative’ have a tendency to do well on the

platform. These types of Twitter accounts achieved considerable reach by rallying audiences
to participate in the distribution of their content. However, a closer look at these accounts also
shows that they are not necessarily ordinary voices but appear to represent an ‘elite’ among
Twitter users, who in everyday terms are often described as ‘influencers’.

5

A look at the top 20 ranking of most retweeted accounts show 10 of them were classified as news

sources or journalists that constitute professional journalism. The most popular Twitter user was a
journalist for social media news site Mashable. Others included the Huffington Post and TechCrunch,
perhaps indicating a greater engagement with online, technology and social media-related news sites.
In addition, four sources were four Iranian bloggers. The study was conducted in 2009 coinciding
with the so-called Green Revolution in Iran and where social media played a large role in generating
international publicity.
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Influence on Twitter has been defined “as the ability of a user to spread information in a
network” (Pezzoni et al. 2013, p. 362). Considering that retweets are the main mechanism by
which information spreads, several studies have tried to identify what factors, aside from
popularity, affect retweeting. Two6 of these have been described as visibility (Hodas &
Lerman 2012; Pezzoni et al. 2013), as well as “name value” (Cha et al. 2010) or “user
standing” (Pezzoni et al 2013). Visibility was measured by analysing the position a tweet had
in a user’s timeline and found that tweets further to the top were more likely to be retweeted.
As already mentioned, today, visibility is no longer determined by the timing that a user logs
onto their Twitter timeline but by an algorithm that pushes specific tweets to the top, hence
reducing the equality among users in achieving visibility. Previously, including during the
periods covered by case-studies in this thesis, visibility involved a greater element of chance
whereas today it is more deliberately engineered. However, even in 2011/2012 visibility was
influenced by retweets within a specific network. The more a tweet was retweeted among the
Twitter users one followed, the greater the likelihood that it would be seen. ‘Name value’ or
‘user standing’ was linked to more subjective qualities such as celebrity, expertise, or
credibility. Given that publicity is in the nature of journalism and access to the public is
ensured through a whole array of media (broadcast, print, online) it is reasonable to assume
that a Twitter users’ perceived news value and reputation as a news source is likely to elevate
their user standing among those interested in news content. Twitter communities themselves
have a tendency to form around common interests (Java et al. 2007) and visibility and name
value allow specific users to become influencers in these communities.

6

Additional factors affecting retweeting behaviour were the use of hashtags and links in tweets. (Suh

et al. 2010)
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Murthy (2013) also discussed how Twitter brings social networks and one-way broadcasting
together to “maximizing audience reach” (ibid., p. 9). He provides a useful distinction in
differentiating social media and social networks to help understand Twitter. Social media, he
argues, “is mainly conceived of as a medium wherein ‘ordinary’ people in ordinary social
networks [as opposed to professional journalists] can publish user generated
‘news’/’updates’” (ibid., p. 8). Social media, therefore, is a medium to broadcast similarly to
mass media, except it provides ordinary people with the tools to reach a wide audience.

For a contrasting definition of social networks, Murthy draws on Boyd and Ellison (2007):

We define social network sites as web-based services that allow individuals to (1)
construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list
of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list
of connections and those made by others within the system. The nature and
nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site. (2007, p. 211)
This definition was created with social networks such as Facebook, Bebo and MySpace in
mind. By applying both of these definitions, an overlap becomes clear between social media
and social network that is inherent in Twitter. Murthy uses the term ‘interactive multicasting’
to capture how tweets spread through social networks:

[A] key difference here between social media and social network sites is the design of
the former to be explicitly public and geared towards interactive multicasting.
Combine the two – as Twitter does – and you have real-time public, many-to-many
broadcasting to as wide a network as the content is propagated by its users. (Murthy
2013, p. 11)
It can therefore be argued that the central function of the microblog’s social networks is to act
as conduits for the spread of information.
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Huberman et al. (2009) makes the assertion that there were two co-existing types of social
networks on Twitter: the first is the ‘following’ of a user, the second is the interaction
between users through @ mentions. Unsurprisingly, the latter networks were significantly
sparser than the former. In this latter network a user is highly selective about who they
interact with. However, it is this network that also most affects tweeting behaviour. The larger
the network that is centred around interactions, the more a user will tweet. By contrast, the
size of a following only boosts the frequency of tweets to a point. In addition, the number of
@ mentions directed at a user are also is considered one measure that contributes to the level
of influence a user yields (Cha et al. 2010).

This section has shown that Twitter is a social media platform that provides any of its users
with the ability to distribute information publicly. On an individual user basis, it operates as a
one-to-many broadcasting medium that can be transformed into many-to-many broadcasting
through the social networks it hosts. On the one hand there are loose social networks, and on
the other a whole range of more tightly knit networks and communities, that thrive and
sustain themselves through the reciprocity of social exchange, and that can be an effective
tool to create influencers. Each user who retweets is a node that distributes a tweet to their
social network, but the followings congregated around users vary in size depending on the
popularity of that user. They are also able to overlap as each user has the ability to follow an
unlimited number of other users and communities are likely to form around particular topics.
Influencers are not determined through popularity -– meaning the size of their following –
alone, but also affected by other factors such as visibility, user standing and @ mentions.
However, these three factors have the potential to reinforce each other. The higher the user
standing, the greater the visibility; the greater the visibility the more likely the @ mentions,
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etc. Influencers, both have the ability to spread their own original tweets further, and it is
logical to assume that their retweets also have greater resonance. This would lead to the
conclusion that influencers are not necessarily formed primarily by a wide loose social
network but can be formed by a much smaller but influential social network.

Power law and Elite users

Having discussed the existence of influencers on Twitter, what characterises these users in
relation to news content and the power dynamics within which they operate warrants further
discussion. Shirky’s (2003) analysis of power law distribution in the blogosphere offers a
starting point and puts forward the argument that “[d]iversity plus freedom of choice creates
inequality, and the greater the diversity, the more extreme the inequality”. Shirky’s paper
predates Twitter, and emerged when news media outlets’ online presence was still in its
infancy, but it does offer some explanation for the unequal power distribution found online
with regards to social media users. He sought to demonstrate how some blogs attract more
attention than others by arguing that individuals’ choices naturally affect each other.

While the first person to link to a blog does so without any outside influence, the probability
of the blog being linked to by the second blogger is slightly increased, and the chances of a
third link is again a little greater, and so on. Therefore, older blogs with large readerships gain
readers more easily, provided the blogger remains active. “The system assumes that later
users come into an environment shaped by earlier users; the thousand-and-first user will not
be selecting blogs at random, but will rather be affected, even if unconsciously, by the
preference premiums built up in the system previously” (ibid.). As a starting point, Shirky’s
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theory assumes total equality as it is based around the assumption that every blogger had an
equal opportunity to become influential at the start but that over time a dwindling percentage
of bloggers reach a mass audience. Shirky explicitly discounts any influence of qualities or
characteristics of a blog on its appeal and likelihood to be linked to. “What matters is that any
tendency towards agreement in diverse and free systems, however small and for whatever
reason, can create power law distributions” (ibid.). This leads him to argue that though the
blogosphere is an unequal terrain, the inequality seen is mostly fair, and not the result of a
cliquish preference for any particular group of bloggers.

Shirky also argued that equality in the blogosphere existed on four grounds. Firstly, the
barriers to blogging are not much greater than the barriers to getting on to the Internet in the
first place, suggesting that there are no significant hurdles to becoming a blogger beyond
getting online. Secondly, blogs require constant activity to maintain audiences. Thirdly,
popularity depends on the preference of a large number of other bloggers that cannot be
simulated. And finally, there is no reason to assume a qualitative difference between a
popular and less popular blogger. He made this final point most forcefully, rejecting
arguments about the concentration of readership on a small number of blogs.

The largest step function in a power law is between the #1 and #2 positions, by
definition. There is no A-list that is qualitatively different from their nearest
neighbors, so any line separating more and less trafficked blogs is arbitrary. (ibid.)
However, in 2003, the internet was a different place to what it is today. The blogosphere that
Shirky describes was not the terrain of professional communicators to the same extent it is
today. News organisations were still coming to grips with new media as a means of reaching
mass audiences. Still, the four claims made to illustrate the ‘fairness’ of the inequality are
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clearly contentious and several arguments critiquing them have been put forward that will be
explored at a later point in this chapter.

First though, how can Shirky’s theory about power laws in the blogosphere be applied to
Twitter? To start with there are parallels between hyperlinking and retweeting. Similarly to
the number of hyperlinks determining the ranking of a blog, the rate a Twitter user is
retweeted determines his level of influence. As already discussed this is broadly accepted in
literature and used as a main measure in Twitter analytics tools to determine the ‘social
authority’ of users (Bray 2013). Shirky identifies visibility, facilitated by bloggers’
hyperlinking, as the key factor in driving audiences to the top bloggers. This also corresponds
with findings on the correlation between visibility and retweets.

Power law distribution also characterised the Twittersphere, with studies (Bakshy et al. 2011;
Kwak et al. 2010; Wu et al. 2011) showing a similar concentration of attention on a small
number of Twitter users. For example, Wu et al (2011) found 20,000 accounts (less than
0.05% at the time) “attract almost 50% of all attention within Twitter” (p. 709). These elite
users typically fit into one of four categories; celebrities, media, organisations and blogs7.

Within this population of elite users, moreover, we find that attention is highly
homophilous, with celebrities following celebrities, media following media, and
bloggers following bloggers. Second, we find considerable support for the two-step
flow of information – almost half the information that originates from the media
passes to the masses indirectly via a diffuse intermediate layer of opinion leaders, who
7

The methodology by which elite users were defined involved crawling user profiles on relevant

Twitter lists for keywords. For the media category, only the terms ‘news’, ‘media’, and ‘news-media’
were searched leading to the potential omission of individual journalists from these elite users who
might identify themselves with the terms journalist, correspondent, reporter, editor.
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although classified as ordinary users, are more connected and more exposed to the
media than their followers. (ibid., pp. 713-714)
The two-step flow of information, or word-of-mouth, showed that nearly half a million users
acted as nodes that were better placed to facilitate the spread of information from elite users
to other users. In regards to media content, the research makes no real distinctions between
the ordinary users who best facilitated such information cascades from elite media users, thus
offering little insight into how this group is broken down. However, it demonstrates that not
every retweet is equal and that certain individuals have a greater ability to spread
information. In a study on viral marketing, Bakshy et al (2011) showed that information
cascades on Twitter, often referred to as ‘going viral’, are more likely to be sparked by
Twitter users with many followers and that have been influential in the past. However, the
virality of a particular tweet is difficult to predict when retweeted by exceptionally influential
users alone. Rather, retweets by a larger number of reasonably influential users was more
likely to start information cascades, so where a particular piece of content piqued the interest
of several influencers it was likely to spread further.

There is a strong argument for homophily among social networks on Twitter (Barberá 2015;
Conover et al. 2011; Wu et al. 2011). Numerous studies into engagement and behaviour
among journalists and news media on Twitter have shown this same preference to largely
limit interactions to other reporters of similar status (Lasorsa et al. 2012; Nuernbergk 2016)
and Twitter users that conform to traditional journalistic norms of authoritative voices
(Almgren & Olsson 2015). Although many journalists on Twitter are not among the most
influential but nevertheless often possess above average influence, it is reasonable to
hypothesise that where enough come together to amplify a particular tweet or hashtag they
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are well placed to trigger information cascades. Given the high degree of homophily in elite
journalists’ interactions on Twitter, a piece of content may ‘go viral’ among journalists first,
before spreading to news audiences sympathetic to their outlets.

Shirky separates the blogosphere from the mainstream media, the latter of which he defines
as broadcasting instead of conversing. He emphasises the reciprocity that bloggers show each
other through engaging with comments and hyperlinking to each others’ blogs. Once a
blogger becomes too popular to engage with all the comments and hyperlinking, he argues
they no longer fit that definition and instead become a broadcast outlet. Having said this,
Shirky’s separation between broadcasting and conversing does not address how bloggers are
able to alternate between the two communication styles and assumes a willingness to engage
wherever possible.

Moreover, by reducing choices to mathematical equations, Shirky’s analysis ignores other
factors that drive the concentration of influence into the hands of a few elite bloggers- this
also helps to illustrate hierarchies on Twitter. McChesney (2013) argues that subjective
human decision-making and economic factors have been key to elevating some online news
sources over others. Although focused on how the Internet has driven the concentration of
media ownership, some of his core arguments are relevant to user behaviour on Twitter.
Firstly, the largest mainstream media organisations have benefited in influence from the
Internet as news audiences congregate around familiar news sources. The apparent abundance
of choice has contributed to the shrinking number of news sources available, with
overwhelmed news consumers seeking out trusted household names. Secondly, the
unresolved dilemma of how commercial news media can survive online has led to further
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media concentration with large media conglomerates better financially cushioned to survive,
while medium-sized news organisations are forced into bankruptcy.

There is a ‘long tail’ of millions of websites that exist but get little or no traffic, and
only a small number of people have any idea that they exist. Most of them wither, as
their producers have little incentive and resources to maintain them. There is also no
effective “middle class” of robust, moderate-sized websites; that segment of the news
media has been wiped out online, leading Hindman to conclude that the online news
media are more concentrated than in the old news media world. (McChesney 2013,
pp. 190-191)
In as far as Twitter can be considered a news source, these factors play into what Twitter
users rise above the rest in influence, with professional journalists, and especially elite
journalists, naturally attracting followers through their trusted and reliable reputation, which
elevates their ‘user standing’. In the blogosphere, Shirky and others (Cha et al. 2010; Goode
2010) highlight the need for bloggers to remain active to maintain their ranking. This in itself
plays into the hands of media and communication professionals as they have the skills and
are often encouraged, if not expected, by their employers to engage on social media
platforms. Goode writes that “one of the major factors often overlooked [...] is the divide
between the time-rich and the time-poor. An abundance of news sources to navigate and
opportunities to ‘join the conversation’ [...] scarcely ‘democratizes’ news for the many
citizens who work double shifts or have round-the-clock care responsibilities” (2010).
Research findings into the most influential American bloggers (Hindman, 2009) substantiate
this point. Less diversity in terms of education level, gender, and ethnicity, were found among
the bloggers than staff in traditional newsrooms.

Moreover, neither a dichotomy between broadcasting and conversation, nor Shirky’s early
assumption of blogger’s willingness to reciprocate, is found in the behaviour of journalists on
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Twitter. This might be because journalists cannot be considered bloggers only because they
also occupy the same space. However, there are also limitations to applying Shirky’s power
law theory with regard to the blogosphere to Twitter, as the microblog is structured differently
and indexing of users and their tweets are not as opaque as the blogosphere in 2003.
Therefore, visibility and user standing are affected differently. Yet, there has also been a
normalising effect observed in how the microblog is used to maintain professional routines,
especially with regard to elite professional journalists. Deuze (2008) anticipated that
mainstream journalists would adopt an ‘us vs them’ mindset towards the apparent opening up
of their professional field to amateurs through social media. While convergence culture
potentially offered opportunities for collaboration, he predicted that journalists would react
nostalgically, while media management would take it as an opportunity to lay off staff, and
audiences would see it as a way to bypass journalism rather than foster closer ties. This
analysis essentially predicted a fragmenting effect that social media would have on
professionals and news audiences.

Indeed, the perceived emergence of a social media echo chamber has been supported by a
number of studies of journalists’ behaviour on Twitter. Lasorsa et al (2012) found that elite
journalist were less likely to relinquish their gatekeeping role on Twitter than their less elite
peers, meaning that those working for national news organisations did not link, retweet or
engage in conversations with non-professionals as much as journalists at smaller news
outlets. They were also significantly less likely to express opinions. Professional norms were
therefore more strictly observed by those with a greater vested interest in them. Since,
research into interactions by journalists and mainstream media has shed more light on how
professionals have adjusted to norms and practices particular to Twitter while safeguarding
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their authority as gatekeepers. Analysis of German political correspondents showed that this
cohort of journalists was likely to “remain in a journalism-centered bubble and to mostly
interact with one another” (Nuernbergk 2016, p. 877). Moreover, they also largely steered
clear of retweeting political actors, perhaps for fear of being perceived as endorsing them.
The findings indicate that journalists often operate in an echo chamber that largely consists of
their peers. An investigation into Twitter use by Norwegian and Swedish public service
broadcasters revealed a similar tendency towards elite interactions in their national election
coverage (Larsson et al. 2016). The findings showed that news organisations were more
likely to be @ mentioned by non-elite users, but more likely to respond to elite users, such as
journalists and politicians. This was the case despite a stated desire by staff to use social
media for greater engagement with the general public.

Nevertheless, it would be disingenuous to argue that mainstream journalism has been able to
simply shut out non-professionals by closing rank (although it may have created a mechanism
to minimize their impact on professional news production). While Deuze (2008) predicted
that professional journalists would begin to compete with those Bruns (2006) dubbed
“produsers”, professional journalism has also undoubtedly been adopting and appropriating
amateur-produced content. The term “produsers” was used to describe the blurring of
boundaries between the consumption and production of content online, with individuals
distributing content that they altered, added to, or commented on in some way.

Describing the distribution of news about the Arab Spring in Cairo, Murthy (2013) wrote that
the Twitter conversation was dominated by a relatively small group of activists in Egypt, and
the platform’s biggest strength was in reaching international audiences, including
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international journalists. By framing the role Twitter played within the context of activism, he
separated Twitter ‘activists’ from journalists, though both participated in the same medium,
carrying out at least some of the same activities. He acknowledged that Twitter had relatively
little impact in mobilising protesters in Egypt but rather showed its strength in raising global
awareness, writing that “much of Twitter’s prominence [...] arose from individuals in the
West tweeting and retweeting” (ibid. p. 112). Therefore, western Twitter users’ participation
in raising global awareness and, by extension, action by the international community can be
understood as a form of activism.

The idea of information being widely shared and retweeted as being activism is an interesting
one, because much of the same information was being shared both by activists and
journalists. So what distinguishes a journalist on Twitter retweeting information from any
other member of the public doing the same? A main difference is possibly intention. It is
argued that a journalist is expected to adhere to professional journalistic practices and an
ethical framework that set both impartiality and accuracy as important values (Kovach &
Rosenstiel 2007). In a time where everyone can potentially publish, this ideological emphasis
on professional norms and practices to set themselves apart has perhaps become increasingly
important to professional journalists. As I will discuss in more detail later in this chapter, a
form of activism or implied advocacy arguably and ironically also becomes part of the role of
the journalist. This activism is not primarily focused on a cause such as toppling an
authoritarian regime but rather on promoting the value and routines of professional
journalism. Mainstream media is no longer simply engaged in reporting the news while
taking the practices it adheres to for granted, but involved in an ongoing process of
self-validation. This comes at a time when the overlap between the activities of amateurs and
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mainstream journalists is growing, complicating efforts to set professional journalism apart in
the eyes of news audiences. McNair (2005) argued that “as the information marketplace has
become more competitive in recent years, the commercial value of reliable accurate
information increases, not decreases, and old fashioned objectivity remains a key marketing
tool for global news brands like the BBC and CNN” (p. 34). Given the radical shift from
information scarcity in the past to a news environment characterised by information overload,
“[t]he sense-making, interpretative functions of journalism are enhanced, not made redundant
in the era of real-time and online news” (McNair 2005, p. 40). Yet, interpretation of news
events is also a main feature of citizen commentary (Bruns 2010). Therefore, it may be that
professional journalists seek out reciprocal validation from peers to raise their profile and
thus potentially create a filter bubble or echo chamber among themselves.

By exploring power law, I have sought to explore some of the early assumptions around
equality in the blogosphere and dispute that these can be translated or applied to Twitter.
Influence on Twitter can be affected by a number of factors that can work in favour of
communication professionals, including their reputation and skills in speaking to large
audiences, their networks of other journalists and their ability to amplify their voices
collectively. As a community they are arguably able to increase their visibility to their wider
networks (or audiences) but also inside their networks of peers.

‘Ambient’ journalism and ‘gatewatching’

An analysis of the nature of news production and distribution on Twitter may be found in
Hermida’s (2010b) description of “ambient journalism”. He argues that social media has
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created an environment that “enable[s] the former audience to become part of the news
environment as it has the means to gather, select, produce and distribute news and
information” (Hermida 2010a). He describes ‘ambience’ as an awareness-system that is
always switched on but shifts between background and foreground in news audience’s
consciousness. The ambient news environment in the TV era was all-pervasive, with
audiences dipping in and out of focusing their attention on news products as consumers.
Within an environment of ambient journalism, there is the option to contribute to the news
environment as producers and distributors. Hermida argues that the collage of fragments, or
tweets, is a form of journalism in its own right. Instead of applying norms of professional
journalism, Twitter creates its own journalistic environment with its own logic that empowers
non-professionals to engage in news production. He writes: “Micro-blogging can be seen as a
form of participatory or citizen journalism, where citizens report without recourse to
institutional journalism” (Hermida 2010b, p. 300).

Citizen journalism emerged in the 1970s and was characterised by small, hyper-local and
alternative media, conceptualizing public communication as an intersubjective discourse,
where meaning is created in the interaction of subjective social beings. Through it “[d]ialogue
has emerged as a centrepiece of contemporary communication theory” that is now a
significant contribution to the media landscape (Christian et al. 2009, p. 60). Citizen
journalism may be considered a dated, and somewhat narrow term, to describe collaboration
in newswork by non-elites. Especially in a globalised world, the normative concept of
citizenship is challenged as it is tied to the nation-state’s ability to confer rights (Siapera
2017). Citizens’ rights and responsibilities are understood within territorial boundaries. This
is problematic with regards to networked journalism because participation in newswork can
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come from individuals who are citizens of geographically remote locations and without an
obvious stake in a news event, or are outside of the definition of citizen but with a substantial
stake in a news event (ie. refugees and migrants). This is not to say that this definition of
citizenry, if applied to citizen journalism, is always without merit but that it is not broad
enough to capture the full range of participants or type of participation in this research.
Therefore, I will apply Siapera’s idea of digital citizenship to non-elite users participating in
newswork. In this conception, the citizen can be outside the boundaries of the nation-state
while trying to achieve change within it.

Hermida’s analysis neatly separates Twitter users between mass media and citizens and feeds
into the early hypothesis that the Internet is leading towards the democratization of mass
communication (Benkler 2007; Jenkins 2006; Shirky 2008a). It also fed into the prediction
that professional journalism, embodied by the press, would become increasingly displaced by
the activities of amateurs thanks to diminishing revenue in a commercial news environment.
However, the democratization of news was envisioned to offset the negative implications of
this trend (Shirky 2008b). Yet, the rise of Twitter as a tool and publishing platform for
journalists shows that the line between citizen and mass media is much more difficult to
identify. The activities Hermida identifies as carried out by citizen journalists are also the
activities of professional journalists participating on Twitter and vice versa.

Bruns (2010) responded to Hermida criticizing the theoretical binary between
’para-journalism’ and journalism that casts the former in a communitarian ethic and the latter
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as a ‘gatewatcher’8 in the interest of corporate media. Much of what was described as citizen
journalism, he renamed ‘citizen commentary’, in which “news curation is the core practice”
(Bruns & Highfield 2012). As Bruns pointed out, news curation relies heavily on the
abundance of available information, including mainstream media reporting. “[T]he
politicization of mainstream journalism and the relatively low cost of producing
commentary” (ibid., p. 8), Bruns argued, had led to the increase of op-eds in the mainstream
news, which in turn fuelled efforts by alternative media to source their own independent
information. In short, the internet produced a news environment where the practices of
mainstream and alternative media increasingly overlap, to the point of a cross-pollination of
contributors, leading to a more heterogeneous news environment. Bruns and Highfield saw
the uptake of Twitter as having ‘turbo-charged’ gatewatching and collaboration between
professional journalists and non-professionals. He described it as a “flat and open network
structure” (ibid., p. 10), where news production and curation becomes malleable and fluid.
News curation is shaped by a multitude of voices as they congregate around specific
hashtags. “[T]he process of news curation [...] is further decentralized and shared; no one
individual Twitter user is now responsible for compiling, collating, and curating the available
information on any given topic. Instead, it becomes a thoroughly collaborative exercise.”

However, the news collage produced on Twitter, as Bruns described it, can only be apparent
to anyone who follows all of the information emerging around a particular news event. While
it might be feasible for the news pastiche to be appreciated in its entirety for less prominent
events, it becomes a practical impossibility for events that generate widespread interest.

8

Given the information abundance, ‘gatewatchers’ would replace gatekeepers, organising and

ordering valuable information.
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Given the abundance of information, hierarchies become necessary, if not inevitable and at
the time of the research in 2015 and 2016 Twitter automatically ordered tweets searched by
‘keywords’ according to popularity rather than chronology. Therefore, a discussion of power
dynamics on the Internet provides further insight into how hierarchies emerge and are shaped.
More recently, Hermida (2017) looked at how professional norms can be adapted whereby
the journalist “acts as a forum organizer guided by both traditional journalistic principles and
emerging values of collaboration and co-creation,” securing the “role of the social media
reporter as a key node in a networked and hybrid media environment” (p. 189). Bringing
professional norms to the ambient journalism environment means that the journalist then also
participates in it but inspires trust and authority.

Chadwick (2011a; 2011b; 2013) also echoed this emergence of a collaborative approach to
news production that he called the ‘hybrid media system’. Analysing the political news cycle
in Britain, he argued, political news production as “a tightly-controlled, even cozy game
involving the interactions and interventions of a small number of elites: politicians, officials,
communications staff, journalists, and, in a small number of recent studies, elite bloggers” is
being contested. “While these elite-driven aspects of political communication are still much
in evidence, the hybridization of old and new media requires a rejuvenated understanding of
the power relations shaping news production” (2011b, p. 7). A main characteristic of
Chadwick’s model is ‘interdependence’, as old media look to exploit the viral nature of
online news, while new media news outlets still operate in an environment where traditional
news media are able to outperform their newer rivals in terms of financial and organisational
resources (2011a, p. 5). Much of new media continues to rely on the scoops and reporting of
traditional news media. Chadwick argued this hybridization between new technologies and
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traditional news media would lead towards the empowerment of non-elites to contest the
mainstream media’s monopoly on framing and reporting of news. “The more that
professional broadcast and press media use digital services like Twitter and Facebook, the
more likely it is that media will become open to influence by activists who use those same
tools.” (Chadwick 2011b, p. 15).

This news environment describes a rich tapestry of actors able to participate in a news
production cycle that is in essence more collaborative and diverse than the linear
one-to-many model of broadcasting. Nevertheless, Chadwick, like Bruns, also recognises
how professional journalists are competing on new media to outperform other actors and
assert their dominance in this space. “[Journalists] have also selectively integrated digital
practices and online sources into their own coverage, as they seek to outperform new media
actors in an incessant, micro-level, and often real- time power struggle characterized by
competition and conflict, but also negotiation and interdependence.” (ibid., p. 8) It is through
competition on the one hand and interdependence on the other that diversity is deemed to be
fostered. With new players contesting the right to draft and determine news, journalists lose
their privilege to decide who gets to speak. Instead, not only must they compete but also take
heed of new emerging voices not to run the risk of rendering themselves irrelevant. “[O]nline
activists and news professionals alike are now routinely engaged in loosely coupled
assemblages characterized by conflict, competition, partisanship, and mutual dependency, in
the pursuit of new information that will propel a news story forward and increase its
newsworthiness” (2011b, p. 19). In more recent work, Chadwick (Chadwick et al. 2016)
returns to the issue of unequal power distribution in the hybrid media system, and how news
media are adapting to newer media. But he insists that greater opportunities remain for

59

non-elites to disrupt information flows than at any other point in the last 60 years. Critically,
Chadwick notes that as professional journalists adapt their practices to digital media “this
process also works in the opposite direction: amateur journalists and bloggers increasingly
integrate the logics of professional journalists” (2016, p. 14) to the point that some of them
are partly accepted into the professional community. I argue that what this suggests is an
ongoing struggle over what constitutes legitimate forms of mass communication and that it is
by no means clear that the give and take in this struggle is equal.

A similar collaborative spirit between citizens and journalists is echoed in Papacharissi’s
(2016) definition of “affective news streams” where “news [is] collaboratively constructed
out of subjective experience, opinion, and emotion, all sustained by and sustaining ambient
news environments.” (p. 34) Everyone is invited to contribute and established norms in
professional newswork, such as neutrality, are called into question. Essentially, it is the ability
to talk back and for subjectivity to shape part of the news stream, that Papacharissi argues,
reconnects journalist with a disaffected public.

If we understand affective news streams not just as informative, but as collectively
generated, pluralistic arguments on what should be news, and how news stories
should be told, we may interpret affective news gestures as indicative of political
statements of dissent with a mainstream news culture, and the agendas that culture
cultivates. (ibid., p. 34)
All four authors are largely concerned in these papers with the consumption and productions
of news through new media, and, it appears, social media specifically. Though not always
stated, it is easy to see how Hermida’s and Bruns’ ambient journalism and produsing emerges
in social networks that facilitate the flow and exchange of information, as seen on Twitter and
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Facebook. Papacharissi specifically cites affective news streams on Twitter in the immediate
aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, and Chadwick’s hybrid media discusses
journalists’ adoption of platforms and practices used by non-journalists for expression, as is
clearly seen in the uptake of Twitter among news media professionals. This work suggests a
technological determinist streak, whereby it is not a deliberate rethinking of professional
routines but technological innovation and adoption that is deemed to pave the way to
democratising the news media. Above all, competition is the guiding principle by which
democratisation takes place in the hybrid media system, and professional journalism is forced
to adapt in order to remain relevant. Firstly, competition forces collaboration and
interdependence as a whole range of individuals are relied on to add value to newswork
through their participation. This inadvertently threatens to deprofessionalise news reporting
as it opens up to non-professionals. Although Papacharissi recognises that ‘affective news
streams’ are often riddled with inaccuracies and therefore produce poor news coverage in the
conventional sense, she argues, they present “liminal paths to accuracy” (ibid. p. 35). She
suggests this will ultimately produce news of the same standard as older conventional news
reporting but will have managed to democratise the process.9

All four authors predicted or argued that this collaborative news environment has a profound
effect on news production that renders it far more open to non-elites. An empowering quality

9

In the case of the Boston Marathon bombing, others were more sceptical of the effect of a ‘tweet

first fact-check later’ approach by networked journalists, questioning that unfettered self-expression in
the “marketplace of ideas will eventually, somehow, produce the right answer” (Annany 2013).
Annany argues for a sense of responsibility in speech. That a networked press must ask, “what if the
version of the truth I’m about to say is taken to be true?”
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is ascribed to new technologies as far as breaking down barriers between the general public
and journalists is concerned. From a macro-level, this activity can be interpreted as an
expression of discontent that forces a renegotiation of professional routines. Given that
attention is a scarce resource in this ambient news environment, not only among news
audience but also the public, ordering the content of these news streams in some meaningful
way becomes inevitable. As already discussed, there is a hierarchy in how information is
likely to be ordered by audiences, but more specifically to this research, by journalists.

Roger Silverstone (2006) problematizes this technologically determinist take on the media
environment from a political theory perspective. In discussing the global media sphere10 he
places the onus back on more conventional forms of media, such as broadcast and the press,
for mediating an effective public sphere for global citizens. Silverstone subscribes to the view
shared by political theorist Mouffe (discussed in, e,g., Carpenter 2008) and supported by
empirical research already mentioned, that the Internet alone, without a link to conventional,
more inclusive media, has a fragmenting effect. He discusses the notion of ‘hospitality’ with
regard to the news media’s public service role. Crucially, hospitality extends an invitation to

10

In Media and Morality, Silverstone is primarily concerned with the importance of the world’s media

in constructing a moral order in a globalised world. As such, pluralism, which he also refers to as
cosmopolitanism, plays a central role. He writes, “Pluralism insists on difference, but not irreducible
difference. It insists that the shared fundament of the human condition imposes limits on the range of
meaningful difference and likewise enables the possibility of communication, some kind of
communication, across the widest and deepest channels.” (2006, pp. 15-16) Therefore, it is envisaged
that there is a single overarching mediated public sphere to accommodate the plurality of voices in a
globalised world.
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speak but also places a responsibility on the host to listen. Such hospitality is a prerequisite
for a pluralist global media sphere, demanding not only that the right to speak is extended to
all, but also the right to an audience. “The internet is often seen as offering such a space. Yet
the internet even in its openness is not necessarily a space of hospitality, for if it is hospitality,
and this is its contradiction in terms, without a host.” (ibid., p. 142) This cuts to the core of
the criticism of the news environment on social media, where participants can ‘produse’ with
abandon but there is no impetus on anyone to listen to agonistic views. The large volumes of
academic work on the alleged ‘filter bubble’ and ‘echo chamber’ (eg. Carlson & Lewis 2015;
Jacobson et al. 2016; Pariser 2012) are proof that this criticism has remained unresolved. The
world’s media therefore has a role that cannot be provided by the Internet alone as the ability
to speak and be listened to has to be extended consciously and deliberately. While a return to
disseminative media, such as broadcast, as the primary form of news media does not appear
likely (or desirable) online news sites by mainstream news media could perhaps be envisaged
to provide a hospitable space. This view on hospitality also has implications for the role of
the professional journalist on the Internet, to, arguably, invite and facilitate a plurality of
voices and views.

Both Bruns and Chadwick touch on the adoption of digital practices in professional news
production, which is of particular interest to this research as it begins to explore how
journalists manage the boundaries between their organisations and social media actors.
However, both authors perceive the social media space to be non-hierarchical and open,
which has been disputed. Chadwick qualifies this argument somewhat, by pointing out that
mainstream news media do remain dominant for a number of reasons, but also forecasts the
slow democratization of the news production process through technology. Yet, the behaviour
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of elite journalists and the formation of interest groups (namely professional journalists in
this case) also shows how a different outcome is achieved, that displays the characteristics of
collaboration and diversity but is in reality quite exclusive (Larsson et al. 2016; Lasorsa et al.
2012; Nuernbergk 2016).

Bruns argued that in the digital age, gatewatching has replaced gatekeeping, as a
newsgathering practice due to the loss of control over information distribution by print and
broadcast (2003), and is an activity engaged in both by mainstream and alternative media
(Bruns & Highfield 2012). Central is the notion of collaboration between professional
journalists and users in uncovering and curating newsworthy information, which, though not
new, has become increasingly widespread. Bruns (2014) cited crowdsourcing projects around
data dumps as examples of how the public are encouraged to survey huge quantities of
information and alert newsworthy findings to journalists, who then work them into stories.
Today, finally, the transition has been further sped up by the widespread availability of
near real-time social media platforms which accelerate the news cycle even beyond
the already significant pressures of 24-hour news channels. The result is the final
breakdown of traditional journalistic gatekeeping models, and a corresponding shift
towards gatewatching. (ibid., p. 226)
In short, there is no longer a need for journalists to carry out all the journalistic tasks of the
past. Instead they should concentrate their efforts their “core practices of investigative
journalism and quality coverage”. The reality, of course, is that what is being watched is often
still the product of professional news production (Chadwick 2011a). It is also not entirely
clear where Bruns envisions the news curation by users should take place. If it is only carried
out on social media platforms specifically, it is simply not feasible for news consumers to
survey the breadth of the ‘prodused’ content available in any kind of time efficient way.
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Although a US survey of news audiences (Pew Research Center 2016) shows that a majority
of Americans do access news through social media, in many cases it can only be a fraction of
the available content that is skewed by individuals’ networks and power laws. If the
crowdsourced news curation is to be incorporated on news organisation’s own platforms,
there is inevitably a gatekeeping process that professional journalists will again enact,
through the selection of news content.

Bruns assessment of the news environment is cast against the background of growing
commercial pressures on the news industry, in which the news media has to rationalise
resources and recruit users to carry out journalistic tasks. Echoing the sentiments of Jenkins
(2006) and Shirky, Bruns argues that in such a highly competitive environment, news users
gain power in influencing news production as media organisations cannot simply exploit their
free labour, and must surrender an element of control. This tapping of the ‘wisdom of the
crowd’ is seen by Bruns to potentially deliver a similar impartiality and objectivity as
required of professional journalism as “there is no indication that the overall user base of
Facebook or Twitter has a common preference for one political view or another,
for example” (Bruns 2014)11. Nevertheless, in practice, research showed (Bastos et al. 2013;
Xie et al. 2011) that ideology plays a pivotal role in shaping dominant online political
commentary, with a small number of highly active, extremely opinionated voices often
polarising the conversation.

11

This assumption is seen in Kevin Kelly’s New Rules for the New Economy (1999), where the

marketplace of ideas inherently produces the correct answers. Kelly’s idea of the ‘swarm’ believes
that the participation of every individual, no matter how ignorant, contributes to producing the right
answer. Technology is considered key in interpreting participation correctly.
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Shoemaker and Vos (2009) argue gatekeeping remains at the heart of how information
reaches conventional news audiences as well as bloggers and other users, who rely on this
information for commentary and news curation. “People rely on mediators to transfom
information about billions of events into a manageable subset of media messages.” (ibid., p.
1) They consider the sharing of media messages by news audiences on the Internet as a
secondary level of gatekeeping that characterises information diffusion after the initial
gatekeeping of the mass media. Therefore, news audiences can also act as gatekeepers. In her
Networked Gatekeeping Theory, Barzilai-Nahon (2008) also critiques the perception of a
flattened egalitarian news environment, often described as characteristic of the convergence
culture generated by technology. By rethinking traditional notions of the gatekeeper in the
context of mass communication, she produces a more differentiated model of gatekeeping
that has currency when adapted to networks such as social media. Barzilai-Nahon describes
the network gatekeeper’s objectives as first, preventing the entrance of undesired information
from the outside. Second, preventing the exit of undesired information to the outside. Third,
controlling information inside the network. The theory suggests that within networks, the
‘gated’, meaning “the entity subjected to gatekeeping” (2008, p. 1496)12 can possess certain
attributes that gives them bargaining power in their relationship with gatekeepers. In
networks, gatekeepers are not only the senders of information but can become the destination

12

Moreover, in networks, users may choose to be gated. “Being a subject to gatekeeping does not

imply that the gated is lacking alternatives or that gatekeeping is forced on her or him. The gated is
bounded by gatekeeping sometimes from her or his free will.” (ibid. p. 1496) Especially, in an intense
content saturated 24/7 news environment and with a limited quantity of attention available to news
users, trusting gatekeepers to select information has its benefits.
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points for information from the gated. However, it is not the capacity to produce information
alone that challenges the gatekeeper as the ability of the gated to produce information does
not necessarily ensure that information will reach an audience. In reverse, this also means that
traditional gatekeepers – meaning journalists in this context – are now required to promote
their own work since publication is no longer the main mechanism of gatekeeping (Vos &
Heinderyckx 2014) “as dissemination in an overcrowded information environment has
become equally important” (Tandoc & Vos 2016, p. 962).

Barzilai-Nahon (2008) identifies four types of attributes, that contribute to message salience
from the gated to gatekeepers:

(a) their political power in relation to the gatekeeper, (b) their information production
ability, (c) their relationship with the gatekeeper, and (d) their alternatives in the
context of gatekeeping. Network gatekeeping predicts that salience of a particular
gated to gatekeepers is correlated to the possession of these attributes; that is, low if
one attribute is present, moderate if two attributes are present, high if three attributes
are present, and very high if all four attributes are present. (p. 1506)
Therefore, the one-way flow of information from the gatekeeper to the gated no longer
applies but the relationship becomes more fluid, whereby the gated can improve their position
through acquiring these attributes. Nevertheless, the theory still tries to capture how a
centralized structure remains in place in a decentralized information space such as the
Internet.

News media as public sphere
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Habermas’ study of the public sphere is the major accepted theoretical model underpinning
the press’ functions in building a public. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
(Habermas 2003) lays out an historical analysis of the evolution of a public arena within
bourgeois society. Although its critics have highlighted many shortcomings, it provides a
widely accepted foundation to explain the emergence of the public sphere and democracy,
and the press as a democracy-building institution. According to Habermas, this space
emerged to hold public opinion – albeit a public that was limited to a small and moneyed
section of the society which was granted privileged access – to exert pressure on political
decision-making by power elites. It is the realm where private persons come together to
discuss issues of common concern to them, and presupposes a strict separation between
matters considered private and public. It is only the public that is concerned with the common
good and warrants deliberation and contestation on a public stage. In order for the opinions
formed to truly represent those of the public, participants must appear as equals and the
Habermasian public sphere suggests this is best achieved through the personal dissociation
from private interests.

Both the press and bourgeois public sphere emerged during a period characterised by a
libertarian concept of what the press should be (Christians et al 2009). In this time the
corporatist emphasis on the common good, to the exclusion of that of the individual, was
modified to include individual liberties. Such liberties were deemed of benefit only to
oneself. In the context of the liberty of the press, this was understood as the right to publish
and read whatever one wishes. Libertarian thinkers believed in an individualistic approach to
society, with every person deemed to be born equal, rational and capable of governing. The
libertarian model grants individuals the right to affirm this equality at least in theory. It was
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grounded in the belief that where there is a free exchange of ideas in a public sphere the truth
will prevail. Therefore, the press was an organ that sought an objective truth. “The classic
marketplace-of-ideas theory was based on the assumptions that the truth is discoverable, that
people can agree on evidence. It is assumed that people are willing to put aside their social
biases and sift through data to get to the core issues in a discussion.” (ibid., p. 49) While the
claim to such an equal deliberative reality was clearly never realised13, it did give a
framework to those who were subjugated or marginalised for them to challenge their position
in society.

Habermas proposes the public sphere of the bourgeois capitalist society, though it remained
imperfect, can be understood as a blueprint for an inclusive realm where debates about the
common good are staged and consensus is reached. The press as an organ of public opinion
and conveyor of information that is of public interest plays a pivotal role in this. It allows
individuals to make informed judgements, but also acts as mediator and facilitator of debates
among a large and geographically spread out citizenry. By speaking to a geographically broad
audience and manifesting the vernacular in written form, the press built the nation state
through imagined communities (Anderson 1983). It was with the appearance of the press –
initially in the form of the newsletter – in the mid-17th century that self-awareness of private
persons as participants of a ‘reasoning’ public emerged. In tandem with the growing
interdependence of local, regional and national markets during the height of merchant
capitalism, the printed newsletter bound together individuals from beyond the local
communities and symbolised “communities of fate” (Goode 2005, p. 6) . At the same time

13

Several theorists (Fraser, Livingston) have long pointed out that public discourse in this era was

dominated by property-owning white men to the exclusion of most others.
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that the printing press brought together communities in a way that challenged the traditional
centres of power, state authorities also appropriated the press to reinforce their reign of
power. “Inasmuch as they made use of this instrument to promulgate instructions and
ordinances, the addressees of the authorities’ announcements genuinely became “the public”
in the proper sense.” (Habermas 2003, p. 21)

Coupled with the emerging self-image of a ‘reasoning’ public, Habermas points out it was
ironically the state-controlled press that provided a model to challenge the abstract state
powers, whose physical presence was increasingly removed from ordinary lives. Instead, the
ruling elite became represented in print, in turn simultaneously pioneering the medium by
which it could be challenged. By representing themselves to geographically distant
communities and society through the press, state powers inadvertently reinforced the idea of
communities seeing themselves as bound together as a public. Persons who had never and
would never meet were being addressed collectively on issues that concerned all of them.
Publicity, through means of the press, made it possible to hold state powers accountable to
society. Initially by scrutinizing the information released by the state into a public arena and
subjecting it to public debate and opinion, and later by responding to the state through the
press freedom and freedom of speech enshrined in law.

These technologies enhance the potential to ‘work through’ the linkages between a
locally situated lifeworld and the intrusion of a ‘world out there’, whilst creating new
distantiated relations through the dissemination of symbols: ‘lived experience’ and
‘mediated experience’ are progressively interwoven. (Goode 2005, p. 93)
Habermas draws on Kant’s ‘principle of publicity’, whereby a rational and just judgement on
political matters is the result of debates by a plurality of spectators. He believed that
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impartiality, and consequently the truth, could be arrived at when citizens embrace the
viewpoint of others. This is only possible when the exchange of ideas takes place in a public
arena so as to be tested against one another. Parity among participants in this exchange is
deemed essential, and could be accomplished by the exclusion of those who could be
described as dependent on others for their livelihoods. This meant the exclusion of
non-property owning classes and women. While he recognises Marx’s argument that the
bourgeois public sphere of the 19th century “hid before itself its own true character as a mask
of bourgeois class interests” (Habermas 2003, p. 124) a progressive integration of lower strata
of society into the public sphere, once brought to its logical conclusion, would culminate in a
single public sphere where all voices were represented.

The bourgeois public sphere was seen as a “means of education” and “integrating the citizens
into the state from above”. (ibid., p. 121) For example, Habermas argues reading societies of
the late 18th century educated the petty bourgeoisie and brought them “up to the level of
culture: culture was not lowered to that of the masses.”( ibid., p. 166) Not only does he
naturalise the bourgeois conception of the public sphere, modelled on its own perception of
what constitutes objective, educated, and rational argumentation, he also attempts to reconcile
two opposing worldviews. Here the Kantian view that values the public realm outside the
power of the state as a forum where arguments can be tested and public opinions formed
stands in opposition to the Hegelian understanding of the public which rejects this same
realm as impotent since it holds no state power, and public opinion as inherently subjective.
For Hegel the public space was only present in the state and public institutions had a duty to
educate society about the principles underpinning political and social life (Muhlman 2010, p.
128). The Habermasian argument that the press has a duty to educate the public in their role
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as citizens is not without its difficulties. It would be difficult to conceive of effective
democratic citizenship without the understanding of what this role entails or access to a basic
level and quality of information to make informed decisions. Yet, at what point does
education turn into the imposition of a dominant ideology on society, forcing those least
served by it into a subservient role pandering to the interests of elites? The notion that lower
strata of society needed to be initiated into the culture of the bourgeoisie through reading
societies can also be perceived as the attempt to assimilate and neutralize the unpalatable
differences these social classes brought to the public sphere, by undermining and
marginalising their experiences through elitist claims to the right to define what constitutes
rationality, impartiality and the common interest. The public sphere, then, does not facilitate
the meeting of participants as equals until innate differences that could lead to any paradigm
shift in society are eradicated.

Habermas saw in 20th century broadcast media as a form of refeudalisation where audiences
consume media in isolation without a forum for discussion. Nevertheless, Habermas himself
dismissed new media as harbouring nothing more than ‘global villages’ that reflect the
fragmentation of society (Goode 2005, p. 106). He considered it an effective way for
individuals to shield themselves from opposing views and opinions by only focusing on those
voices that are in agreement, therefore not encouraging participants to form opinions in a
deliberative manner.

Nancy Fraser scrutinized several assumptions in the Habermasian theory. Citing revisionist
historians she argued that bourgeois public sphere met opposition from counter publics
comprising the disenfranchised from the start. As it remained inaccessible to large sections of
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society it never lived up to the utopian vision of unrestricted discussion. Moreover, some
claims assert that this was never its intended goal. “On the contrary, it was the arena, the
training ground, and eventually the power base of a stratum of bourgeois men, who were
coming to see themselves as a ‘universal class’ and preparing their fitness to govern” (Fraser,
1990, p. 60). The claim to the bourgeois public sphere as the only or true public sphere to
have emerged appears profoundly ideological, and Habermas’ argument that it set the
foundation for a theoretical but unrealised ideal is thrown into question. However, Fraser’s
work is not primarily focused on dismantling the idea of the Habermasian public sphere but
to explore historical counter narratives that offer lessons in how its limitations can be
overcome, equipping it as a better counterbalance to political power elites.

Three of those criticisms hold relevance to social media as a public arena. Firstly, Fraser
questions the assumption that an equality among actors is possible by simply assuming it
rather than manifesting it in social and economic reality. When participants in the public
sphere interact as if they are equals it will by nature benefit the dominant class, since the
socially and economically disadvantaged are required to sideline their concerns. This is one
criticism relevant to this research as social media is often perceived as a leveller of voices.
Less regard is given to the real-world factors that may allow some voices to become more
prominent or authoritative. What presumptions and characteristics do social media users have
to live up to, in order for their opinions and information to resonate across a wide
demographic and make it into newsrooms? Secondly, Fraser questions the supremacy of the
single public sphere to the exclusion of other publics. She argues that in an inegalitarian
society this too plays into the hands of power elites, as other stratas of society are unable to
collectively define issues and opinions relevant to them as a community and agree tactics
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before taking them to the larger public sphere where they are pitched against agonistic views.
Even in an egalitarian, and presumably multi-cultural society, multiple publics are still
necessary for identity-building. Fraser does not dismiss a greater overarching public sphere
but rather considers smaller ‘subaltern publics’ as fulfilling a necessary function to level the
playing field on a larger stage. The array of online communities speaks to the demand for
forums that facilitate certain segments of society and is reflected in several protest
movements that organised actions and agitate online before and while taking to the streets.

Thirdly, the dogmatic separation of public and private issues often worked to the detriment of
women and those in the lower stratas of society, for whom the private sphere – both
constituting economic and domestic life – was distinctly political. Therefore, the definition of
what is considered public has and must constantly be revisited and redefined as the clear
distinction between the two spheres shift according to public opinion. With social media the
line between public and private matters has been blurred beyond recognition. Topics that are
private are shared widely, arguably diminishing social media’s potential to act as a forum to
discuss issues of a common concern. On the other hand, this space also facilitates
communities that come together to discuss profoundly public matters. Social media, then,
might best be understood as a means to create a public space, not the space itself. And as a
platform to facilitate discussion around public as well as private matters, can it lower the
hurdle for perceived private matters, that are nevertheless of public concern, to cross over
into public discourse? For example, the ‘me too’ movement in 2017 saw many individuals
share their private stories to build a momentum that led to intense public debate in the
mainstream news media and among political actors about sexual assault and harassment, and
a perceived culture that facilitates it.
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While Habermas believes that a single public sphere will facilitate a plurality of opinions
from which consensus emerges, pluralists argue that this does not acknowledge that public
opinion is not a monolithic block and will necessarily comprise perspectives that are
irreconcilable (Mouffe 2009). It is how the public space can make live within itself these
agonistic views that is the key question. Mouffe, like Habermas, also dismisses new media
for not providing the necessary “agonistic public space” that exposes citizens to conflicting
ideas, but instead makes it possible to continually reinforce one’s beliefs by blending out
everything that does not correspond with it (Carpentier & Cammaerts 2006). Although she
does not believe that the public space must lead to consensus among participants in the way
that the Habermasian public sphere does, she sees it as a space where oppositional views
must clash and find a way to exist side by side. Both Habermas and Mouffe’s criticisms of
new media that allows participants to circumvent and shield themselves from confrontation
have been validated by research about the ‘echo chamber’, whereby a network of users is
only confronted with views they agree with, (eg. Barberá 2015; Conover et al. 2011) but also
challenged by research suggesting a much more varied news diet by interested users than
feared (eg. Bakshy et al. 2015; Dubois & Blank 2018). Speaking of Twitter, Fuchs (2014)
also argues against the notion that Twitter, in particular, qualifies as a public sphere. He
argues that the unrealised promise made by the bourgeois public sphere of inclusion and
equality are just as absent from the environment on Twitter. “Capitalist structures of
accumulation operate not just in the economy, but also in culture, where they result in the
accumulation of reputation, visibility and attention of a few” (ibid., p. 192). Ultimately, the
same rules apply, whereby, those with the most resources hold the greatest sway and
presence, while the social nature, meaning interaction and exchange, is particularly limited.
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“Twitter’s reality is one of asymmetric visibility; its democratic potentials are limited by the
reality of stratified attention and the visibility characteristic for a capitalist culture.” (ibid., p.
192) Rather, he calls it what Habermas described as a “pseudo-public sphere” or
“manufactured public sphere” (ibid., p. 201). However, whether or not social media qualifies
as a public sphere is not the subject of this research. The research considers the public sphere,
in the context of news, as primarily represented in the professional global news flow. The
question is how the disruptive nature of social media has affected professional journalism and
been integrated in the mainstream news flow. It leans on Fraser’s ‘subaltern publics’ as a way
to understand online communities discussing matters of common concern. Mouffe, when
speaking of the journalist as gatekeeper, says they must be a ‘gate-opener’ to the views and
arguments put up by all sections of society. To facilitate plurality it is insufficient to put
across individual voices or fragments of information. Rather communities must be permitted
to put across their agonistic views as comprehensively and complete as possible since
pluralism is not an exercise in individualism and contains the idea of the collective.

The literature discussed in this chapter has sought to explore both the social media and
conventional news environment and the logics that govern the two. By exploring how users
function in social networks, I provide a basis for understanding how journalists may also
function there. In addition, I have looked at conceptions of the role of the journalist as
opposed to the amateur or the everyman, and the professional boundary work in journalism
that attempts to validate journalists’ right to their own interpretive community. Finally, I have
attempted to make the case for why mainstream news media remains important in providing a
public sphere in order to explain why the research specifically looks at the adoption of
collaborative newswork by these institutions.
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3. News organisations and their media models
As already mentioned, the news outlets studied in this research are the BBC World Service,
AlJazeera’s English-language news and France 24 English. This warrants a discussion of the
professional cultures that these organisations are based in and how they might carry out
boundary work before analysing the findings of the research. They outlets were chosen as
they are all comparable in the size and scope of their mission but are also characterised by
differences that may potentially produce contrasting findings. They are all elite international
news organisations with global audiences and share many professional norms, albeit in
different cultural contexts. They also have a formalised commitment to interactive
newsgathering with the allocation of resources to these kind of sourcing routines. They also,
in some cases, carry out professional training, while two of the organisations had best
practice guidelines in place when this research was performed. By investigating different
practices in interactive newsgathering at each of the news organisations, the research hopes to
look at what approaches are being developed and how these are rationalised. It will take into
account the particularities of the different media systems and their professional cultures
(Hallin & Mancini 2004) to help the interpretation of the findings. By considering the
different typologies of the media models within which each of the organisation exists the
research attempts to investigate whether interactive newsgathering practises are adapted to
and/or reinforcing pre-existing norms. The typological approach to describing the news
organisations in terms of media models in this research was chosen to offer an understanding
of how journalists rationalise their own professional role at their organisations, and the
context of the media system within which they operate. Although professional routines
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suggest common normative practices, the news organisations investigated in this research are
all embedded in media systems that produce defining characteristics that will be explored
next. Each of the organisations has also defined a particular ‘ethos’ or mission statement
which are also outlined.

While each of the organisations speaks to a global audience, they do not necessarily speak to
the same audience, or may be valued for different viewpoints as perceived by their viewers.
For example, the BBC sample in this study speaks primarily to the Anglophone world, while
France 24 speaks to the Francophone world. Although this study examines France 24’s
English-language output, it is still largely focused on communicating France’s, or the
Francophone world’s news agenda. Al Jazeera is focused particularly on the Arab world and
competes for global audiences from outside the largely western-dominated international news
media. Nevertheless, Al Jazeera’s adoption of western professional norms provides a basis for
comparison.

Both the BBC and France 24 are public service media but embedded in significantly different
media systems, and experience differing degrees of government influence and journalism
cultures. Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) definitions of Western media systems is used to
compare the liberal system, of which Britain is a part, and the polarized-pluralist system that
includes France. Al Jazeera, on the other hand, is not at home in a democracy and funded by
the Qatari government. This can make it vulnerable to authoritarian forms of censorship, but
its business model, which aims to attract a pan-Arab audience, was chiefly made possible
through the independence of its journalism (Sakr 2005) and the adoption of western
professional norms. Nonetheless, Al Jazeera presents itself as challenging dominant Western
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global news outlets, by bringing an Arab perspective or viewpoint to the global news market
(Bebawi 2015).

Although different forms of western media models, preceding but also informing Hallin and
Mancini’s typologies, first emerged and manifested in the printed press, they are mirrored
loosely along the same geographical lines in broadcasting (Kelly 1983). In as far as western
Europe is concerned, the different relationship between politics and the broadcast media sees
a “formally autonomous system” in Britain, and a “politics-over-broadcasting system” in
France (ibid., p. 73). Hallin and Mancini’s typologies have been cited for comparative
approaches to western media organisations in investigations of the effect of the Internet on
these systems (Benson et al. 2012; Powers & Benson 2014). They remain relevant and a
necessary consideration in the analysis of the findings, particularly because research by
Powers and Benson (2014) found that new media did not necessarily have a homogenising
effect on news production across different media systems. Rather, their particularities were
reaffirmed in online news. For example, news outlets in the US were more likely to become
homogenised, while online news remained similarly diverse in France and Denmark. In
relation to the Anglo-Saxon media system, this is supported by research into the UK media
(Redden & Witschge 2010) that also found “news organisations often cover stories from the
same angle and different news organisations repeatedly publish the same information in their
stories” (Witschge, 2011). However, Power and Benson’s findings suggest homogenisation is
observed in the news outlets inside this one media system, but not across different media
systems.
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BBC

As regards Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typologies, the BBC is couched in the liberal media
system that is characterised by an informational style of journalism, political neutrality, and
strongly developed journalistic professionalism14. It is also referred to as the Anglo-Saxon
model but several major differences between the American and the British media remain
which has led to the latter also being placed within a broad definition of a European media
model (Mancini 2005). Primarily, these are found in the idea of public service media, which
is less developed in the US. The BBC was historically considered the gold standard for
public-service broadcasting and influenced the shape of other PSB across Europe15. As such,
“broadcast journalism was assumed to be oriented towards the values of universalism” (ibid.,
p. 88) with the idealised aims of objectivity and independence that were said to be delivered
through the “political insulation of public broadcasters and regulatory authorities” (Hallin &
Mancini 2004, p. 199). The aim of ‘neutrality’ does not mean an absence of values but rather
a centrist position that attempts to stretch across mainstream politics.

The Annan Report (1977) that directs British broadcasters to impartiality asserts that
broadcasters “are operating within a system of parliamentary democracy and must share its

14

However, partisanship, as commonly seen in the British press, is also significantly at odds with the

American media model, which is represents the other main country in this system. Despite this, “the
existence of ‘fact-centred practices’ is certainly a common characteristic of the two journalisms and,
in turn, it differentiates them from many other journalistic practices in Europe.” (Mancini 2005)
15

Although it was also significantly altered, especially in southern Europe, including France, where

governments exerted considerable control.
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assumptions.” This means that voices seeking to undermine democracy need not be shown
impartiality.

In place of ‘mathematical’ balance and ‘indifferent’ neutrality Annan proposes ‘due
impartiality’, which comprises three elements. First, the broadcasters should allow a
full range of views and opinions; second, they should take account of the weight of
opinion (‘While it is right that the accepted orthodoxies should be challenged,
equalise it is essential the established view should be fully and clearly put…’); this
they should recognise that the range and weight of opinion constantly changes
(p.269). (Hartley 2014, p. 51)
Therefore, ‘due impartiality’ harbours contradictions that restrict the degree to which
broadcasting can challenge orthodoxies and mainstream discourse. By definition, mainstream
views must be given greater weight, reinforcing a centrist ideology, while also representing
other opinions. It appears that broadcast media is not envisioned to be a substantial force in
shifting mainstream opinion, since, although required to represent the “full range of views
and opinions”, it must reinforce established public opinion. What is not clear is how
mainstream views are defined and whose they are, especially in the case of the BBC World
Service. When covering world news events, is it the views of the British public and British
foreign policy or the mainstream views of the country where the news event is taking place
that must be given greater weight? Projecting British mainstream opinion is certainly one
element that shapes the news content of the BBC as became clear in the parliamentary debate
that ensued from the Annan Report, where Lord John Vaizey said that “the BBC World
Service performs a great role in getting our message, a message of freedom and democracy,
across” (Annnan Report 1977) . However, this cannot be taken to mean that the BBC is
merely an extension of the foreign office, especially given the structures designed to
safeguard editorial autonomy. Since its inception, the BBC was envisioned as “an intra- or
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cross-diasporic contact zone” (Baumann & Gillespie 2007). It was deemed to present “a
unique opportunity to foster bonds of understanding and friendship between the peoples of
Britain’s scattered dominions and the mother country, and to bring to Britons overseas the
benefits already enjoyed by the British public at home” (Reith 1932 quoted in Mansell 1973,
p. 1). As the foundation charter states and Bauman observes, Britain assumed the central
point within this dialogue. “We cannot know, of course, but may safely assume that the BBC
Empire Service was not meant to provide a global diasporic forum for, say, the descendants
of indentured labourers from British India scattered from the Caribbean to Eastern and
Southern Africa”(Bauman & Gillespie 2007). Returning to the notion of ‘due impartiality’,
this is to say that mainstream views and opinion informing news production were, at least on
one side, weighted in favour of British mainstream public opinion. Perhaps at its most basic
though it is the perpetuation of journalistic professional routines and norms of the liberal
media model and the BBC’s own version of social responsibility journalism that are part of
the ‘democratising mission’ of the BBC. Since the beginning, the BBC’s mission was to
actively shape society with a remit to build a national identity, first and foremost domestically
(Potter 2012). However, the same premise was applied to its Empire Service, the BBC World
Service’s frontrunner.

Applied overseas, these ideas came to mean that the BBC would also seek actively to
reinforce the bonds of empire. In this way, it was believed, broadcasting could
encourage international peace and order and, to a lesser extent, the spread of
democratic values, thus helping Britain retain its influence in the wider world. (ibid.,
p. 5)
The aim to promote democratic values perhaps suggests that, already at its inception, the
BBC was preparing for the possible dissolution of the Empire. Arguably, the professional
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norms adopted in news production that create power relationships between a plethora of
voices – more of which is discussed further on – were providing a template that it was hoped
would be accepted by audiences, and perhaps replicated by local media.

In the liberal model, the commercial press emerged early with, as already mentioned, a
strongly developed professionalism. Hartley (2013) discusses how the commercial press
continues to exert influence over the BBC, which, although state-funded, exists within a
commercial media environment and is influenced by market-forces through its competition
with for-profit organisations (p. 48). For example, deregulation of commercial broadcasting
in Britain has had the knock on effect of softening of news values in PSB (Curran et al.
2009). Professionalism in the liberal media is defined by a clearly developed hierarchy in the
editorial process to produce a polished finished product but that also inhibits journalists’
autonomy (Hallin & Mancini 2004). In part, professionalisation developed in the earlier part
of the 20th Century to shield journalists from media owners, who were often accused of
imposing their own interests (Curran & Seaton 2003). However, it also serves to ensure
widespread appeal by not limiting its market through partisan positions and constrained
journalists’ ability to express their own views (Gabszewicz et al. 2001). In Britain, this holds
especially true for broadcast journalism, which in any case is under pressure to appeal to a
wide audience due to the production costs involved. Moreover, publicly-funded broadcasting
also has to fulfil its public service mission to appeal to all sections of society in order to
justify the license fee (Curran et al. 2009) The press, on the other hand, is characterised by
partisanship, which spells the biggest difference between the US and the British versions of
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the Anglo-Saxon media model16.

Therefore, some of the potential findings of the research with respect to the BBC might be
expected to include:
i) A strong emphasis on professional norms and routines in interactive newsgathering
ii) Comparatively few polarised sources

France 24

France 24 is embedded in Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) polarized-pluralist media system that
is found across Europe’s Mediterranean region. Although France differs from southern
Europe, where many countries saw major disruptions to the development of their news media
through periods of dictatorship, it also exhibits similarities in its tendency to place the media
within the political sphere. France 24, like all French public service broadcasters, is overseen
by a mediating council. While initially French broadcasting was under the control of the
government with directors appointed directly by the president, since the 1980s there has been
a move away from such direct intervention with the establishment of the Conseil supérieur de
l'audiovisuel whose responsibility it is to regulate broadcasters. It is to one-third each
appointed by the president, assembly, and senate. In addition, one-third of its members are

16

While in the US the press reacted to increasing concentration of ownership through strengthening

independence and norms of objectivity, in Britain this would have undermined the partisanship of
national tabloids. However, Britain also did not move to publicly fund newspapers to encourage
diversity of views, as is often the case in other European media models. (Curran & Seaton 2003)
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newly appointed every two years. This has broken direct political intervention in the
day-to-day running of broadcasters (ibid., p. 107) but the council remains plagued by
criticisms of being too politically partisan (Blumler 1994, p. 151).

Benson (2002) captures distinguishing features of French journalism as follows: “Important
aspects of the French ‘political/literary’ approach to journalism include the use of particular
narrative formats, such as the interview, the commentary, and the reactions story, and
secondly, a style of writing that mixes to a significant extent descriptive and normative
statements.” (ibid., p. 63) A defining characteristic of this media model is the strongly
pronounced partisanship among news organisations within a political system that is more
pluralist with greater differences than seen among mainstream parties in the rest of Europe
and North America. The press pursues explicitly political, ideological or commercial ends,
and the professionalisation of journalism, insofar as journalists see themselves as autonomous
actors independent of their employer, is less developed. State subsidies, in some form or
another, account for a significant portion of funding among French media, and is designated
to maintaining the plurality of media voices, especially those on the fringe. Commentary and
opinion are established forms of journalism that play a far greater role than in the liberal
media system and journalists are usually expected to work for organisations that are broadly
sympathetic with their personal views. Hence, countries that are regarded as existing within
this media model typically provide a legal basis by which journalists can be compensated if
the political orientation of the organisation they work for changes since a journalist’s
ideological alignment with their organisation is considered intrinsic to their work.
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Historically in France, many journalists were part of power and ideological elites, not only
political but also religious as well as scholarly, and for longer than seen elsewhere in Europe.
They were mostly directing their speech at peers. While there has been a shift toward the
liberal media model with increased professionalisation of journalism, these elite voices
continue to carry greater weight. Therefore, it is of interest to this research to examine if this
tradition is translated into the sourcing of social media content or whether there has been a
greater move to democratising news media through wider non-elite participation.

The rise of French commercial media, however, has created a push towards the more
commercially-oriented liberal model. This is also reflected in broadcasting where the
introduction of commercial TV has meant a shift to more centrist programming to capture
larger audiences. However, distinguishing qualities of the polarized-pluralist model remain
(Blumler 1994; Powers & Benson 2014).

The potential findings of the research with respect to France 24 might be expected to include:
i) A greater representation of ideological elites
ii) Greater amounts of opinion and commentary
ii) More fringe sources to maintain a broad sense of plurality

Al Jazeera

Al Jazeera’s independence has always been a bone of contention since the organisation is
funded by the rulers of Qatar’s hereditary monarchy . However, much of its pan-Arab appeal
and success has been the result of its insistence on independent reporting in a region
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characterised by state-owned media that serve as mouthpiece for governments. This
commitment to journalistic independence has made the broadcaster a target for punishment
by Arab leaders throughout its lifespan (Rinnawi 2006) but it has also been thanks to this that
Al Jazeera has been credited for altering the media landscape of the Arab world, and
somewhat loosening the grip of government control (Sakr 2005).17

Its professional culture also emerged from the European public service broadcasting model
with strong initial links to the BBC, but later shifted towards its own distinct identity. Sakr
describes the broadcaster’s origins, “When the BBC Arabic news service folded, Qatari
officials set about recruiting its redundant members of staff, thereby forming the nucleus of
what was to become the Al Jazeera satellite Channel, broadcast from Qatar’s capital, Doha,
with effect from the end of 1996” (ibid., p. 148). The employees took with them the training
and norms that they acquired in their work at the BBC, forming the core of the culture that
would be cultivated at Al Jazeera. However, the former BBC employees also criticised the
broadcaster for failing to deliver the public service needed for Arab audiences.

It had been both a dream and a challenge, talkshow presenter Sami Haddad told a
media awards ceremony in June 2003, to move from reporting the world ‘from the
viewpoint of London’ to meeting the ‘real needs’ of Arab viewers from inside the
Arab world, through ‘facts not propaganda, different views not sanitised views,
appeals to their intelligence, not insults to their intelligence’ (Haddad 2003). (ibid., p.
149)

17

The Qatari government’s support for the Syrian opposition during the Syrian conflict (eg. Maclean

& Finn,2016) cannot be disregarded in Al Jazeera’s news coverage. Yet, it can be argued that the
prevailing politics of a country is often found reflected in its news media.
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As a result, the culture fostered at Al Jazeera saw journalists largely left to their own devices
with little government censorship. However, at the same time, Al Jazeera teased out its own
particular brand that shaped its news coverage and that is broadly defined by the organisation
as ‘giving voice to the voiceless’. In it , it is implied that Al Jazeera will turn on media
imperialism and represent those that elitist Western news organisations sideline. As such,
Galtung’s Structural Theory of Imperialism (1971) and the 1970s and 1980s push for a New
World Information Order (Samarajiwa 1984) provide a starting point to interpret the sourcing
practices of Al Jazeera. Both the NWIO and Galtung sought to address the West’s domination
of the global news flow’ through its powerful transnational news organisations that
centralised agenda-setting power in the former colonial countries18. Galtung defined a
hierarchy between centre – meaning Western – and periphery states, where the former
significantly influences the news agenda of the latter. Between peripheral states the news
flow was found to be limited. Haynes (1984) disputed Galtung’s research finding a much
more active role in news agenda setting and framing within periphery states and a
considerable emphasis on regional news. However, the adoption of similar agenda setting
principles as those common in centre states, was also found, suggesting an adoption of
western professional norms as the basis for deciding what and who is newsworthy. Galtung’s
theory was preceded by Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) pioneering work on news values tested in
a study of international news reporting in Norwegian newspapers. A combination of the 12

18

According to a 1979 NWIO report presented at UNESCO, 80 percent of the global news flow came

from the major transnational news agencies based in the West, while only 20 to 30 percent of the new
produced covered so-called developing countries.
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news values19 found by the researchers in international news stories could increase the
ranking of news stories about non-elite nations or groups that were especially disadvantaged.
To illustrate this point they outlined a number of hypothesis that included but were not
limited to the following four:
1. “The lower the rank of the nation, the more consonant will the news have to be”
(ibid., p. 82) – meaning it must affirm preconceptions.
2. “The lower the rank of the nation the more negative the news from that nation has to
be”. (ibid., p. 83)
3. “The lower the rank of the nation, the higher will a person have to be placed in that
nation to make news”. (ibid., p. 83)
4. “The lower the rank of a person, the more negative will his actions have to be”. (ibid.,
p. 83)

Al Jazeera clearly identified with the premise behind the NWIO and the Structural Theory of
Imperialism and articulated this in some of their corporate branding with slogans such as,
“‘Reversing the North to South flow of information’, ‘Setting the News Agenda’, ‘Every
Angle / Every Side’, and ‘ All the News / All the Time’.” (Bebawi 2015, p. 71) The mission
statement of Al Jazeera and the geopolitical context within which the organisation exists
(El-Nawawy & Iskandar 2003) may mean that Al Jazeera challenges the structural
imperialism theory with its coverage through specific practices or routines that differ from
those by the other two news organisations.

19

Negativity, proximity, recency, currency, continuity, uniqueness, simplicity, personality,

predictability, elite nations or people, exclusivity, and size.
90

Attempting to define a more generalised Arab journalism, independent of the constraints
enacted upon it by censorship, Pintak and Ginges (2009) set it against “Western journalistic
norms of objectivity and disengagement”.

Arab journalists see their primary mission as driving political and social change in the
Arab world (Pintak and Ginges, 2008). Some leading Arab media figures wear two
hats, that of journalist and that of politician. (ibid., p. 171)
The authors define Western journalistic norms primarily according to the Anglo-Saxon
model, but Arab journalism considers its role as struggling against some of the norms.
Although, Al Jazeera’s media culture has integrated characteristics shaping the BBC, there is
a strongly articulated attempt to add plurality to the global news media and break Western
dominance in the news flow. For example, a specific characteristic that Pintak and Ginges
noted to shape Arab journalism was respect. In a survey, the vast majority of journalists
agreed or partly agreed that ‘‘journalists must balance the need to inform the public with the
responsibility to show respect” (p. 171). The notion of respecting the subjects or groups of
news reports produced a journalistic norm within Arab journalism culture.

Al Jazeera’s mission statement suggests that it will attempt to break or subvert the routine
reliance on accredited and authoritative sources in professional journalistic practice.
Therefore, the case studies will help explore if and how social media was mobilised to
achieve this.

Therefore, the potential findings of the research with respect to Al Jazeera might be expected
to include:
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i) emphasis on providing a forum for citizen voices
ii) Social media-sourced content more likely to be sought from less elite nations

Overview of social media strategies at BBC, France 24 and Al Jazeera
BBC

In 2011, the BBC published a roadmap named Delivering Quality First (BBC 2011) that laid
out core areas for the organisation’s online strategy to “[p]repare the BBC for a
fully-converged digital world” (ibid., p. 52). Among the listed online products targeted by
this strategy was the BBC’s news service. The following points laid out in the report were
two areas relevant to this research.
Digital curation: use editorial, social and personal tools to make the most of content,
bring audiences more of what they like, and increase their engagement and
participation with the BBC.
Social experiences: to make the most of the growing popularity of networks off
bbc.co.uk, extend the reach of content, engage with new audiences and closely
integrate experiences with BBC Online (ibid., p. 52)
These two agenda items show that the BBC is, firstly, aiming to distribute its own news
products on social media and networks. Secondly, they are also encouraging collaboration
and interactivity to feed back into BBC Online news output. However, the primary strategy
appears to be to position the BBC’s output as the content around which audience participation
and engagement takes place.

Therefore, the BBC primarily considers its own material as social media content more
generally. However, elsewhere the organisation distinguishes between its own material spread
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through social media channels and other types of social media material. The 2014/2015
annual report (BBC 2015) mentions BBC Live, the online real-time blog which was used
extensively both in the Greek referendum and the migrant crisis case studies presented here.
It was described as a format that “brings together the best of the BBC’s output and the best of
social media to provide an interactive, immersive experience” (p.49). It aims to make
“coverage more interactive, social and relevant” (ibid., p. 75). This description suggests that
the BBC considers the material produced by its varying services and channels as separate to
material produced outside the organisation.

Elsewhere in the report, the BBC Online newswork is cited in connection with delivering and
distributing news texts through social media in accordance with its own mission statement to
‘inform, educate and entertain’. Moreover, the report states that “[a]s the distinction between
fact and rumour blurs online, there is a greater opportunity and role for the BBC in providing
impartial and independent news” and “[the] Corporation’s journalism will always rely on
reporters on the ground, where it matters. In a world where trust is at a premium, the BBC
guarantees news that is trusted and gets its facts right” (ibid., p. 58). This suggests that the
BBC considers its role online (be that on its own proprietary platforms or outside platforms)
to produce journalism according to its own professional norms. This is in line with the
hypothesis laid out above that engagement with social media is primarily focused on
reaffirming and reflecting journalistic norms and practices.

While there is no specific reference to the BBC’s own journalists’ activity on social media,
there is a suggestion that the online strategy is largely geared towards distributing BBC
output. This suggests a tendency to primarily consider Twitter as a distribution platform, that
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does not steer far from the traditional top-down news delivery of mass communication. The
annual report highlights that since its inception BBC Live garnered over 1 billion page views
across 40 news events (ibid., p. 49). This shows that the user-generated content shown there
has considerable reach.

The BBC Outside Source product launched as a radio show in 2013 before it transitioned to
an hour-long daily programme on the BBC World News television channel, also reflects
online conversations on social media. Primarily, it aims to emulate the non-linear interactive
consumption of news online through a large touch screen TV used by the presenter to display
texts originating on social media. As a format, it is designed to “provide audiences with a
fully integrated web, radio and TV experience” and encourage “audiences to share their
knowledge and experience of that day’s stories, no matter where they are in the world, via
social media” (BBC Media Centre 2014).
We were looking online at how people consume the news, and they don't consume the
news in the same linear way as they do in a broadcast medium [...] They also take lots
of relevant and current information from a whole range of sources rather than going to
one source – whether it's the BBC or any other – and making that their own place to
get information about the world. (Reid 2015)20
It aims to incorporate news content produced by the BBC’s different language services and
conventional news sources, such as agencies, on the one hand, and to combine this with
unconventional sources. The latter are typically sourced through interactive newsgathering on
social media platforms.

In addition to the aim to place the BBC’s brand and original newswork at the forefront of its
social media strategy, the organisation also harnesses the newswork of non-journalistic and

20

Not all BBCOS programmes are televised with some produced just for online.
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outside sources when it is considered relevant to the news coverage. The BBC UGC Hub,
which sources, verifies and distributes user-generated content to the organisation’s various
news services, is tasked with sourcing eyewitness material and non-journalist voices through
social media. Therefore, there are two competing interests that the BBC attempts to bring
together. Firstly, to represent itself as a focal point on social media, through which it positions
itself to reach news audiences. Secondly, to incorporate networked journalism into its own
coverage. The way the BBC negotiates this conflict is by placing itself in an intermediary
position that shifts its emphasis to authenticating and vetting voices (Barot 2013) , rather than
defining its role as opening up access to a wider array of voices. However, plurality and
diversity are obviously an important journalistic norm and editorial value that the BBC
subscribes to, and in a promotional video (BBC Academy 2013), senior World Affairs
producer Stuart Hughes asserts that he mobilises social media to access a greater variety of
sources.

France 24

France 24’s digital strategy, like the BBC, also focuses on distributing its own news output
through social media. The organisation’s overarching ethos is to cover international news
from a “French perspective” (France 24 2017). This, again, suggests that one might find
evidence of characteristics of the polarized-pluralist media model specific to France in the
networked journalism carried out by this organisation. Again, like the BBC UGC Hub,
France 24 has a commitment to sourcing eyewitness media, and fostering audience
participation. This is particularly reflected in its ‘The Observers’ news product. The
Observers describes its aim as covering World News through eyewitness media and invites
non-journalistic sources to share their material and draw attention to issues they would like to
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see reflected in news coverage (France 24 n.d.). However, the editorial team of the Observers
has a gatekeeping role in selecting what to report on its platform and how to contextualise it
as they mainly treat the material and accounts provided to them as source material. The term
user-generated content is mostly applied to visual and audio-visual material captured by
amateurs and a strong focus is put on the authentication of such material. France 24 also
positions itself as sifting through, verifying and transmitting amateur social media content in
its mainstream coverage. This is reflected in The Observers’ efforts to educate news
audiences on professional routines regarding verification of amateur content (France 24 2018;
France 24 2015).

France 24’s newswork is closely linked with the French press agency AFP21 and often uses its
news reports on its own platforms. AFP has also laid out its ethical standards and verification
processes in the use of eyewitness media in its editorial charter (AFP 2016). Both France 24
and AFP have formally extended their newswork to integrate collaboration with
non-journalists but also stipulate how they maintain their gatekeeping role by selecting
collaboration based on what is deemed relevant to their news agenda. Therefore, there is an
expressed commitment by France 24 to mobilize social media to access citizen voices and
eyewitnesses on the ground for direct input into the news coverage, through the material
produced by these sources. While The Observers is the flagship of networked journalism at
France 24 social media-sourced content is also found throughout its other online coverage. As

21

AFP is the third largest international news agency. While it is not controlled by the state, three of 18

seats on its board are controlled by the French government, from where it also receives approximately
40 percent of its funding. (Allsop 2018)
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seen in the BBC, this is most prominent in live blogs — although France 24 enlists this
method of reporting less frequently — but also in other audio-visual and online text reports.

Al Jazeera

Al Jazeera mobilizes social media for its coverage throughout various English-language news
services. However, two of its sections, The Stream and AJPlus concentrate on collaborative
newswork more than any of the others. The Stream is both a website and a webcast that
generates its content almost exclusively from social media content — usually in a
discussion-style format. The objectives of The Stream give an insight into how it mobilises
social media for its newswork. Al Jazeera put an emphasis on deliberation and discussion
among non-elite voices in the marketing of The Stream around the time of its launch. When it
first went live in April 2011, The Stream was plugged as a means to give ‘voice to the
voiceless’. By focusing on social media as news source, its mission statement was to “report
and take part in the global conversation” and to “break down the centralized control of what
constitutes news” (Keller 2011).

The Stream was primarily envisioned to take its lead from online communities on social
media as a news source but did restrict its remit to “less-covered online communities” (ibid.)
with non-mainstream angles and viewpoints on news events. The reason to point this out, is
that it was not an entirely commercially-driven service focused on bolstering its news
audience by reporting on the most popular themes and content on social media. It was framed
as fitting into the wider ethos of Al Jazeera, to “cover the people often ignored; people whose
voices must be heard” (Al Jazeera 2014). Therefore, on one level Al Jazeera ascribes
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user-generated content in news coverage a role that breaks down barriers between gatekeeper
journalists and ordinary citizens, and claims to offer an opportunity for online communities to
act as agenda-setters. Its emphasis is placed on Al Jazeera’s participation in online
discussions. For example, The Stream’s hosts typically engage with audiences on Twitter,
approaching members of online communities with questions to encourage a dialogue around
particular issues. On the one hand, The Stream emphasises its role in reflecting a global
conversation. On the other, it bills itself as reflecting voices on the ground. Therefore, issues
that can have a very local quality and focus are opened up for a global discussion through
social media participation.

Beyond The Stream, Al Jazeera’s overarching ethos to give voice to people and communities
less covered is also likely to inform how networked journalism is mobilised for other
audience-facing news products online. Visual and audio-visual user-generated content was
described as “critical” (Bartlett 2014) in news coverage, in a 2014 interview with former Al
Jazeera English managing director Al Anstey, and integration of collaborative news practices
essential in comprehensive coverage of news events. Anstey defined such content as
originating from non-journalistic sources further underlining how Al Jazeera, primarily
harnesses social media to source material produced by amateurs.

Like BBC and France 24, Al Jazeera also has a strategy to distribute its own news output
through social media platforms, and does so throughout its many different social media
accounts (Ellis 2012). Especially, AJPlus provides all its coverage directly to audiences
through social media without redirecting them to Al Jazeera’s own proprietary platform. By
being native to social media platforms, AJPlus both reflects audience participation through
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the use of amateur content and produces stories that are generating interest on these
platforms. However, it also distributes the news coverage produced by its own staff that ties
in with news stories that are generating discussions on social media. As such, AJPlus both
reacts to hot trending topics on social media and also tries to steer these with its own in-house
produced content.
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4. Methodology
Aims and Objectives
The overall aim of this research is to investigate how integration of collaborative or
interactive newsgathering via social media platforms has affected professional sourcing
routines at three elite international news organisation. It examines the role that traditional
notions of professionalism in journalism play in how collaboration is managed with social
media users. In order to examine the use of social media for newsgathering, analysis of three
case studies of crisis and conflict reporting were carried out, as well as in-depth interviews
with professionals at each of the organisations.

Often social media-sourced content that enters the global mainstream news flow is
understood as synonymous with ‘amateurism’, meaning that a citizen journalist dimension is
often ascribed to it, and is frequently referred to by corporate media as user-generated
content. In the analysis of the news texts, identities of different kinds of ‘users’, or
‘produsers’ (Bruns 2006), will take the conventional typologies of news sources into account
to contribute to an understanding of sourcing and gatekeeping routines. It will then
investigate the power relationships between different types of social media users and the
news organisations to contribute to understanding of how interactive sourcing routines are
affecting professional norms. By measuring not only the level of social media content, but
also source identity, relationships, and framing, the research attempts to contribute to
understanding of the origins and role of such user-generated content in news coverage.
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Norms in journalism refer to overarching values defined by the professional community that
should be embodied in their work. They are considered integral to the occupation such as
impartiality, transparency, reliability and accuracy, and so on. Schmidt (2008) distinguishes
between normative roles and cognitive roles, where the former comprises adopting desirable
values and the latter is about the methods by which these are put into action. In journalism,
normative roles are fairly persistent although emphasis can shift overtime. For example,
while impartiality persists as a norm for much of journalism, it is losing importance for
journalists engaging on social media as studies have shown (Lasorsa et al. 2012; Vis 2013).
Instead, transparency has emerged as a more important norm among journalists (Singer 2015)
as journalists reveal how they work in an almost real-time news environment where the flow
of information may undermine accuracy. Rather, journalists aim to build trust with audiences
by sharing their practices to show how they arrive at the best version of the truth at a
particular moment in time, and acknowledging if this information is revealed to be inaccurate
at a later stage. Norms can therefore be said to have longevity as a code of ethics that
journalists sign up to as a community. As the news environment changes, emphasis on
different normative roles may shift to accommodate the professional reality. Cognitive roles
can be understood as professional routines, which are “concerned with those patterns of
behavior that form the immediate structures of mediawork” (Reese & Shoemaker 2016, p.
399). They are the mechanisms that have been legitimised and adopted by the journalistic
community to fulfil their norms. The analysis of the effects of collaborative newsgathering on
professional norms and routines are broken down into the following three research questions
that form the focus of the study.
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RQ1: Is social media sourcing affecting the power relationships between primary and
secondary definers?

RQ2: How do professional journalists create and articulate professional boundaries in the
participation by non-authoritative citizen voices/audiences?

RQ3: What mechanisms do professional journalists use to maintain their gatekeeping role?

As I have explored in the previous chapter, the three news organisations comprising this
research are based in different media models and traditions. Therefore, the ways in which
journalists engage with non-journalists and the type of newswork they produce should be
considered in their specific context. The respective media models can arguably be expected to
determine and shape the professional boundary work done in collaborative newswork by
journalists at the respective news organisations, and this provides a frame in which to
interpret the findings to the research questions. With regard to RQ1, the specific media model
may affect the identity and representation of primary and secondary definers, and how these
two interact. With regard to RQ2 and RQ3, media models may affect the extent of inclusion
or exclusion of audiences and the roles they are attributed.

Case studies

The research comprised three main case studies that spanned between eight and 28
consecutive days of coverage of a news event. These news events were selected based on
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three criteria. Firstly, they had to exhibit an international dimension that made them
significant news events to the sample of media organisations described above and would
dominate the news agenda for at least a few weeks. Secondly, they had to be examples of
crisis and conflict reporting that would foster citizen engagement both online and offline
through discussions, debate and actions. For example, the social media discussions might
provoke widespread interest and participation, but can also translate into actions in the real
world through protests. Citizen engagement, therefore, did not remain solely in the virtual
realm, but its real world manifestations also fed back into it through tweets, photos and
videos. Lastly, all case studies had to exhibit a strong social media dimension in how
newsworthy information was shared and could therefore affect news coverage.

News coverage in each case study was analysed for social media-sourced material. This
material was filtered out and analysed separately from other content comprised in the
coverage. News coverage by each organisation was collected through selecting all relevant
news texts via the online news archive where possible. Some of the news organisations’
archives were better suited than others as they provided search functions that enabled filtering
by date and keywords. For the three main news organisations, this was the case on
aljazeera.com, stream.aljazeera.com, and observers.france24.com. In other cases, the search
functions were linked with algorithms that did not allow a systematic filtering of all coverage
but returned results for certain keywords based on popularity,. This was the case for the BBC
World News website and the website of France 24 English. Therefore, a complete set of news
coverage could not be obtained through searching the website alone. Since all of the news
organisations distribute their news output on Twitter, the workaround solution was to search
the organisations’ main Twitter accounts. Tweets from their accounts were filtered for
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keywords through advanced Twitter search across the entire timespan of each case study. For
the BBC, the Twitter accounts trawled were @BBCWorld, @BBCTrending,
@BBCMonitoring and @BBCOS. For France 24 English, the Twitter accounts included
@FRANCE24, @France24_en, @France24Debate and @BreakingF24. In addition, two Al
Jazeera Twitter accounts were also examined — @AJPlus and @AJStream.

The research focussed on three separate case studies:

1. News coverage of the Greek debt crisis around the time of the referendum in July
2015. All news coverage by BBC World News, France 24 English and Al Jazeera
English between 26 June and 15 July were collected and analysed for social
media-sourced content. The dates spanned the period during which the story most
dominated the international news agenda, and started on the date the referendum was
announced until the Greek parliament voted on legislation that was demanded in the
negotiations for further loans.

2. News coverage of the migrant crisis for four weeks in 2015 from the 20 August until
the 17 September. During this period, events dominated headlines across all three
news organisations. The news event had a strong civic dimension and public pressure
led governments to take actions that had far-reaching consequences for migrants and
refugees.

3. News coverage during the air offensive in the battle for Aleppo, in Syria, in
November 2016. The online news coverage by BBC, France 24 English and Al
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Jazeera English was gathered from the 15 November to 22 November. The period
studied started with the end of a ceasefire between rebels and the Syrian regime and
Russian military.

As all the case studies involve global news events, the research cannot reveal anything about
how practices might differ when the events take place in closer proximity to the news
organisations studied. All the news organisations are global players and national or local
news outlets may have significantly different approaches to interactive newswork on stories
on regional or national stories. While the media system varies with regard to the news outlets
in the research the type of story remains in some ways the same. A study of the demarcation
between local and national boundary work found that “local press’ boundary intersection with
national coverage [...] signified a desire to maintain local expertise when reporting on local
identities and issues” (Gutsche Jr & Shumow 2017, p. 12). Local news media sought to claim
authority by delegitimising national news media, which suggests two different journalist
communities that behave differently. It may be reasonably assumed that this distinction
between journalistic communities holds true for national and global news media as well.
There are, however, other ways in which these news events differ. One is largely cast as an
economic news event, while another cast as an humanitarian event, and the third as an
example of war reporting. For example, differences in levels and forms of citizen inclusion
are observed in some types of news stories over others.

Case study analysis
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The three case studies of international crisis reporting provide a basis for a comparative
approach to examine how the three news organisations mobilised social media. As the
discussion of the media models and social media strategies attempted to spell out, the case
studies sought to explore how networked journalism may be affecting the commonalities and
differences between each of the organisations. Sourcing practices is one way in which this
can be studied. For example, it was used as methodological approach in a study by Benson
(2002) to determine whether commercialisation of the news media resulted in a shift towards
a more ideologically centrist news media in France. Benson wrote that “[i]deological
diversity can be measured according to the social actors who are given voice, or the content
of the pronouncements, regardless of source, which are mentioned in journalistic accounts.”
(ibid., p. 56) By employing this methodology over several case studies, a comparative
analysis of how networked journalism is integrated into news production within each
organisation over an 18-month period and across different news stories is possible.

The research aims to provide a clearer view of the extent to which networked journalism is
integrated into routines by limiting anecdotal evidence through a structured content analysis
of the all relevant news texts over the course of the case studies. By studying all the social
media-sourced content over the same period for each organisation, the aim is to take a holistic
view of networked journalism. While the analysis of specific incidents of collaboration and
participation on news production by amateurs is valuable in its own right, the value in this
research is considered to be in a more comprehensive analysis of newsgathering routines that
attempts to provide a more representative picture of the relationships between journalists and
non-journalists in their collaboration. Three case studies spanning international crisis or
conflict reporting across the three organisations over a set period aim to provide a broad
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enough basis for comparisons that are not only case-specific but allow a wider inference
about the role of networked journalism in news reporting.

Quantitative content analysis is an established method for the systematic study of mass
media. It is considered “an extremely useful tool for summarizing a large quantity of data and
establishing relationships among different factors with a known degree of certainty” (Priest
2010, p. 7). Its use as a research method in mass communication has consistently grown
throughout the second half of the last century (Neuendorf 2002, p. 27) and it is used
extensively throughout the three case studies of this research. The Lasswell model was
developed to study propaganda messages in the two world wars and is best summed up as
”who says what to whom via what channel with what effect” (ibid., p. 34). Quantitative
content analysis was used, for example, in the study of contributors to the e-zine
openDemocracy, that laid bare a social inequality in dominant voices out of step with the
site’s proclaimed aims (Curran & Witschge 2010). The research aims to define the level of
agency granted to different groups active on social media by empirically recording the
sources of social media content used in newswork, the frequency of their use, and the type of
messages they contain. The method seeks to reveal the voices with the greatest ability to
access traditional news media with their messages along with what type of messages are able
to cross into mainstream media.

To establish if and how sourcing routines are applied in networked journalism and whether
they involve significant levels of inclusivity and involvement of non-elite sources, for
example, it is important to code the sources. For the purpose of the research, sources were
coded by referencing primary and secondary definers (Hall et al 1978). In addition, the
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identities of non-elite sources comprised amateurs, citizens, accidental eyewitnesses, and
citizen journalists, and were therefore neither conventional primary or secondary definers. As
discussed in the previous chapter, conventional primary definers are typically representatives
of major social institutions, mainstream politics, and accredited experts. Conventional notions
of secondary definers are professional journalists and their institutions that rely primary
definers to influence framing of the news agenda. The identities of those involved in the
networked journalism found in the case studies were therefore grouped into seven broad
categories:

1. Professional journalists of the respective news organisations, described as ‘in-house
journalists: These were social media sources that were directly affiliated with the
respective news organisation that was analysed in the case study. For example, BBC
journalists were considered in-house journalists across BBC news texts.

2. Professional journalists of other news organisations: These were those who were
affiliated with other professional news organisations.

3. Professional news media: These were the social media accounts of professional news
media, and included both those of the news organisation studied and others. However,
the data indicates how many of the news organisation’s own social media accounts
were used.
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4. Political representatives: These included politicians in mainstream politics or
spokespeople of political parties, governments, and the institutions linked to
governments.

5. Experts: These included individuals or organisations that were sought out for their
professional expertise in a given topic but were not linked to any of the previously
stated groups. For example, these might include academics or analysts.

6. Citizen and amateur voices: These were conventional non-elite voices, who were
speaking as private citizens, amateurs, voluntary activists and citizen journalists, or
grassroots movements.

7. Other sources: Some sources did not fall into any of the above definitions. Often,
these involved famous personalities who, by the nature of their personas, were
speaking in a semi-public capacity with their activity on social media.

Confining sourcing routines to a count of the sources in each category does not necessarily
reflect how each group ranked in terms of access to the mainstream news coverage.
Therefore, measuring the ‘weight’ – or the ‘source power’ – (Cottle et al. 1998, pp. 110-111)
that each group possess in the collaborative newswork had to take frequency of each groups
access to the professional newswork into account. Each category was not only analysed for
its number of sources in the news coverage but also how much importance these voices were
given in the news texts. This was done by the method of calculating the average number of
times that sources in each category were able to cross their message into the news texts of the
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case studies. For instance, two same-sized groups may not have the same source power if one
is relied on more frequently to inform the news texts.

As social media is a very broad spectrum of platforms, the research sought to avoid excessive
generalisation of networked sourcing routines by differentiating between them. For example,
while Twitter is a popular platform with journalists, it has far fewer users than Facebook and
is dominated by a different demographic. As explored through the literature, the degree to
which the news organisations rely on specific platform is another way of testing what types of
sources and messages our sought. Interpreting the results of the case studies without
acknowledging the environments created on social networking sites would suggest a
homogeneity that is not representative of social media. Therefore, wherever possible the
gathered data was separated by the platform that it originated from. While this was not
always possible (eg. sources may have cross-posted content on a number of platforms or the
content could not be traced back to a platform), in the majority of cases the origins of
material was either clearly signposted ora reverse search of the material linked it to a specific
social media account. This enabled the research to answer a number of additional questions at
a level under the main research questions defined at the beginning of this chapter. These
questions provided a more nuanced analysis of the research questions, by exploring
gatekeeping mechanisms, boundary work, and power relationships found in the case studies
with regard to specific social media environments.

1. What were the most popular social media platforms for newsgathering by each of the
organisations?
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2. Were there differences between the news organisations in what platforms they sought
out for their sourcing routines?
3. What types of sources, according to the seven categories, were obtained through
which platforms?

Though the exception rather than the norm, sources were not always attributed when their
content was used in the coverage creating potential obstacles in identifying all of the content
creators. Furthermore, mobile technology has made it possible for some user-generated
content to become practically indistinguishable from professional content. The news output
of social media news agency Storyful, which specialises in sourcing and verification of
eyewitness and amateur material for professional news organisations, could be accessed for
cross-checking some of the content where sources were not clearly identifiable. As a
journalist at Storyful at the time of the research, I worked on all of the news stories comprised
in these case studies and therefore had in-depth knowledge of the material that was being
circulated through social media at the time and where it originated from.

While Lasswell’s model provides empirical data, it is a mostly descriptive method and does
not generally allow inferences about intent of the message or its sources (Neuendorf 2002, p.
53) Clearly, all of the user identity categories named are very broad and while they provide
some insight into the kind of sourcing routines on social media, a solely quantitative analysis
could miss some of the nuances in professional practices that emerged. Therefore, qualitative
analysis of the sources in each category was necessary to explore the identities of these
voices and the nature of the collaboration in more depth. By only categorizing sources there
is the risk of reification, that is “thinking that abstractions like attitudes, values, and content
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themes are objectively real when they are actually just convenient categories invented by the
researcher” (Priest 2010, p. 6). For example, political sources may have also been analysed
for affiliation. Did they represent the mainstream centre of politics or fringe elements? In an
international context, what type of political sources may have gained more access to elite
media through their social media activity?

Critical discourse analysis as a means to investigate representations, identities and relations
of such actors complemented the quantitative analysis of actors and and their source power.
Of particular interest is Norman Fairclough’s argument that discourse analysis can shed light
on relationships, which ties in with the research aim to investigate power-relationships and
hierarchies established in networked journalism. How the source groups interacted and what
relationships were constructed between conventional primary and secondary definers, and
non-elites, explored whether the position of the different groups to define news texts had been
altered and how.
1. How is the world (events, relationships, etc.) represented?
2. What identities are set up for those involved in the programme or story
(reporters, audiences, ‘third parties’ referred to or interviewed)?
3. What relationships are set up between those involved (for example,
reporter-audience, expert-audience or politician-audience relationships)?
(Gillespie & Toynbee 2006, pp. 122-123)
Fairclough (2010) describes the methodology: “the discourse analyst will focus on discourse,
but never in isolation, always in its relations with other elements, and always in ways which
accord with the formulation of the common object of research” (p. 5). In the context of this
research, textual analysis explores the ways in which collaboration takes place and is
presented. This means that the relationships that are manifested in networked journalism are
explored with reference to the discourse of journalistic professionalism and the discourse of
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collaboration. Therefore, the case studies did not serve to analyse the representation of the
news event itself but the relationships and practices that were played out through
collaborative newswork. In other words, the research analysed how two discourses, those of
collaboration and professionalism, were manifested in the news texts.

Therefore, among the key concepts of textual analysis, the most relevant ones to the case
studies were: actors and their framing or agenda-setting power; language, grammar and
rhetoric of and to describe different social media actors and their content; discursive
strategies. The most obvious discursive strategy employed is framing and selection to
produce a text. Others include positioning, legitimation, politicization (Carvalho, 2008).

Positioning is a discursive strategy that involves constructing social actors into a
certain relationship with others, that may, for instance, entitle them to do certain
things (cf. Davies and Harré, 1990; Hajer, 1995). Positioning can also be viewed as a
wider process of constitution of the identity of the subject through discourse. [...]
Legitimation consists in justifying and sanctioning a certain action or power, on the
basis of normative or other reasons (cf. van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999).
Politicization is the attribution of a political nature or status to a certain reality[…].
Some of these strategies have a reverse, such as de-legitimation and de-politicization.
(ibid., pp. 169-170)
For the purpose of the research, examining positioning means investigating what relationship
is constructed between social media actors and their content in news texts. Legitimation
examines how much power social media actors possess to have their viewpoint affirmed or
translated comprehensively in texts. Politicization examines to what extent sources are
represented as political or apolitical voices, which, in terms of collaboration can have bearing
on how authoritative they may appear since professionalism in journalism is often
represented through values of impartiality and autonomy. For example, to be entrusted with
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the role of collaborating on newswork, those involved may need to prove they can adopt
journalistic values. Of course, discursive strategies are not only the realm of journalists but
also other users publishing on social media, whose content is used in the news texts. “A good
method of discourse analysis should account for those two levels of discursive intervention
over a certain ‘‘object’’ – the sources’ or social actors’ intervention, and the journalists’
intervention” (Carvalho 2008). The research therefore considers the legitimation of discursive
strategies by actors on social media as a component in defining the authority they are granted
in the news texts. This means, to what extent are the discursive strategies by different types of
social media users replicated or contested in news texts?

Discourse analysis often examines only key texts or texts over a very short time span.
However, changes in discourse over time should be a component of analysis, which is
addressed in the research in two ways, by examining case studies of coverage in 2015 and
2016, as well as examining a sample of texts over varying time spans from eight days to 28
days. In order to put the findings in some context of news developments and how they may
have affected networked newswork.

A final consideration was the ‘liquid’ nature of digital journalism, meaning that news texts
are able to be edited after initial publication and news content deleted. This has led to some
calls for new research methods in studying online news texts (Karlsson & Sjøvaag 2016) by
analysing them in real-time and revisiting them periodically to check for changes. The
resources required for such analysis were outside the scope of the research and all news texts
were analysed retrospectively, at a time when any further changes to the texts were unlikely.
Karlsson and Sjøvaag also acknowledge that the need for new methodological approaches
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may be “overstated as they relate to the practice of news enterprises that have not changed as
much as digital media allows” (ibid., p. 188). In the case studies, the texts were also largely
likely to be static for the following two reasons. Live blogs, though evolving, build on
information and are not generally changed retrospectively, and audio-visual texts are too
labour intensive to produce to be edited and republished multiple times.

Interviews
In order to triangulate the findings in the case studies, interviews were conducted with editors
at the three news organisations. These interviews served mainly two purposes; to identify key
themes, trends and emphasis representative of each news organisations’ approach to
collaborative news production; to explore some of the findings in the case studies further, and
corroborate conclusions drawn from them.

The primary focus on news texts ensured that the research remained modeled on the state of
practice in journalism as it is, not as it is perceived to be by media professionals. The
pervasiveness of theory ascribing democratising qualities to social networks, especially
among those who are deeply engaged in it professionally, runs the risk of colouring
interviewees’ perception of how social media-source content is incorporated into news
coverage. For example, former editor of the BBC College of Journalism Kevin Marsh
welcomed the emergence of the ‘journogeek’ as a means to return to one of journalism’s core
values of involving the public in news production. He wrote: “At last, we can use thousands –
sometimes tens of thousands – in our audiences to build accurate pictures of what's really
happening in our communities” (Marsh 2008). Similarly, the Guardian’s former editor Alan
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Rusbridger described Twitter as a ‘level playing field’, where it is what you say, not who you
are, that matters, and argued that the news environment on the platform possessed its own
values and agenda which could influence newsdesks (Rusbridger 2010). This perception of
the integration of social media in mainstream news production is visibly at odds with critics,
who accuse old-school journalists of hostility towards the opportunities offered by new media
(Lee-Wright 2010). More recently, media academics have pointed to the persisting gap
between professional journalists and online communities, calling for ‘relationship building’
to facilitate greater collaboration (De Aguiar 2015; Schaffer 2015). Therefore, subjective
perceptions and interpretations of the impact that social media has on news routines without
empirical data offer very limited insight.

Nevertheless, textual analysis alone also offers little insight into how the journalists at the
news organisations perceive their role in relation to social media newsgathering. Interviews
were therefore aiming to contribute to an understanding of how editors at the news
organisations studied perceive their interaction with social media content and what routines
they apply to this. As a research method, interviews provide a representation of experience
and perception rather than complete access to a person’s thoughts (Silverman 2006).
However, they are a means to tease out the intentions of professional journalists. Despite their
limitations, interviews can offer an insight into the meanings ascribed by journalists to social
media-sourced content and how they negotiate the challenges posed by social media to
professional norms and practices.

A special interest of qualitative researchers lies in the perspectives of the subjects of a
study. Qualitative researchers want to know what the participants in a study are
thinking and why they think what they do. Assumptions, motives, reasons, goals, and
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values—all are of interest and likely to be the focus of the researcher’s questions.
(ibid., p. 423)
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were considered a means to obtain an insider perspective
at each of the organisations. “In a semi-structured interview, some topics are chosen before
beginning the research based on the literature or practice. However, when and how the topics
are presented is not structured” (Corbin & Strauss 2013, p. 39). Together with the text
analysis it was possible to probe stated aims for social media newsgathering, and the possible
practical and professional reasons for any discrepancies shown up in the case studies (Cottle
et al. 1998, pp. 44-45).

An interview guide was drawn up in advance outlining questions addressing specific themes
in relation to sourcing practices on social media. The questions were open-ended and delved
into the editors’ knowledge of their routines, experiences, as well as opinions. Instead of
fixed questions the guide was deemed to offer enough flexibility throughout the interviews to
tease out nuances and details in the interviewees’ responses. It allowed specific topics to be
explored further ad hoc and permitted participants to provide additional information if they
wanted. The final question of each interview allowed the participants to raise anything that
they felt was of importance but not addressed upto that point.

Interviews were carried out with editors responsible for formulating and applying the
organisations’ news production processes for collaborative newswork through social media.
The interviews comprised many of the same questions, although they were not necessarily
asked in the same order. There was flexibility in the interview, with some questions skipped
or adapted to explore in more detail if the topic had already been addressed in another
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answer. Overall, the interviews addressed all the same themes and subjects making it possible
to largely compare the answers of the three editors systematically.

As the methodology was designed to explore the integration of collaborative newswork into
coverage, the news organisations’ editors and producers tasked with developing social media
use for networked newswork were best placed to offer this insight. With the responsibility of
gatekeeping through selection and oversight of news stories they were deemed to provide
information that would allow conclusions representative of each news organisation’s
approach to collaborative news production to be drawn. The interviewees were conducted
after the completion of the first two case studies. The participants were BBC social media
editor Mark Frankel, France 24 Observers producer Julien Pain, and AJPlus executive
producer Ethar El-Katatney. Julien Pain was the only interviewee no longer employed at the
relevant organisation at the time of the interview, However, he had been working there
during the period spanned by the first two case studies and was therefore the appropriate
person to discuss the coverage.

The interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewees and later transcribed.
All three interviews lasted between 25 and 30 minutes and and were carried out over the
phone or via a video call, while the interviewees were in their workplace. They had all
received an introduction on the topics that would be covered in the interview several weeks in
advance, including the case studies that had been analysed.

The following questions were addressed by all the interviewees in some shape during the
course of the interviews :
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1. Is there a formalised strategy in place at your news organisation for how social media
is used in news reporting?
2. How does citizen journalism and participatory journalism fit into this?
3. How would you define the sourcing criteria of social media content for news
reporting? What qualities should it possess to be picked up for your news coverage?
4. What would you consider the biggest impediments to the use of
user-generated-content from citizen journalists in your news production?
5. If you had to define how an extra-media source was to most easily be featured with
their content hoping for it to be covered, what would that look like?
6. Do you believe there are guidelines necessary for journalists in how they use social
media for newsgathering?

Other questions asked specifically about the findings in the first two case studies. Such
questions attempted to tease out some of the reasoning behind the use of social media content
by correspondents, experts or citizen journalists in the case studies.

The transcripts were analysed according to the questions and themes laid out in the interview
guide. This ensured a systematic approach to the textual analysis that provides a basis for
comparison and a focus on the questions set out (Cottle et al. 1998, pp. 279-280). The
findings of the interviews were also considered within the framework of the media models
relevant to each of the organisations, as already described.
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Journalist as researcher
My professional experience as a practitioner affected the choice of methodology and the
weighting of different methodological approaches. It prompted me to focus on the empirical
and textual analysis as the foundation of my research, that was followed up and explored
further with interviews but aimed not to allow these to supersede the case study analysis. For
one, I thought that raw data found in news texts could provide a frame for the subsequent
interviews and a basis to limit the subjectivity of their analysis. In my experience, journalists
are often accomplished rhetoricians and frequently speak in anecdotes. I believe an empirical
approach built on with textual analysis could act as a corrective to this while the interviews
still offer valuable professional insights that social media editors could provide. The news
text analysis could provide context or potentially dispute some of the interview findings.

Through my work at Storyful I had considerable exposure to the news events in all three case
studies. I had been covering the Greek debt crisis, the so-called refugee crisis, and the Syrian
war since the uprising, giving me an in depth knowledge of the social media content that
shaped their reporting before I began analysing the news texts in this research. This was
beneficial in terms of establishing as much accuracy as possible in the empirical data of the
case studies as it can be difficult to always trace users and content retrospectively, especially
where information is deleted or edited or becomes unavailable in some other way. For
example, having covered the Syrian war through collaborative newswork from the days of the
uprising, I was familiar with many of the actors shaping the news coverage. This meant I was
able to identify them and had knowledge of how and where they distributed information. It
also meant I had a degree of background knowledge of how these actors evolved, where they
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were located and how they had established themselves as news producers. Similarly with the
Greek debt crisis, I was aware of the daily nuances and developments of how information
emerged and events unfolded online. This gave me the privileged position of also having a
broader view of other social media content available beyond that found in the news texts of
this research. But perhaps most importantly, it meant that I had experienced the newswork
through social media in all three case studies at different points in real time, leading me to
acquire a level of detailed knowledge of the news events that might otherwise have not been
possible to achieve.

Of course, my professional involvement in precisely the type of collaborative newswork this
research explores has meant that I am familiar with the practices involved in appropriating
and legitimising non-journalists’ newswork for professional news media. My professional
role as journalist made it easier to gain access to the interviewees and allowed me to conduct
the interviews on a level of peers rather than as an outsider. Applying a set of routines to
make material by non-journalists fit for use in professional news reporting is at the heart of
the work I do everyday. I know how these routines are adapted to different types of
collaborative newswork, depending on who journalists engage with. Coming from a company
that in many ways set the industry standard for collaborative newswork, I entered this
research already deeply familiar with much of the rationale behind it. However, the routines
and practices, and the rationale that supports them, is something that has evolved over the
time that I worked in this area. From a personal point of view, the methodology also
permitted me to take a step back from my professional involvement and explore the
consequences of this type of work based on raw data. I should add that my reasons for
choosing the news organisations here rather than Storyful was because I believed that it was

121

more representative of how collaborative newswork is presented to audiences. Storyful’s
news agency model means that there is a buffer between the collaborative newswork done by
the journalists and its final presentation to news audiences. Public-facing professional news
organisations can play a stronger role in communicating professional boundary work.

Summary
RQ1: Is social media sourcing affecting the power relationships between primary and
secondary definers?

The quantitative analysis was designed to help answer RQ1 by identifying the user groups
most relied on in interactive newsgathering and by attempting to measure their source power.
Textual analysis of the framing and contextualising of collaborative newswork with different
user groups also sought to investigate power relationships and hierarchies created in the
collaboration.

RQ2: How do professional journalists create and articulate professional boundaries in the
participation by non-authoritative citizen voices/audiences?

RQ3: What mechanisms do professional journalists use to maintain their gatekeeping role?

The textual analysis played a large role in exploring RQ2 and RQ3 focusing on how social
media sourced content was presented and referenced. It looked at how power relationships
were formed between journalists and non-journalists. It specifically attempted to identify
collaboration with citizen users and explore how this was framed by focusing on what place
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these users took in the news texts, how they were described and whether and/or how the
activity of collaboration was highlighted explicitly to news audiences. The quantitative
analysis of the breakdown of sources according to social media platform explored one the
mechanisms by which collaboration was managed and allowed further insight into what role
the platforms play in boundary work.

The consideration given to different media cultures sought to explore all three research
questions within their cultural context. The interviews sought to explore these research
questions in further detail by analysing the way that social media editors articulated their
professional norms, routines, and practices to describe and validate collaborative newswork.

5. Gatekeeping the Greek financial crisis
The Greek referendum in July 2015 amid the country’s financial crisis became global
headline news and was covered extensively by all three news organisations. In June 2015, it
became apparent that talks between international lenders and Greece’s young Syriza
government were deadlocked. Syriza had been trying to negotiate new loan conditions for the
country’s ailing economy that would not entail more austerity measures but had made no
headway. As a loan repayment deadline loomed but lenders refused to release further funds
unless their conditions were met, the government called a referendum in a last ditch attempt
to break the deadlock. The timeframe of this case study covered the main part of the news
coverage about the referendum. As a democratic exercise, the vote naturally generated large
amounts of discussion on social media platforms and news texts about it were shared widely.
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Framed as a stand-off between eurozone lenders, the IMF, and Greece, it was presented as a
pan-European news event that did not just affect Greeks but members of the public in other
European nations. New developments in the negotiations were frequently broken on social
networks by political and social actors, as well as journalists. The tendency for any new
developments to be tweeted almost instantaneously created extremely fast-paced news
coverage that relied heavily on interactive newsgathering. Therefore, the key role that social
media played in the newsgathering and the platform it offered to civic engagement made it a
prime candidate for this research.

The crisis and the vote itself saw news content, information and commentary widely shared
on social media platforms not only in Greece but internationally. The use of popular hashtags
22

illustrates some of the social media discussion generated by the referendum itself.

#Greferendum, #Oxi, #Nai and other hashtags relating to the financial crisis were trending23
on Twitter, providing forums for commentary and the sharing of information. #Greferendum
was tweeted over 310,000 times in the seven days preceding the referendum, while
#dimopsifisma – an English transliteration of the Greek word for referendum – was tweeted

22

On Twitter, hashtags are keywords that allow the sorting and filtering of tweets. They essentially

provide open forums to users on specific topics. To participate in one of these forums one simply adds
the same hashtag to one’s tweet.
23

A trending hashtag is one that stands out for its popularity and is highlighted to users. It is

determined by Twitter algorithmically and is visible to users based on their geographical location.
(Twitter, n.d.)
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145,000 times24. The Greek word for ‘no’, oxi, became another popular hashtag with nearly
290,000 tweets in the seven days preceding the vote.

Timeline
A timeline of the key events throughout the news coverage allows some of the findings to be
placed within the news context. As professional routines may be adapted according to news
events, an overview is useful for understanding the social media components of news texts.

● 26/06: The Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras announced a referendum on the
conditions attached to talks about new loans to support his country’s economy.
● 29/06: Capital controls were imposed on Greek banks that saw limits set on the
withdrawal of money from private accounts. A large demonstration was staged in
Athens against the loan conditions, calling for a No vote.
● 30/06: A large demonstration took place in Athens calling for a Yes vote.
● 03/07: Rival protests took place in Athens calling for a No and a Yes vote.
● 05/07: The referendum took place, returning a No vote.
● 13/07: Eurozone members agreed a deal for new loan discussions to start.
● 15/07: The Greek parliament passed legislation to satisfy conditions for new loan
discussions against the backdrop of angry protests and rioting in Athens.

24

These figures were obtained through online Twitter analysis tool topsy.com on July 5. The tool

counts the number of times a hashtag is tweeted in a period of up to one month previous from the date
it is used. The term #greferendum was not found to have been tweeted earlier than June 26, while
#dimopsifisma had been tweeted almost another 85,000 times in the three weeks before Greek prime
minister Alexis Tsipras announced the referendum.
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News texts between 26 June and 15 July were examined for social media-sourced content and
relevant texts were gathered and analysed. The period under investigation started with the
Greek government’s announcement to hold a referendum on 5 July regarding conditions
attached to potential new loans. The period between 26 June and the referendum saw a
number of protests for and against the conditions. It also saw the introduction of capital
controls which limited ordinary Greeks’ access to their savings and put caps on cash
withdrawals. Following the referendum that delivered a ‘no’ vote, discussions with eurozone
members and international lenders ramped up. This culminated in a deal on the 13 July that
was largely perceived as damaging to the Greek public. On the night of the 15 July, the Greek
parliament voted through legislation that would fulfill conditions attached to the deal against
the backdrop of civil unrest in Athens. While the financial crisis had been rumbling on over a
long period, the announcement of a referendum had been unexpected.

Sample of news texts
News texts were collected according to the methodology in the last chapter with only texts
containing social media-sourced content selected for analysis. The BBC coverage comprised
17 online news texts that were relevant to this study; 15 of the texts were live blogs that
published rolling updates on new developments. Each blog was typically closed within a 24
hour period. Aside from regularly updated main news stories in the more traditional format of
a closed news article, live blogs provided the BBC’s main online news coverage on the
financial crisis.25 The remaining two texts were reports on memes that emerged on social
25

Research on the prevalence of live blogs in breaking news coverage showed that “15 percent of

news consumers use live blogs on a weekly basis” (Newman and Thurman 2014, p. 662) reaching a
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media platforms in response to the news coverage of the Greek debt crisis. There were no
‘native content’ texts identified, which is industry terminology for texts published solely on
one of the BBC’s social media accounts without a hyperlink back to the organisation’s own
proprietary platform. France 24 English published 16 relevant news texts of which 10
contained live blogs similar in format to those published by the BBC. The remaining two
news texts featuring social media sourced-content were closed-format texts found on the
France 24 website and featured embedded tweets as well as multimedia material. Al Jazeera
produced 10 relevant news texts. Their emphasis and format differed significantly from the
BBC and France 24 with no use of social media content in live online coverage. The texts
comprised six written and closed news texts, five of which were published on the Al Jazeera
English main website, while one was featured on the The Stream website. The latter was also
the basis for a webcast that comprised the extensive use of social media users in a live
discussion on the Greek financial crisis. The format invites Twitter users to participate in the
discussion and their tweets are reflected in the webcast or amplified by @AJStream through
retweets, creating a virtual forum. The online news text published in the runup to the webcast
featured social media content on the financial crisis which also comprised commentary and
testimonies circulating on social media. There were also three ‘native’ multimedia texts
published on a verified Al Jazeera social media account. Fig. 1 lists the news texts analysed
according to their date of publication.

BBC

France 24

Al Jazeera

26.06
27.06
popularity on par with news videos and audio and that audience participation was twice as high as in
other online news (ibid, p. 663).
127

28.06
29.06

BBC Live
bbc.com

F24 Live
Media Watch

30.06

BBC Live

Media Watch
France 24 Debate

1.07

BBC Live

F24 Live

2.07

BBC Live

3.07

BBC Live

aljazeera.com

1. Aljazeera.com
2. AJPlus video
1. The Stream online
report
2. The Stream
webcast

4.07

aljazeera.com

5.07

BBC Live

1. F24 Live
2. france24.com

6.07

BBC Live

1. France 24
2. Media Watch

7.07

BBC Live

1. F24 Live
2. france24.com

8.07

BBC Live

F24 Live

9.07

BBC Live

F24 Live

10.07

BBC Live

F24 Live

12.07

BBC Live

F24 Live

13.07

1. BBC Live
2. bbc.com

F24 Live

AJPlus video

14.07

BBC Live

15.07

BBC Live

F24 Live

aljazeera.com

1. aljazeera.com
2. aljazeera.com

11.07

Figure 1. Sample of news texts covering the Greek financial crisis
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Sometimes a single piece of content sourced through social media was used in several news
texts of the same news organisation. For example, they may have been featured in a live blog
first as well as a closed-format news text a short time later. In the quantitative analysis, each
piece of content was counted only once and the initial report was sought out and included in
the sample shown in Fig. 1. However, each new piece of content referenced in the news
coverage, including where its source was cited with other information in another news text,
was included in the study. As stated in the methodology, the number of times that a source
was able to contribute to news coverage with pieces of social media content was considered a
marker for source power.

The vast majority of sources across all three news organisations originated on Twitter. This
can be largely attributed to its accessibility as a crowdsourcing tool and its structure that
allows to act as a one-to-many publishing platform. The microblog’s public nature means
most of its users’ tweets can be viewed by anyone. The indexing of tweets with the ability to
search keywords and hashtags chronologically, as well as the retweet function, means that it
is relatively easy to identify the original sources of information. Compared to other more
popular social media platforms, such as Facebook with its privacy settings and algorithmic
search function, Twitter content is considerably more transparent. Given the importance of
accuracy and verification in journalism, it is therefore far easier to incorporate in professional
routines. However, the number of active monthly users on Twitter in 2015 was 304 million,
according to figures published in July 2015, compared with the 1.4 billion Facebook users,
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who log into their account at least once a month26. Twitter and Facebook user demographics
also differ in terms of age, education level, income and geography, with Twitter users
younger, more educated, wealthier and more likely to live in urban areas than Facebook
users. While social media networks cannot be viewed as representative of global society with
its huge disparities in accessibility around the world both from an economic and
infrastructure perspective, it is, however, evident that Twitter is far less popular as a means to
publish and share information and less diverse.

Quantitative Analysis
Twitter users and source power
The BBC’s news coverage used the greatest number of Twitter sources (195), followed by
France 24 (167) and Al Jazeera (44). In the quantitative analysis of these sources, they were
grouped according to the categories discussed in the literature review and methodology. They
are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 and include: journalists of the respective news organisation;
other journalists with mainstream news media; official news media sources, political sources;
expert and analyst sources; citizen voices such as eyewitnesses, bloggers, grassroots
movements and opinions by private members of the public; and finally, sources that did not
fit into any of the aforementioned groups.

In-house
journalists

26

Other
journalists

News
Orgs

Political
sources

Analysts
/Expert
sources

Citizen
contributo
rs

Other

Figures published at the end of the second quarter of 2015 showed a 0.7 per cent growth in its

membership quarter on quarter with the growth rate significantly declining year-on-year since 2013.
(Arthur 2015; Scholer 2015)
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BBC

31

66 (8)*

10 (5)*
(3)**

28 (5)*

14 (1)*

41 (22)*

5

France
24

5

56 (7)*

24 (1)*
(1)**
(8)***

20 (2)*

30 (1)*

31 (7)*

1

4 (2)*

1**

2*

1*

44 (14)*

Al
Jazeera

With the largest group of Twitter users in the BBC sample, it follows that the outlet also
sourced the greatest number of tweets (533), again followed by France 24 (313) and Al
Jazeera (55). Fig. 3 lays out the number of tweets reflected in the news texts according to
each category of users as another quantitative measurement of source power – the number of
tweets by each group were divided by the number of users in them to indicate the source
power of the group by average number of tweets per account. The higher the average number
of tweets per account in each group the greater weight and authority the group was
considered to have been given in the coverage.

In-house
journalists

Other
journalists

News
Orgs

Political
sources

Analysts
/Expert
sources

Citizen
contributo
rs

Other

BBC

199

124

24 (3)*

87

34

60

5

France
24

21

120

37 (7)*

40

54

39

1

6

1

3

1

62

Al
Jazeera
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Overall, both the BBC and France 24 showed a much greater proportional use of journalist
sources, or conventional secondary definers. In addition these sources also had considerable
access to the news flow through their tweeting than other groups. Of a total 533 tweets in the
BBC coverage, 199 tweets came from their 31 in-house staff. In terms of source power, an
average of 6.4 tweets were referenced in the news texts by each account in this group.
Another 125 tweets from 66 other professional journalists were found in the texts, meaning
an average 1.9 tweets per account Political sources, though a comparatively small group of
accounts (28) in the BBC coverage, had the second greatest weight as sources with an
average of 3.1 tweets each. Citizen sources had the least weight with an average 1.5 tweets
per user.

France 24 published 313 tweets of which 141 were posted by professional journalists. In this
user group, France 24 relied mainly on professional journalists from other mainstream news
media with a slightly higher average to the BBC of 2.1 tweets per account. Its own inhouse
staff comprised only 5 sources, but they too were most often referenced with 4.2 tweets.
Twitter accounts by news organisations or those aggregating professional news texts were
also heavily relied on. Citizen sources had the least weight with 1.3 tweets per user. There
were two main differences to the BBC’s sourcing found in the texts. Firstly, France 24’s
greater reliance on expert users. This user group was proportionally much greater in France
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24 coverage although the BBC gave greater weight to those users that it did reference.
Secondly, the BBC made considerably greater use of its own journalists’ tweets.

In this sense, both the BBC and France 24’s use of social media conformed to the more
conventional gatekeeping approach of professional journalism and is consistent with research
on live blogs that found innovative new approaches to sourcing, correction and verification
but not necessarily a radically new approach to the inclusion of citizen testimony (Thurman
and Newman 2014, p. 663). It also chimes with Reich’s analysis (2015) showing no
significantly greater involvement of citizen testimony in online news compared to older news
mediums, especially in political and financial news. However, what the data does show is the
strong reliance on professional journalists on social media from across a wide range of
mainstream news media. The overwhelming majority of journalist Twitter users were not
Greek and all tweeted in English. While this could be partly explained by the pan-European
nature of the news event as it played out in several geographical locations (Athens, Brussels,
Frankfurt), the vast majority of journalist users worked for elite news organisations as foreign
correspondents. Therefore, journalists from similarly elite organisations to the BBC and
France 24 served as the preferred contributors for networked journalism.

A third way to quantify source power was to look at the overlap in sources between news
organisations, meaning the individual accounts that had been able to enter the global news
flow through more than one of the news organisations. This overlap was particularly
significant between the BBC and France 24 with tweets by 51 users referenced in the
coverage by both organisations. This accounted for 26% and 31% of all Twitter sources
respectively. These sources were almost exclusively accounts of power elites and journalists,
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meaning that they did not originate among the citizen user group. The overlap of sources
indicates that both news organisations approached collaborative newsgathering in a similar
way from a common pool of sources.

There were some changes observed in the type of Twitter users found in the BBC’s news
texts over time. Texts published in the earlier part of the period studied showed a heavier
reliance on the BBC’s journalists as Twitter sources when compared to later texts. The live
blog published on the Greek debt crisis on 29 June contains 13 tweets from BBC journalists
compared to just 7 from other sources. The following day, 12 tweets had been tweeted by
BBC journalists compared to 8 by other accounts. Both days one official BBC Twitter
account tweet was included in the blogs. On 5 July, the day of the referendum, 40 of the
blog’s tweets had been posted by BBC journalists whereas 34 tweets were posted by other
sources. By 12 July, the day of the eurozone summit where a deal was struck, it was
non-BBC related accounts that took the lead with 67 of 88 tweets not posted by the
organisation’s own journalists. Again, on 15 July, when the Greek parliament passed
legislation required by the deal, only 14 tweets published on the blog came from BBC
journalists compared to 41 from other accounts.

These changes over time may have two reasons. One being that as the Greek debt crisis
dragged on dominating the international news agenda correspondents from around the world
travelled to Athens and Brussels, many of them also tweeting the latest developments. This
led to a pooling of information and resources from across news organisations which became
available to everyone, including newsrooms. Journalists from other similarly elite news
organisations are likely to have been trusted to employ similar professional routines to those
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of the BBC, making them easy to incorporate in the BBC’s own coverage. Secondly,
journalists in the BBC’s newsroom may have developed more trust towards specific outside
sources over time, leading to their direct commentary becoming increasingly reflected in the
news coverage. As the BBC’s staff monitored Twitter accounts tweeting about the financial
crisis, over time they were able to identify key voices that fit the organisation’s criteria for
authoritative, newsworthy and trustworthy sources. Therefore, reporters editing the live blogs
had time to refine their sourcing of Twitter comments and reports, picking information from
accounts that had established themselves within the context of the news event.

As shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, Al Jazeera mobilised Twitter differently with a much greater
emphasis on users in the citizen category. While these users had a similar weight to the same
type of sources used in the BBC and France 24 coverage, Al Jazeera almost exclusively
sourced information from these users. As a result, there was also only a very small overlap in
sources between Al Jazeera, the BBC and France 24 with only 3 sources in common. The fact
that there was such little overlap between Al Jazeera’s Twitter sources and those of the other
two news organisations, also underlines the weaker source power of citizen voices in their
access to multiple news organisations. Only one source in this group was found among all
three news organisations and went by the Twitter handle @GreekAnalyst. Their true identity
was never revealed and they described themself in their hyperlinked blog as “providing on
spot, real-time coverage and analysis of the Greek economic crisis”. The commentary this
accounts was tweeting was largely in opposition to the Syriza government. The account
tweeted both in English and Greek, and although the location of the person behind the
account was undisclosed this suggests that they were in fact Greek. One might argue that the
anonymity of may have meant that the source was miscategorised. Yet, as there was no other
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information available it was treated as a non-elite source as it presented itself as such and
gained no obvious advantage from a potentially different status. The other two sources that
all three organisations had in common were political sources.

In terms of its news output, one significant difference between Al Jazeera and the other two
organisations was that it did not run any live blogs on the debt crisis. Instead of using
interactive newsgathering in a breaking news/rolling coverage format, it was used largely to
gather commentary and testimonies to reflect a plurality of opinions in citizen debates taking
place. The majority of all users in the Al Jazeera coverage were found in two news items
featured on The Stream. In the run-up to the referendum on 2 July The Stream published an
online news text entitled The great Greek drama, which also became the subject of a live
webcast. By not relying on Twitter for real-time newsgathering to reflect the latest
developments, Al Jazeera could focus on citizen testimony and commentary to reflect a
public debate. Rather than using social media for conventional newsgathering with its focus
on authoritative voices, it gave space to opinions and first-hand experiences of the Greek
financial crisis by members of the public. Real-time collaborative newsgathering arguably
places a lot of pressure on reporters to ensure accuracy and verification of information from a
distance and within a very short timeframe.

Type of sources in user groups

As mentioned already, the vast majority of tweets used in Al Jazeera’s news texts was found
in the two texts by The Stream. In the The Stream webcast four Greek interviewees, a hotel
owner, a student living in London, an unemployed man and a psychologist posed as a virtual
panel of interviewees that were dialed into the show on a conference call. The show’s
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moderators then invited questions and comments via Twitter in real-time but had also
preselected older comments and questions to put to the panel. In the days before the
programme The Stream’s Twitter account had put out calls to participate in the live webcast
by tweeting comments, questions and accounts of personal experiences directed at
@AJStream or with the hashtag #AJStream. A call was also put out via Facebook but yielded
considerably less engagement, none of which was represented in the webcast and other online
news text.

Among the accounts used by Al Jazeera in the citizen group, 13 were Greek. Greek sources
were generally given greater weight with multiple tweets used in the news texts of The
Stream. The remaining accounts were spread across the world, with some in India, Australia,
the US, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Latvia, Ireland and elsewhere. Some of these users were
tweeting questions directed at Greeks, while others expressed opinions. This created a global
discussion around a news event that was otherwise framed by The Stream as a very local
event in Greece and the experiences of ordinary Greek citizens. This global discussion and
opining on an issue experienced largely by Greeks was also acknowledged by the
programme’s host in a comment to the panel. In contrast, among the citizen users sourced by
the BBC and France 24, a large section of them were not Greeks and of those that were, there
was not necessarily more authority attributed to them. In the BBC sample, Greeks were the
largest group (22) in the citizen group with 19 others from around the world, while there were
just six among the same group in the France 24 texts. This raises questions about what
purpose is served by drawing in comments by those who remain unaffected by the news
event.
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Greeks were the smallest group among the expert accounts with only one Greek in this group
both used by the BBC and France 24. Therefore, the power to interpret the Greek financial
crisis by sources that were typically referenced by the BBC and France 24 for their perceived
disinterested expertise (Hall et al., 1978) was granted almost exclusively to non-Greeks. The
following are some of the users found in this category: head of analysis at the Danish
free-market think tank CEPOS, Otto Brøns-Petersen; head of European macro credit research
at RBS, Alberto Gallo; political analyst at think tank Open Europe, Vincenzo Scarpetta;
Professor at European Politics at the Fletcher School of Tufts University, Kostas Lavdas; the
German central bank and the World Economic Forum.

Politicians, party spokespersons or representatives of political institutions played a large role
in the BBC coverage with significant weight given to them27. In this category the largest
single group, comprising 10 Twitter accounts, were EU sources. They included EU council
and commission representatives, their spokespersons, MEPs or the EU institutions’ media
relations operation. Leader of the Eurogroup and Dutch finance minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem
was counted among this group but could also be considered as acting both as an EU as well
as a national representative. five sources were Greek, three Spanish, two British, and the
remaining eight were from Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Belgium, Italy, Finland
and Malta. German politicians or German government sources were absent despite being the
most influential political players in the negotiations. All of the represented sources tweeted
consistently and overwhelmingly in English. With regards to Germany neither Chancellor
Angela Merkel nor Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble had a social media presence,

27

This may be explained by a professional practice that prefers to seek out those who can be held

accountable, as once put by a BBC Newsnight editor (Katz 2017).
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although other official government sources do exist but mainly tweet in German. There was a
very limited use of official French government sources with one tweet by President Francois
Hollande. Both Hollande and his prime minister, Manuel Valls, tweeted almost exclusively in
French, as did the official government Twitter account @Elysee. The German and French
governments’ positions were amplified and represented almost exclusively by reporters. For
more peripheral political voices from smaller or less influential nations, the use of social
media appeared to give them greater representation both in the BBC’s and France 24’s news
coverage. They were mostly members of the political elite in their own respective nations
such as government leaders, ministers and their spokespersons. It can be assumed that their
access to the global news flow was helped by their strong social media presence. The
engagement with social media platforms alone did not ensure access but needed to be linked
with tweeting in English – a foreign language to most. Twitter voices that either did not have
the ability or will to tweet in English were excluded from social media-sourced news
coverage. Therefore the political voices included in the coverage were actively seeking to
address an international audience rather than their own national one. Overall, political sources
that were sufficiently elite to be counted among the favoured source types perceived as
authoritative were able to use social media in a way that enabled them to enter the global
news flow. Nevertheless, these same sources may previously not have been given the same
weight in news coverage as they were not considered the main or most important actors in the
news event. Therefore, Twitter engagement raised their profiles and permitted ‘authoritative’
but less influential sources to draw more attention to themselves through their tweeting,
leading to a greater likelihood of inclusion in news coverage.
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Text analysis
Power relationships

The source power findings in the quantitative analysis was also borne out in the textual
analysis. Investigating the power relationships between users from different groups and the
representation of their content in the news coverage showed a similar hierarchy both in the
BBC and the France 24 news texts. The BBC more frequently represented its journalists as
authoritative sources on Twitter and set out to build communities of non-authoritative users
around them. In several of the live blogs, readers were directed to BBC journalists active on
Twitter to ask questions or follow for updates. This responded to changing ways in which
news is consumed in an increasingly interactive collaborative way on social media, as for
example, described by the “affective news stream” (Papacharissi 2016). It suggests that
audiences may be disinclined to click through to BBC’s own online platform and wish to be
informed mainly through their Twitter feeds. Individual reporters became ‘social media
anchors’ with whom audience interaction was encouraged through Twitter. For example, the
BBC live blog pointed readers to its Athens-based correspondent tweeting as
@BBCRosAtkins to direct questions on the Greek debt crisis to (see Fig. 7). It also pointed
readers to its economics correspondent Robert Peston on @Peston, Athens correspondent on
@jasminecoleman and business correspondent on @Theothebald. Similarly, the BBC Outside
Source programme that is marketed as providing a platform for non-elite voices also invited
questions from social media users to ask Peston in a webcast on 13 July28.

28

This programme could not be reviewed later but the tone in the relationship created was concluded

based on the invitation for questions.
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These interactions taking place with BBC journalists on Twitter were always framed as
audiences being informed rather than as a reciprocal level relationship. Journalists were
framed as holding the power to create meaning and presented as authoritative. While their
Twitter activity also provided straightforward reporting, a large portion of the BBC
journalists’ Twitter-sourced content consisted of opining. As the news events moved along
rapidly with information often emerging not from reporters in the first instance but through
actors involved in the news event, such as politicians, journalists took on the role of
contextualising. In addition to their commentary and analysis, it was also BBC journalists’
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anecdotes and personal experiences that were reflected in the liveblogs, that centred the focus
on them (see Fig. 5).

The tweets of other journalists found in the coverage were more likely to resemble the solely
factual reporting characterising hard news, such as quotes from officials, breaking news
updates, or other information that had become available and fit with professional routines in
newsgathering. Therefore, the mobilisation of Twitter to conduct a reciprocal level networked
journalism was illustrated primarily through the interactions with other professional
journalists. As journalists pooled their resources through the loosely connected social
networks created on Twitter information spread quickly between them. However, these
journalists were often similarly elite and all English-speaking, showing that the group itself
was to an extent homogenous. BBC correspondents’ tweets were more likely to be sourced if
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they contained some form of analysis, positioning these journalists as a type of primary
definer and authoritative voice by representing them as an expert source. Other journalists
were more likely to be sourced for their own newsgathering befitting the role of a reporter.
BBC journalists opined alongside other elite sources and linked into a loose network of
influential users that could be described as news- and opinion-makers. In other words, their
analysis was based around the actions and viewpoints expressed by other elite sources, who
they most interacted and pooled information with. Primary definers such as politicians and
experts had significant clout as newsmakers, as the quantitative analysis of source power
showed, and they were able to access the news flow with announcements or their
commentary and analysis. The greater level of opining by journalists on Twitter has been
pointed out in previous research (Lasorsa et al. 2012). However, amid a loss in the ability to
report news due to a news environment saturated with information, the textual analysis shows
that opinion and commentary by journalists is used to add value to the coverage. Although it
has been suggested that the greater amount of commentary in the news reporting would open
up professional newswork to bloggers and blur lines between professional journalism and
amateurs, this was not proven to be the case in the BBC texts. Instead, the organisation,
seemed to attempt to consolidate – and, by including opinion, effectively to extend – the role
of its journalists through social media.

In the France 24 news texts, content by journalist Twitter users typically had a more
informational style. Given the small number of France 24 correspondents among this Twitter
group, it mirrors the way that information was interactively gathered through a broad
community of similarly elite international correspondents as the BBC. The journalists’ tweets
often deferred to traditional primary definers and reported on their words or contained images
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of documents or events with a few also providing analysis. However, analysis in Twitter
content was mostly left to the expert users. Although, as will be discussed, France 24
journalists played a significant role in general in framing and contextualising pertinent social
media content that had surfaced. Outside of the extensive use of journalist users in their live
blogs, France 24 also used tweets to link to what other news organisations were reporting. All
of these organisations were elite French and international media, further emphasising that
Twitter was appropriated primarily to highlight and promote the work of professional news
media (see example in Fig. 6). It was comparable to the news reviews often done by news
outlets, which, on the face of it, summarise a diversity of views and stories from across the
news media. However, it also reinforced the echo chamber of similarly elite journalists and
their organisations using Twitter as a distribution platform for their content to audiences as
well as other news outlets. In addition, there were 24 sources identified as news organisations
in the France 24 coverage of which only one was Greek. However, eight were not news
organisations in the traditional sense but Twitter accounts that aggregate and republish news.
They have here been described as ‘aggregator’ accounts and are usually characterised by their
lack of transparency, meaning it is not possible to identify the group or person operating these
Twitter accounts. Their main purpose is to collect news through Twitter and amplify it by
sharing it, while not producing any of the information themselves. They may also be bots,
meaning the tweeting of news content is automated and there is no additional information, be
it opinion or commentary added. Therefore these accounts were listed in the news media
group of users. Even tweets by citizen Twitter users were at times reflected to amplify
professional news coverage. These tweets were not sought out for a representation of these
users’ views other than their retweeting or hyperlinking to professional news reports. This
was specifically a peculiarity of the France 24 news texts. Therefore, the use of non-elite
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sources and citizen commentary contributed to a very mainstream media-centric view of the
Twitter activity around the news event.

As already shown, Al Jazeera took a significantly different approach as it focused on building
a ‘community’ around AJ Stream’s social media presence that aimed to facilitate a
conversation between its members. There was a very limited amount of Twitter-sourced
content found in the straight reporting of the crisis on aljazeera.com. Where it was
incorporated it followed the same professional sourcing routines as the BBC and France 24,
such as users who were journalists and politicians but none of the tweets were sourced from
Al Jazeera journalists. The Twitter interactions seen in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 are representative of
a typical exchange between The Stream producers and citizen users participating in the
webcast. The Twitter interaction is reciprocal and non-hierarchical. It is also one-to-one as the
Twitter accounts respond to each other through the use of their Twitter handles at the start of
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each tweet, which eliminated the tweets from the timelines of their followers. The comments
emerging from citizen users in these conversations were amplified through retweets and/or
inclusion in the Stream programme.

By comparison, the questions and answers format with BBC correspondents (Fig. 4) did not
see them personally engaging with individual users at all. The testimonies and opinions of
citizen users were at the centre of the conversation. It followed a style of interaction
comparable to the vox-pop format that is typically used in news reports to gauge public
opinion. Through the real-time reflection of these Twitter accounts in the programme
interactions between them could develop as users were able to advance the conversation and
respond to the opinions of other users. It was the only example among all the news coverage
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where citizen users had the opportunity to be represented as primary definers in a news text
and granted the ability to shape the discussion with their views. Both of the other news
organisations attempted similar engagement but with limited success. Comments were invited
via @France24Debate or #F24Debate as well as @BBC_WHYS and #WHYS – an acronym
for World Have Your Say. The France 24 Debate webcast however did not feature a single
social media comment and comments sent to the BBC were few and far between, suggesting
that their Twitter presence was not considered sufficiently engaging for users inclined to enter
into a conversation.

Overall, cartoons were very common in the tweets sourced from citizen users among all three
news organisations. Complex messages that would have been too difficult to fit into a single
tweet were conveyed in a way that was visually engaging. These messages were presented
largely unmediated, meaning that control over the type of comments that were represented
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was practiced primarily in the selection process rather than through framing. However, it also
meant that these tweets were mostly used to add colour to an otherwise complex political and
financial issue and were presented as less important. The users were rarely, if ever, introduced
or contextualised, unlike the sources from the other user categories. Left largely nameless,
this contributed to defining their level of importance as below that of other users. With the
exception of the report discussed by The Stream, the selection of the tweets seemed to be
mostly based on editors’ preferences rather than any clearly defined approach to sourcing
such tweets. For example, there were no particular qualities among the sources’ identities,
such as personal involvement or experience, and origin. The only common trait that all
possessed was that they tweeted in English. What was presented both in the BBC and France
24 news texts was often an undifferentiated global conversation around the news event,
where voices within the citizen user group were largely presented as indistinguishable29.

I also analysed source power in two examples of specific events that took place during the
period studies and the findings are presented in the following two sub-sections.

Varoufakis’ resignation
As social media have created a news environment comprising huge amounts of information,
legacy media compete for the ability to define what that information means. As already
mentioned, collaborative newsgathering has been integrated into sourcing routines which is

29

This was not the case for emails reflected in the coverage, sent by readers. Citations from these

were often accompanied by a preamble about the writer’s identity and reason for their interest. For
example, they were holidaying on a Greek island or were a British citizen living in Greece.
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more about distilling information rather than producing news. In an information saturated
news environment, where journalists have lost the privilege of being the only ones to publish
and broadcast, their personal input is to select, frame and analyse the news. Through the
newsmakers’ ability to publish to audiences it is possible to compare original texts published
on social media with how they are reproduced in the news texts of the research. This arguably
offers more transparency about the selection process in newswork, as press releases which
used to be sent to journalists were largely inaccessible to the general public. A comparison
between the blog posts of Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis and their reproduction in
news texts could reveal what was selected and what was omitted.

Newsmakers, meaning those individuals who are influential in shaping news agendas through
their words and actions because they are a major actor in news events, may not primarily (or
even at all) try to get the attention of professional news media but rather bypass it to speak to
their audiences directly through social media. This was most clearly seen in the social media
activity of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and his finance minister. Both tweeted
regularly throughout the period and frequently in English, suggesting that they were not
addressing Greeks but the international community. Moreover, the news of important
developments were often broken through their Twitter engagement, bypassing the
‘gatekeeper’ journalists. For example, Varoufakis’ surprise resignation on 6 July, the day after
the referendum, was announced in his blog to which he tweeted a hyperlink. It was just one
of numerous examples of how actors in the news events themselves published their own
breaking news outside of the orbit of professional news media. Varoufakis published and
tweeted his resignation only in English, retaining the greatest possible level of control over
how the announcement would be framed for news audiences outside of Greece. A
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comparison between the original text and its treatment in the news coverage is discussed
shortly, and illustrates how professional journalists assume their role in interpreting and
analysing news events for audiences. The interpretation offered by both the BBC and France
24 focused on Varoufakis’ rhetorical and negotiating style with creditors. It was both his
personality and conduct that was framed as the major barrier in reaching any agreement in the
talks.

In the BBC’s live blog on 6 July there are several references to two blog posts published by
Varoufakis throughout the day. The first was about the previous day’s vote and the second
announced his resignation. Two extracts from these posts were cited in the BBC texts, both of
which are presented below. The extracts of the first blog were featured in the BBC live blog30
with two citations that were contextualised with a short comment by the journalist calling
them a “mixed message” and “tough words”.

From the moment our election seemed likely, last December, the powers-that-be
started a bank run and planned, eventually, to shut Greece’s banks down.
[...]
Today’s referendum delivered a resounding call for a mutually beneficial agreement
between Greece and our European partners (Varoufakis 2015a).
The second blog post announcing that he was stepping down, was also cited but the citations
focused on the interpersonal aspects of the negotiations. While Varoufakis listed bullet points
on what he believed the Greek government had attempted to achieve in its time in office, how
he believed creditors had reacted, and how the Greek government planned to approach
negotiations in light of the referendum result, these did not become subject of the news text –

30

This blog post was not quoted in the news texts of either France 24 or Al Jazeera.
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either through direct quotation or paraphrasing. The first extract that was used in the BBC
text was as follows:

Soon after the announcement of the referendum results, I was made aware of a certain
preference by some Eurogroup participants, and assorted ‘partners’, for my ‘absence’
from its meetings; an idea that the Prime Minister judged to be potentially helpful to
him in reaching an agreement. For this reason I am leaving the Ministry of Finance
today (Varoufakis 2015b).
A second citation of the resignation, quoted him writing "I shall wear the creditors' loathing
with pride". This was followed by two tweets from BBC correspondents that provided
analysis and commentary about the resignation. There were several other pieces of analysis in
the live blog and elsewhere in the BBC coverage but none that were sourced through Twitter
31

.

The France 24 reports on the resignation also contained quotes from Varoufakis’ blog post.
The blog was cited in one multimedia text that contextualised and commented on the finance
minister’s five months in office, mixing it with some analysis. In the France 24 Media Watch
programme on 6 July, the resignation became a topic for analysis and featured three
journalists and three citizen Twitter users sourced alongside other journalists’ commentary.
Four out of the five tweets sourced for this programme focused on Varoufakis’ appearance,
and his much commented on departure on his motorbike with his wife, while only two
reflected the Twitter users’ opinion of his policies or what his resignation means in a political
context (see examples in Fig 9). The Debate, another programme aimed at providing analysis,
also discussed Varoufakis resignation. While the programme invites discussion and
comments through social media it did not feature any social media content. So France 24 too

31

There were also numerous quotes from emails to the BBC by readers, most of whom were British.
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responded largely with opinions and analysis in how it reported the resignation, imposing its
control over the message that was contained in the blog post. It turned to social media mainly
to add some lighthearted commentary rather than involve and invite participation in the way
that meaning was constructed.

Al Jazeera news texts took three quotes directly from the blog post. It was followed with one
quote of analysis from the Al Jazeera correspondent in Athens that was not taken from social
media. All of the news organisations contained the second quote above regarding Varoufakis’
decision to step down after the referendum’s No vote as he was made aware that some of the
Eurogroup members preferred for him not to be taking part in the negotiations. Al Jazeera
and BBC also quoted the sentence, “And I shall wear the creditors’ loathing with pride.”

152

While the blog post was hyperlinked to in news texts, the quotes reflected were limited. A
strong focus among all the news organisations was the fact of Varoufakis resignation due to
the Eurogroup members dislike for him and his overt defiance. It was particularly the
personal animosities that received coverage, while his blog post comments describing the
vote by the Greek people as a democratic action and his call for different loan conditions
based on this were not cited. The text subsequently became the subject of extensive analysis
with journalists and expert sources largely left to provide interpretations. There were also a
small number of citizen sources, who most commonly tweeted caricatures that were
presented in the programme. For example, all of the tweets by citizen users in the France 24
Media Watch programme contained illustrations. These tweets were not solicited by France
24 or specifically targeting the programme, but rather were selected by its producers from the
range of commentary available on social networks. So it did not appear to be a design of the
programme to include only illustration from such type of users, but rather the outcome of
where journalists and producers see value in citizen participation.

Protest representation

Several protests took place in Athens in the run up to the referendum during which
eyewitness multimedia material was posted online. While the demonstrations received news
coverage across all the news organisations, this was mostly limited to traditional reporting
styles. Reports were filed by correspondents at the rallies, who often also tweeted about them.

France 24 did not include any social media-sourced content, Twitter or otherwise, of the
protests in their news coverage. The BBC used a number of tweets containing images and
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text reports but all of them belonged to their own correspondents in Athens. They followed a
format that concentrated largely on the size of the turn-out while incorporating a small
number of citizen testimonies, relayed by the BBC correspondents. The BBC live blog on 29
July included four tweets about the rally by one BBC correspondent. The first referred to the
arrival of a colleague at the rally. The second commented on the size of the rally with an
image overlooking the protest and the final two contained images of protesters amid the
protest. There was also a reference to a solidarity march in London with a hyperlink to a
Periscope video shot by a Guardian journalist. The BBC live blog on 30 June included three
tweets about the rally. All of them by BBC correspondents. Again, two comprised images
taken from a nearby balcony overlooking the protest and the third cited a slogan chanted by
the protesters. On 3 June, two rival protests took place in Athens, the larger one saw
thousands rally in front of the Greek parliament calling for a rejection of the loan conditions.
The smaller one called for voters to accept the conditions. In the BBC’s liveblog, three tweets
by two of the organisation’s correspondents in Athens contained bird’s eye-view images of
the larger rally. As in the previous days, they were taken from high up balconies of nearby
buildings. One of these was a short video. It also included two tweets by Tsipras, who
addressed the rally.

In the coverage of civic action through protests, an event that might be considered
particularly well suited for collaborative newsgathering with citizen users, coverage remained
entirely under the control of BBC reporters. There were no tweets by citizen users sharing
images or comments from or about the protests. The voice of protesters was gauged in terms
of numbers, while journalists were distinguished by their named presence. A very limited
amount of amateur footage was used in the news coverage and the lack of attribution to its
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sources allowed little deeper analysis into its origin. The fact that were was such little
eyewitness material is likely to be down to the fact that a large number of professional
journalists from across the world had travelled to Athens to cover events and news
organisations had their own crews on the ground to provide high quality multimedia material.
The amateur footage that was used showed clashes outside the European Commission offices
in Athens on 2 July, where news crews were not present, and some of the clashes on 15 July.
Therefore, the exception in sourcing material from citizen users was when the footage could
be considered novel, such as showing the breakout of violence, in the absence of any news
camera crews. In these cases, the citizen user carried out an act of journalism that was
consistent with the news agenda and therefore could easily be incorporated into the coverage.
However, the large media presence in Athens meant there was little occasion for this
scenario. Al Jazeera’s main coverage of these protests also contained no social media-sourced
content. However, The Streams’ coverage did involve citizen users referring to the protests
and voicing their opinions, including one user tweeting from one of the rallies. All social
media content was in English, across all three news organisations, limiting the number of
Greek voices that were represented. Those Greek voices that were sourced were not speaking
to each other or the Greek media but specifically aimed to reach a global audience.
Inadvertently, this excluded those who did not speak English, or used social media primarily
to communicate with other Greeks.

Platforms
The reliance on the social media platform Twitter over other platforms may have affected the
types of users that news organisations involved in their coverage. Since Twitter users can
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easily send out their messages in the traditional one-to-many style while capitalising on loose
networks that amplify tweets in a many-to-many broadcasting format, the platform is a
natural fit for newsmakers and journalists, who already benefit from larger followings that
allow them to broadcast more widely. Other social media platforms are more popular with
ordinary citizen users by comparison and a focus on delving into the online communities on
them might produce different results.

In this case study, however, other platforms were used very sparingly for interactive
newsgathering. On 29 June, Greek banks imposed controls on cash withdrawals that limited
customers to withdrawing a maximum of 60 euro a day. Several images used in news texts
showed long queues of anguished-looking people outside banks. There were seven social
media-sourced contributions on the capital controls in the The Stream report. Of these, six
came from citizen users, and only two of these had been posted on Twitter. The other four had
been published on Reddit32and were in English. The contributors described their daily lives
being largely unaffected by the bank closures, writing: “Common people carry on with their
lives like before. It's not like we have any substantial amount of money left in the bank” and
“as long as you don't watch TV, it's just another day.” The overall message was that for many
spending 60 euro a day was far beyond their means and therefore the limit did not have any
palpable effect on them.

Although some of this was also evident in the BBC coverage as correspondents noted the
calm in Athens, there was little offered in terms of an explanation. Such citizen testimonies,
however, did provide exactly that. These kind of personal accounts of how Greeks felt

Reddit is best described as huge messaging board where users can share information in threads and
vote other users’ messages up or down, determining their visibility in the thread. (Bond 2018)
32
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affected by the financial crisis and unfolding events were largely missing from the social
media-sourced content in the BBC and France 24 coverage. A link between the type of users
that were reflected and the preference for Twitter became evident. Although The Stream did
also source many citizen Twitter users, this particular social platform was easy to adapt to the
existing sourcing routines by France 24 and the BBC.

In general, where France 24 and the BBC used social media sources from other platforms
than Twitter they also showed a strong reliance on traditional sources. The BBC incorporated
four blog posts by Greek finance minister Varoufakis, a blog post by IMF chief economist
Olivier Blanchard, one by American economist Jeffrey Sachs and a contribution by political
analyst Professor Richard Rose on the London School of Economics blog. There was also
one Facebook post by Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi. A Facebook post by the Greek
Solidarity Campaign on 29 June called for a protest at London’s, Trafalgar Square – one of
the few representations of citizens as activists. But a video shot by a Guardian contributor of
the rally was used to illustrate the protest in a later text.

Both France 24 and the BBC used a YouTube video of MEP and former Belgian Prime
Minister Guy Verhofstadt delivering a confrontational speech in the European Parliament on
8 July, accusing the Tsipras government of not offering any concrete commitment to reforms
on “five points”, including downsizing the public sector, “opening the markets” and
privatising public banks, and ending corruption and “privilege”. The speech elicited a great
deal of social media reaction. Both organisations also published a YouTube clip of European
Council President Donald Tusk addressing reporters, one on 9 July and one on 13 July. In the
latter he announced an “agreekment” in the euro summit talks, sparking reaction on social
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networks under the hashtag #Agreekment. France 24 also linked to an EU Council livestream
on 7 July and two statements by the council’s communications department. The BBC on 5
July linked to a statement by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude
Juncker. On 6 July, both France 24 and BBC linked to a press release by the European Central
Bank. Together with the reliance on EU Twitter sources for breaking news updates, this
shows that power-elites were able to use several social media platforms and their own
websites as an additional way in which to enter the news flow.

Summary
Non-elites sources were largely marginalised in the networked journalism that was evident in
both France 24’s and the BBC’s news coverage. By and large social networks were not found
to be used to represent citizen testimony directly. Ordinary citizens were given voice almost
exclusively through traditional format interviews in online text and audio-visual reports. In
the live blogs, significantly more of the citizen commentary reflected was sent directly to the
BBC via email. However, this type of content is outside of the scope of this study for two
reasons. Firstly, this type of commentary, in contrast to citizen testimony published on social
media, is self-selected as contributors have to take the initiative and put in effort to address
the BBC directly. This is likely to skew the spectrum of opinions. For example, it is unlikely
that an ordinary Greek would take the time to write to a foreign news outlet in the same way
that they might embrace Twitter or other social media to publish their comments, opinions
and experiences. Secondly, it is also not possible to review the gatekeeping done by the BBC
in selecting comment for publication as there is no knowledge of what was not published.
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Where Twitter was used mainly to mobilise public participation in news coverage – as seen in
the Al Jazeera sample of sources – as expected, the vast majority of sources fall into the
citizen user group of which many were Greek sources with greater source power than other
users in the news products. At the same time, there was a wider global social media debate
reflected, not only by Al Jazeera but also the BBC, with participation from several sources
that had no stake in the news events. This raises questions about the value of some of these
contributions and the news organisations’ rationale for publishing them. If the objective is to
depict a more authentic picture of public opinion and news events through interactive
newsgathering and social media commentary then the aim may be better served by virtually
getting as close to news events as possible. Diluting the commentary and information shared
by citizen with a personal stake in what is being reported with an undifferentiated global
input threatens to erode the specific geopolitical context of a news event and undermines the
voices of those directly involved and affected. However, other factors may have driven the
choices made by journalists such as building a model of participation that involves actual
audiences of the news organisations, rather than the most relevant ones. Such decisions may
have given more weight to commercial considerations.

The BBC’s own staff were producing an overwhelming amount of the social media content
that was used by the news organisation, suggesting a trend towards social networks being
used as a tool to publish reports in a less formal matter. The interview chapter of this thesis
explores further how the BBC formalised news production for social media audiences, but
this research demonstrates that journalists’ participation on social media was sanctioned by
the organisation and incorporated in a number of different ways. As the BBC’s
correspondents build up a presence on Twitter they are trading on their status as professional
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journalist and benefit from their employers’ reputation. At the same time they become Twitter
personalities in their own right with their organisation taking second place. This is a departure
from traditional news coverage, where the byline is largely less important than the brand or
title of a news product.

The pooling of information and commentary of professional journalists from a wide variety
of news outlets and the considerable overlap of sources used both by the BBC and France 24
may point towards a homogenisation of mainstream media rather than the diversification of
sources. The data shows that the dominant accounts used in the news coverage by two of the
three organisations were most commonly professional journalists from a wide spectrum of
news outlets. On the one hand this undoubtedly ensures that acquired knowledge is spread
widely and pushes for news organisations to reflect it. On the other hand, while this pooling
of information and commentary has been argued to have a diversifying effect, when it takes
place almost exclusively among established media professionals it can also have the opposite
effect of leveling the differences between the news outlets as the organisations develop a
symbiotic relationship among each other. In short, the distinctions between a report by France
24, the BBC or another news outlet collecting information in the same way are minimised
despite a greater number of sources. When the content published by different news
organisations is substantially identical, plurality suffers.

The attraction of drawing on the work by professional journalists working for other
organisations shared is self-evident, as they are usually abiding by similar professional
standards while producing news content at no extra cost. Crowdsourcing information in this
manner is very cost efficient. Material by bloggers, citizen-journalists and eyewitnesses on
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the other hand, can add an extra layer of work for the mainstream news organisations in
discovering such content, contextualising, and verifying it. In-house journalists need to have
the skills and time to thoroughly engage with the news content produced by non-journalists to
ensure that the standards on which news organisations build their reputation are met.

The research shows bottlenecks and obstacles in the two-way flow of information between
social media users and professional news media. I believe there are two aspects to this. One is
mainly practical and based on a necessary selection process to whittle down the overload of
information available. The social media gatekeepers serve an important function of separating
important and accurate information from unimportant and inaccurate information. The as
professional journalists active on social media, these gatekeepers adhere to the same
conventional selection criteria that inform professional routines elsewhere adapting their
practices to a different environment rather than allowing the environment to significantly
shape their news reporting.

As the data showed, France 24 also used citizen sources as a way to link to news texts created
by mainstream news organisation. This means the number of citizen users among its coverage
were not reflective of the actual amount of original content they provided in the news
coverage. In the overall composition of the live blogs it created the impression that social
media users remain largely passive in their consumption of mass media and their engagement
is reduced to simply sharing professionally produced news. The also seemingly arbitrary
choice of most citizen sources diminished their value significantly in contrast to the other
sources.
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The entire source sample showed a clear preference for English-language contributions with
non-English social media content facing much greater hurdles in accessing anglophone
international mainstream media. There is a genuine possibility that where information is
originally not produced in English but gathers momentum through retweets and wider
discussion, it will eventually be tweeted and commented on by English-language sources.
Yet, this does not detract from the fact that non-English sources are disadvantaged in the
access to these news organisations; a significant problem when the news event is taking place
in a non-anglophone country. Essentially, they rely on privileged social media gatekeepers to
show an interest. A willingness by elite global news media to engage with social media users
in their local language would perhaps be helpful in achieving a more authentic representation
in news coverage.

Several examples showed France 24 and the BBC using material shared on social media that
fuelled online discussion but not necessarily following through in reflecting the ensuing
engagement. This suggests that both organisations sought to assume leadership roles in social
media debate. In addition, the BBC’s efforts to build up a strong presence on social media
with its own staff shows that the aim is predominantly for these news outlets to place
themselves at the helm of public debate. Social media did at times fulfill the function of
contributing to news coverage in unconventional ways and arguably the trickle down effect of
a vibrant social media forum leads to elite journalist sources within that environment being
informed by it and eventually enabling it to enter the global news flow. However, the
opportunity of direct public access to the professional news flow, as seen in the findings
relating to France 24 and the BBC, is far more limited in scope than commonly held
assumptions about social networks’ power to transfer privileged media access to non-elites.
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6. Migrant crisis: the pursuit of journalism’s ethics
This case study sought to investigate the use of interactive newsgathering in the coverage of
what came to be known as the ‘migrant crisis’ in Europe. It analysed online news coverage
across four weeks straddling August and September 2015. The chosen timeframe both saw
the migrant issue surge to the top of the news agenda among mainstream news media and
spark public debate, citizen initiatives and protests organised and discussed on social
networks. Social media played a multi-faceted role in how it facilitated public engagement
around the topic, affected developments in the news events, and also served news
organisations as a tool in their own news production.

Below are the main news events relevant to the collaborative newswork found in the news
texts. They are listed in chronological order and provide an overview of the period covered in
this study and the pace at which news events developed. As is evident, the migrant crisis was
a truly pan-European news event that sparked public debate across borders and provided the
basis for reporting on local, national and international level.

Timeline
● 22/08 – 23/08: Rioting broke out in the eastern German town of Heidenau over a
planned asylum seekers home. Videos of the clashes with local police were shared
online by the local branch of the left of centre Social Democrats Party (SPD).
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● 25/08: German authorities announce the suspension of the Dublin II agreement for
Syrian asylum seekers via Twitter.
● 27/08: The bodies of dozens of suffocated migrants are discovered in a truck parked
on the side of a motorway in Austria.
● 02/09: The body of drowned Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi is found washed up on the
beach in Bodrum, in Turkey. The boat carrying his family capsized during the
crossing to Greece, killing him, his brother and mother. Photos of the dead boy lying
on the beach are captured by a Turkish photographer and used prominently across
international news media.
● 03/09: An Austria-bound train carrying migrants was allowed to leave Budapest’s
Keleti station after weeks of stand off between migrants and Hungarian authorities. It
was then stopped in the Hungarian border town of Biscke with news crews at the
scene.
● 04/09: Migrants stranded in Budapest set off on foot to the Austrian border.
● 05/09: First trains carrying migrants from Budapest arrived in Munich.
● 09/09: Migrants broke through a police cordon at Roszke, in Hungry, where they had
been held. Video of a Hungarian camerawoman showing her tripping up a man
carrying a child quickly spread across social media. Meanwhile, in Denmark
authorities suspended the rail-link to Germany.
● 12/09: German authorities said 40,000 migrants arrived in the country in one day.
● 16/09: Clashes between migrants and security forces broke out on the Hungary-Serbia
border.
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As large numbers of migrants crossed European borders and made their way into central and
western Europe, social media platforms saw high levels of news content shared both from
mainstream news media, official sources, and alternative media sources. The rampant
exchange of communication contributed to an impression that public opinion was vocalised
through online social networks precipitating action from state powers. Germany announced
the suspension of the Dublin II agreement that requires asylum applications to be submitted
in the country of migrants’ first entry to the EU. At the start of September a photo of a
drowned toddler on a Turkish beach hit front pages around the world and prompted a public
outcry. The extent to which political actions can be traced back to public social media
engagement is not clear but platforms were used as spaces to organise civic engagement in
the real world. While the number of migrant arrivals to the EU peaked in October (UNHCR,
n.d.) the scene for this development was set in August and September when developments in
the political arena surrounding the migrant crisis developed rapidly. Activities on social
media were prominent at different points during the course of this study and were used
extensively to share news texts among audiences, as well as provide a platform for
commentary. They facilitated the organisation and coordination of numerous citizen
initiatives across Europe and drummed up support for anti-asylum seeker protests. Social
media was also used as a means of communication between authorities and citizens as well as
migrants. Other times, information and eyewitness media was shared through social networks
revealing the mistreatment of refugees. Social media also served as a way for human
traffickers to publicise their service and a means for migrants to share their own
user-generated content, as well as advice and information to fellow migrants about their
journey to western Europe. Thus, the group least able to access mainstream media, the
migrants themselves, was given a forum on social media through which their voices could be
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represented. However, given the precarious situation many migrants found themselves in,
content owned by them was often shared publicly by third parties to protect the anonymity of
the original owner. Social media engagement also sparked heated debates on freedom of
speech in Germany and led the German public broadcaster to run a campaign against online
hate speech.

Sample of news texts
The websites of the news organisations as well as the Twitter accounts – named in the
methodology – were searched for the keywords ‘migrant’, ‘migrants’, ‘refugee’ and
‘refugees’. All texts between 18 August and 17 September were examined. All of the
identified news texts over the timeframe were then selected and scanned for social media
content. All news texts that did not contain any clearly identifiable social media content were
disregarded, whereas those that did were analysed using qualitative and quantitative
methodologies. Fig. 10 shows a break down of the total number of online news pages
gathered from the BBC, France 24 and Al Jazeera coverage. They illustrate the news texts
found that contained social media content.

BBC
18.8

France 24

Al Jazeera

BBC Trending

19.8
20.8

BBC Outside Source AFP

@ajplus

21.8
22.8
23.8

france24.com

24.8
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25.8

BBC Trending
bbc.com

Al Jazeera Blog

26.8

BBC Trending
bbc.com
bbc.com

@ajplus

27.8

bbc.com

AFP
Media Watch
AFP

28.8

@BBCOS
@BBCOS
bbc.com
bbc.com

Observers

29.8
30.8

aljazeera.com
BBC Trending

31.8
1.9

Aljazeera.com
@ajplus
bbc.com

2.9

france24.com

@ajplus
@AJStream

AFP
france24.com

The Stream
aljazeera.com
aljazeera.com

3.9

bbc.com
bbc.com
bbc.com
bbc.com
BBC Live

france24.com
france24.com
AFP
france24.com
AFP

@ajplus
aljazeera.com

4.9

BBC Live
bbc.com
bbc.com
@BBCOS
@BBCOS
@BBCOS
bbc.com

france24.com
AFP
france24.com
France24.com
France 24 YouTube
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The BBC sample consists of 49 texts. They comprise 40 texts published on bbc.co.uk and an
additional 10 tweets published on one of the BBC Twitter accounts listed in the methodology.
All of these texts, including the tweets, contained or referenced content that could be traced
back to originating on social media. The social media-sourced content comprised text, images
and audio-visual material. Overall, there were 47 online news pages found on France 24’s
English-language digital platforms that contained or explicitly referenced social media
content. The texts were published both on france24.com/en and observers.france24.com/en.
France 24 features not only its own content but also frequently news output by news agency
Agence France-Presse (AFP). Since AFP coverage is featured across france24.com and
subsequently distributed through France 24 Twitter accounts, it was not possible to separate
the news texts from one another. Therefore, all 18 AFP online news texts used or distributed
by France 24 is comprised in the sample of the coverage. Al Jazeera featured a total of 41
news texts. The main website aljazeera.com featured 21 texts comprising or referencing
content originating on social media. Four texts were published on the digital platforms of the
Stream web community. These include news texts on stream.aljazeera.com, @AJStream and
a webcast. In addition, all tweets published on the @ajplus and @AJEnglish accounts
containing the keywords were examined of which 16 featured content sourced through social
media. These tweets did not link back to any coverage on Al Jazeera’s own websites. They
were all also analysed as part of this research.

A wide variety of news texts featured social media content across all three news
organisations, ranging from hard news reports to opinion pieces, media reviews, live blogs
and social media focused sections. While Twitter remained the most commonly used social
media platform for newsgathering – similar to the previous case study – Facebook was also
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used extensively for newsgathering. A comparison between Twitter and Facebook sources
shows differences in the type of users that were sought out. This was especially true for the
news texts of the BBC and France 24, where collaborative newsgathering on Twitter has been
shown to be shaped significantly by elite journalists and the professional news media.

Quantitative Analysis
Twitter Sources
Twitter users were divided into nine groups: in-house journalists working at the respective
news organisation, other professional journalists, news organisations, politicians, state
authorities, aid organisations, experts, citizens, and others. Humanitarian aid organisations,
due to their activist nature, were not considered ‘expert’ users, while their formalised and
professional organisational structures also did not fit the citizen user group.
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The BBC had a total of 91 different Twitter sources with the use of content tweeted by
in-house journalists highest. While BBC employees comprised the largest group of Twitter
sources it was closely followed by other professional journalists with 52 sources overall
originating in the mainstream media, mirroring the media-centric approach to collaborative
newsgathering that was also found in the case study of the Greek financial crisis. Moverover,
the sample in Fig. 11 only comprises the BBC journalists whose Twitter content was found in
the news texts. In addition, the BBC directed readers to a Twitter list of 33 of its own
correspondents to follow for updates, illustrating an effort to build social networks around its
own journalists speaking directly to news audiences through the micro-blogging site. The
hierarchy of this conversation is primarily one-to-many from the position of the journalist,
who is not required to follow back the users following them making the conversation
primarily uni-directional (Murthy, 2013). The hoped for result is that users who follow the list
will retweet some of its content, which then turns it into a many-to-many form of distribution
(Kwak et al, 2010). The journalists from other news organisations were typically similarly
elite and English-speaking. They originated from international news organisations such as
Channel 4, New York Times, ITV, The Guardian, as well as younger but by now assimilated
professional news organisations such as Buzzfeed. Others included German broadcaster RTL
and Arabic news outlet Al Alan TV. The third largest group were citizens users. They were
geographically spread out, comprising users across the world but with an emphasis on Arabic
voices. Users that could be identified as hailing from countries affected by conflict were
limited. Where there were such users, they were usually speaking about their perception of
the migrant crisis from the viewpoint of an outsider rather than as someone with personal
experience of it.
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France 24 stood out for its very limited use of Twitter for newsgathering with only 32 sources
overall. Almost a third of them were journalists and another third were citizen users. Since
the news event often played out in remote areas and involved people with very little
opportunity to relay their experiences to a wider audience by themselves (ie. without
mainstream news coverage), journalists very arguably facing less competition from
non-journalist sources in reporting from the field and could default to more conventional
news reporting through its own proprietary platforms. The BBC’s extensive use of Twitter
was used primarily to highlight their reporters’ presence on the platform as a means for news
distribution. France 24 on the other hand appeared less invested in building social media
audiences around its individual reporters.

Al Jazeera had the largest number of Twitter sources (91) with the vast majority defined as
citizen users. This corresponds with the findings in the coverage of the Greek debt crisis
although in this sample the use of Twitter was more broadly spread out across many different
types of news texts. In the last case study they were almost limited to a single webcast by The
Stream, suggesting that the use of Twitter was not prominent in the overall coverage.
Nevertheless, a large number of Twitter sources in this study were also found in a webcast by
The Stream and the related written news text published on 11 September. The format to host
citizen voices through the interactivity that social media allows puts these types of users front
and centre of the programme, which is not necessarily the case in any other of the Al Jazeera
texts.

The overlap in sources between the news organisations was limited, given the very different
approaches to Twitter sourcing routines between the BBC and Al Jazeera. All three
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organisations shared only two Twitter sources: a cameraman for German broadcaster RTL
(@RichterSteph), and the emergency director at Human Rights Watch (@bouckap). Despite
France 24’s extremely limited newsgathering through Twitter it had more sources in common
with the BBC (five) than Al Jazeera (three) did. These sources were in addition to the two
sources found across the news texts by all three organisations. France 24 also had three
sources in common with Al Jazeera. Most overlap was found among journalist sources, while
there was also some overlap among citizen users. As already stated in the last chapter,
sources with access to multiple news organisations can be considered to have more weight
and authority than those who are represented in the texts of only one.

Twitter Source Power

The quantitative analysis of source power was measured in terms of the number of tweets by
each user group that was included or referenced in the news texts. Although a tweet may have
been used more than once in different news texts, individual tweets were only recorded once.
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Among the 173 tweets found in the BBC news texts nearly half originated from its own
reporters tweeting from the field. On average a BBC reporter would see their tweets used 3.1
times in the BBC’s coverage, while other journalist users would be featured with around 2
tweets on average. Citizen users, while being the third largest user group, would have
comparatively little source power with just over 1 tweet per user. Overall, France 24 featured
41 tweets. Albeit a much smaller sample group than that of the BBC, the outlet also gave the
greatest platform to its own journalists with two tweets per user on average. Other journalists
were only represented with one tweet each, putting them on par with citizen users. The two
expert users featured were represented with two tweets each. Al Jazeera had the largest
number of Twitter sources but only 107 tweets in its coverage. This can be explained with the
greater reliance on citizen users, a group generally associated with less source power. Citizen
users were represented in the coverage with an average of 1.2 tweets. However, Al Jazeera
did not give greater preference to professional journalist sources either with only 1.2 tweet
per user. The much more limited use of media sources and the equal source weighting
underlines Al Jazeera’s more non-elite approach to interactive newsgathering on Twitter, and
social media overall.

However, this quantitative method to measure source power could not reflect the interest and
attention that some pieces of content generated. For example, a particularly high-value tweet
may have been used several times across numerous texts but was only recorded once here.
Therefore, the news texts around a range of pieces of content that were able to generate a
considerable amount of coverage or were presented in a more prominent way are investigated
more closely in the textual analysis.
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Facebook Sources
The sample in this case study had a much greater amount of Facebook-sourced content than
the Greek debt crisis, which permitted interactive newsgathering to be broken down
according to platforms and examine differences in sourcing routines. Facebook was used
primarily as a platform to source citizen users, and distinctions between the identities of
non-elite sources provided a better idea of who they were. As seen in the breakdown of the
users according to their identity in Fig. 13, four groups comprised sources that are non-elite
users and which would have been grouped into the citizen user group among the Twitter
sample.
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As already mentioned, the refugee crisis generated considerable civic engagement (both in
support and opposition to refugees) that also received widespread news coverage. Often
organisation of citizen groups and initiatives took place on Facebook and the platform itself
received media coverage amid a political outcry in Germany over the unchecked publication
of hate speech by users.

Syrians, the main focus of the refugee crisis coverage, were all but absent from the sample of
Twitter users. However, the BBC focused much of its Facebook newsgathering on finding
users that identified themselves as Syrian. Although Facebook played a role in the coverage,
source power through this platform was limited. Where individual users were referenced it
was usually only once throughout the news texts. Groups and initiatives were reported on but
not necessarily named or linked to. The overlap in users again mirrored the trend found in the
Twitter news sourcing, with BBC and France 24 having the most sources in common (three),
while the three organisations only had one source in common. The one Facebook user
comprised in the news coverage of all three outlets was an Icelandic initiative calling on
Icelanders to open their homes to refugees. The page received 12,000 likes within days33 and
was treated in the coverage as representing public sentiment towards the refugee crisis. The
other two users shared by the BBC and France 24 were a Syrian refugee and activist living in
Vienna and a Hungarian TV station. The TV station attracted media attention due to footage
tweeted by a German journalist, showing its camerawoman tripping up a man carrying a child
as refugees broke through a police line. Hence, it was related to a news item that was initially
broken on Twitter by a reporter and not necessarily representative of the sourcing routines
specific to the platform. The limited overlap across the board underscored the overall trend

33

Iceland had a population of under 330,000 in 2015.
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that sees less source power for non-elite users, which accounted for the majority of Facebook
accounts.

Source power was limited for citizen users, with far less access to the global news flow, but
the range of voices showed sourcing practices that led to plurality in who was represented.
Sources sought out by the different organisations showed diversity in users, meaning the
sources of the organisations were not originating from similar demographics. For example, Al
Jazeera reported on a Turkish Facebook page that organised boat crossings to Greece and an
Islamist Facebook community accused of providing a platform for extremists to divide Arab
nations. This provided a more non-European perspective on the coverage, and included other
regions that had a role to play in the migrant crisis. By comparison, France 24 took a
Europe-centric approach that focused both on European initiatives supportive of refugees as
well as those strongly critical of the intake of refugees, including a Croatian Facebook
community and the British incarnation of the German anti-immigrant PEGIDA movement.
Similarly, the BBC focused on the different ways in which citizen were organising their
support and help across Europe, but did not mention any anti-refugee Facebook content.

In general, Facebook content was often used to construct a representation of public opinion.
One way in which the BBC did this was through Facebook sources that published
illustrations, including satirical cartoons. The sharing of illustrations was understood to be
indicative of how the users thought about the news topic. However, the representation of
Facebook as a gauge of public sentiment was common to all three organisations. Hence,
Facebook groups, and community and events pages represented the largest number of
Facebook sources for France 24 and Al Jazeera. Where these sources were referenced in the
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news coverage, what was typically reported on was their existence and their purpose, while
actual content posted to these pages by individual users was typically absent. With a few
exceptions, individual users were not the focus of the coverage. Instead, the views expressed
through Facebook campaigns and how they organised concrete actions offline were seens as a
barometer of the public mood.

YouTube Sources
Content originating on video-sharing platform YouTube was not pervasive in the coverage
with Al Jazeera making the most extensive use of the platform for newsgathering with 11
videos. While some of the videos may have been posted on YouTube, the news organisations
may have become aware of them through another platform. For example, embedded YouTube
videos are common in tweets or on Facebook and can be viewed without leaving either of the
platforms. By comparison, links to Facebook content are less common on Twitter as there is
no embed option for Facebook posts. Therefore, Facebook content is likely to have been
discovered initially on the platform, whereas YouTube content may have been first found on
other social media platforms. This does not allow any analysis of how journalists specifically
use YouTube for newsgathering.

Footage sourced on YouTube tended to be of a high production and playback quality which
limited the range of sources. Only poor quality footage deemed to be of high public interest
would warrant inclusion in news coverage. However, one such video had the highest source
power as it was featured by all three news organisations. It was the only video featured by
more than one of the organisations and filmed by an Austrian volunteer at a Hungarian
reception centre for refugees in Roszke, Hungary. The footage showed refugees scrambling
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for sandwiches thrown at them by security guards. The clip was shared on social media by
the volunteer’s husband, an Austrian politician.

The tables below list the number of videos sourced through YouTube by each of the news
outlets, and details their title, content and uploader. The uploader in each case is also the
producer of each of the clips.

BBC
Title

Description

Uploader

‘The millionaire saving

A short documentary about

timesXtwo – an ABC and

migrants in the

non-profit rescue mission

BBC collaboration

Mediterranean’

MOAS

‘Syrian Border Stories’

A short documentary about

timesXtwo – an ABC and

four displaced Syrians

BBC collaboration

The national team: Spot

Video campaign against

DFB Team – German

against racism

racism

Football Association

Unknown

Video of refugees

Unknown

demanding to be let into
Keleti train station in
Budapest (deleted)
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Refugee camp Roszke

Secretly filmed footage of

Sprido08 – Austrian

security throwing food into

politician

crowd of refugees in Roszke
Online – Arabic satirical site

The @BBCTrending Twitter account linked to two short documentaries published on
YouTube by a joint ABC and BBC venture. News content reported on by BBC Trending is
framed as originating in social media and of interest to audiences in this space. However, it
was also used to highlight and distribute content created by the BBC. This follows the BBC’s
trend in highlighting content created by its own or affiliated journalists. One of the short
documentaries, ‘The millionaire saving migrants in the Mediterranean’, documents the work
of the MOAS rescue boat charity, which raised its profile especially through its Twitter
activity, where it published photos, footage and updates from rescue missions. The
documentary may have therefore benefitted from MOAS’ prominence when distributed on
Twitter and other social media platforms.

France 24
Title

Description

Uploader

Refugee camp Röszke

Secretly filmed footage of

Sprido08- Austrian

security throwing food into

politician

crowd of refugees in Roszke
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‘MEDITERRANEA by

Documentary trailer

Jonas Carpignano (Official

NDM Ventas internacionales
– Film production company

Trailer)’

Al Jazeera
Title

Description

Uploader

Musical presentation by

Video of Palestinian man

Al Yarmouk Camp – media

youths of Yarmouk camp

playing the piano amid

activists in Yarmouk, Syria

rubble
You are not welcome here!

Video of the mayor of

Mairie de Béziers – Mayor

Béziers visiting refugees

of French town Béziers

occupying an empty
building
Destruction in the market of

Video of the aftermath of a

amran amar – media

Douma

bombing in the centre of the

activists in Douma, Syria

Syrian city of Douma
Refugees Welcome – FC

Footage of FC Bayern

Bundesliga – German

Bayern Make a Statement

players walking onto pitch

Football League

with child refugees
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Unknown

Aerial footage of an airstrike US Central Command –
carried out by coalition

US-led military coalition

forces
Migrants break through

Video shows migrants

Nemzeti1tv – Hungarian TV

security line in Roszke

breaking through police

station

lines in Roszke
Refugee camp Röszke

Secretly filmed footage of

Sprido08- Austrian

security throwing food into

politician

crowd of refugees in Roszke
Werde Fluchthelfer.in

Campaign calling on people

Robyns Lifehack Palace –

to ferry migrants across

citizen activist

borders
Public dialogue "Living well German chancellor Merkel

Bundesregierung – German

in Germany – what’s

takes questions from

government

important to us": Chancellor

highschool children, among

in conversation with

them a Palestinian girl

students

fearing deportation.

Anja Reschke: "Push back –

Clip showing news anchor

ARD – German public

Open your mouth"

calling on people to speak

service broadcaster

out against racism

182

Project: Refugee Smiles

Video about charitable work

Deah Barakat – citizen

done by American dentists

activist

for refugees

Al Jazeera featured the widest range of YouTube videos originating from professional media
and citizen journalists, as well as government sources. The selection of YouTube videos
shows some of the same news topics emerge as found in the news texts by the other two news
organisations. For example, the issue of hate speech and anti-refugee sentiments was given
voice through some of the Facebook and Twitter content in the France 24 coverage. The
anti-refugee mayor of the southern French town of Bezier received coverage by France 24
and AFP after he used an altered AFP photo of refugees waiting to board a train. Attention
was drawn to the use of the photograph via a tweet by an AFP journalist (Lemarchand, 2015)
comparing it to the original. Al Jazeera covered the mayor’s attitude through the use of one of
his YouTube videos showing him visiting a group of Syrian refugees to tell them that they are
not welcome in the city. Al Jazeera also featured a YouTube video of a German news
presenter calling on people to speak up when they encounter racism. The use of BBC
YouTube videos mirrored the overall trend of a heavier emphasis on professional journalistic
sources, while Syrian citizen journalists and activists were most likely to feature among the
Al Jazeera sample.
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Text analysis
Journalists as sources

While the quantitative analysis showed tweets by journalists were sourced extensively,
textual analysis of some of the news texts reiterated that point. Journalists reporting on the
refugee crisis were given special coverage by news organisations highlighting the popularity
of the social media content they posted. With Twitter employed as a broadcasting and
self-promotion tool for journalists, news organisations gave prominence to some of the most
popular material tweeted by journalists.

For example, the BBC gave prominent coverage to a photograph by a photojournalist. But
before it became the subject of news reports, the image had been widely shared on Twitter
and the following analysis partly investigates how this dissemination took place.
Photojournalist Daniel Etter, who was commissioned by the New York Times to cover the
migrant crisis, was interviewed by BBC Outside Source after one of his photographs attracted
huge amounts of attention on Twitter. The photograph showed a father’s tears of relief as he
disembarked an inflatable boat that had safely landed on the shores of the Greek island of
Kos. The photo was one of a series that Etter produced on the migrant crisis, and which went
on to win the 2016 Pulitzer Prize in Breaking News Photography (The Pulitzer Prizes, 2016).
A tweet by @BBCOS on the 20 August said, “We speak to @DanielEtterFoto whose
incredible photo of a refugee family has gone viral.” The BBC Outside Source video could
not be viewed for this research;, however, it is clear from available summaries that Etter was
interviewed about his personal experience witnessing and photographing refugees arriving in
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Greece and his reaction to seeing his photo gain so much traction. The photo also received a
special mention in a news piece titled “10 moving photos of Europe's migrant crisis” which
was published by BBC Magazine two weeks later. A short text accompanying the photograph
included a tweeted comment by an Irish journalist for Ireland’s leading broadsheet Irish
Times, saying, "An entire country's pain captured in one father's face." The apparent impact
that the photo had on social media platforms was used to frame why this particular photo was
chosen for coverage. It was not only a compelling photo by a professional photographer but a
photo worthy of coverage because it ‘went viral’. The image’s popularity was presented as a
measure of its newsworthiness and proof of its ability to capture the public imagination.

The photo was first published by the New York Times on the 16 August and some of the
earliest mentions of the photograph on Twitter originate on accounts by New York Times
staff (Tufekci, 2015; Yeginsu, 2015). A cursory analysis of all the accounts mentioning
@DanielEtterFoto in reference to the photo throughout the day shows that many of them
were elite professional journalists. Among those who shared the photo early on, were
journalists from the Wall Street Journal, NPR and Vice. The photo was also tweeted by Barry
Malone (Malone, 2015), the producer of The Stream. Given that The Stream has built a
particularly large social media community around it, the tweet unsurprisingly received
thousands of retweets. Etter tweeted the photo himself on 17 August (Etter, 2015), writing, “I
am overwhelmed by the reaction to this family's tears of relief. This is why I do what I do.”
In the coming days, the photo went on to be featured by many professional global news
organisations and their journalists. The reconstruction of the earliest users to share the image
shows that professional journalists played a significant role in the distribution of the
photograph on Twitter for several days. Effectively, the BBC’s coverage simply contributed
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to building public awareness of the image and helping it be distributed further. The choice of
a tweet by the Irish journalist to contextualise the photograph in the BBC Magazine news text
just underscored further how much weight is given to journalists users in selecting what
content makes the grade for collaborative newswork. As is perhaps to be expected, often this
is content created by fellow journalists.

In a BBC Trending story published on 10 September, a photo by BBC correspondent
Manveen Rana was featured for ‘going viral’ on Twitter. The photo was described as showing
a policeman hugging a Syrian toddler near a crossing in southern Serbia and the news text
was framed as discussing why the photo attracted so much social media attention. The
headline of the news text said: “ Why this picture of a migrant child being hugged went
viral.” In the title the photo of a BBC journalist was contextualised as pertinent in the eyes of
the public. The first six paragraphs of the news text described the scene and quoted Rana on
what she witnessed at the border crossing putting the spotlight on her as the reporter.

In the fifth paragraph, Rana is quoted on the Twitter reaction she received to the photo from
Serbians. In the seventh and eight paragraph, some of the tweets from Serbians reacting to the
photo were published without identifying the users and the report claimed that echoes of the
Balkans War were the reason why the images resonated with many. Despite the headline’s
promise, the public debate was not given prominence in the news text. Rather, the focus was
firmly on the BBC correspondent and the material she produced, making her the main subject
of the report, while social media discussion independent of her was buried far down in the
article. The fact of the social media reaction itself was again framed as the reason why the
images were worthy of special coverage on the BBC’s own platform.
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In the BBC coverage, marketing the ‘buzz’ around the social media content created by
professional journalists, and especially that around BBC reporters, was found to be a core
element of their social media newsgathering routines. Social media was not only a reporting
tool, or a newsgathering tool but also an important promotion tool. While publishing news
content through social media platforms is a part of almost every news organisation’s
distribution strategy, it was the reciprocal relationship between news organisations and
individual reporters in the marketing and distribution of their own content that stood out in
the findings.

Although interactive newsgathering using Twitter was less prominent in the France 24
sample, one of its own reporters’ Twitter activity was at the centre of several news reports. In
a text headlined “The journey to exile notebook’”, three France 24 correspondents reported
on joining refugees on their trip along the Balkan route to central and western Europe. The
text features a photo of the reporters at the top and presents a diary running from 31 August
to 4 September that concludes with a feed to one of the reporter’s Twitter account,
@Fernande_VT, embedded at the bottom. But her Twitter activity and a link to her account is
already featured in the lead of the news text. While the France 24 texts also includes some of
the images shared on Van Tet’s Twitter account, most of the report appeared to have been
produced exclusively for France 24’s online website. In the most part the Twitter account
featured different content from that presented on the website and the cross-over between the
two was less evident than in news texts by the BBC featuring their own correspondents’
tweets. Twitter served mainly as a tool to diversify news content distribution and the reporter
was partly tasked with distributing their own coverage in tandem with their organisation
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highlighting their newswork. Like the BBC, France 24 used Twitter as a one-to-many
broadcasting platform where the journalist takes on responsibility of broadcasting their own
content directly to audiences without the intermediary of the newsroom and its editors.
Therefore, the attraction to tune into this journalist is dependent on the appeal of her news
content. As news audiences source their own content on particular issues, the news
organisations tried to push their own correspondents into the limelight and assume the role of
a one-person new outlet. However, as news organisations seek to protect the professional
routines and practices in order to distinguish themselves from amateurs, encouraging
audiences to follow correspondents on a platform where their reporting bypasses newsroom
routines, also undermines professional boundaries. Journalists are expected to embody
established practices and routines without the structures (ie. the editor and copy editor) that
are responsible for implementing them. Aside from acting as a reporter, the journalist acts as
representative of their profession on Twitter, assumed to be acquiring authority and a high
reputation by doing so.

Al Jazeera did not carry out this type of promotion of individual journalists as sources for
news audiences. In one report (Phillips, 2015), Al Jazeera journalist Barnaby Phillips
described his week on a refugee rescue boat in the Mediterranean. The report featured a photo
Phillips had tweeted looking out over the sea from a cabin but while Phillips recorded his
experiences on Twitter, the report did not mention his Twitter account or activity there nor
cited the social media platform as the origin of the photo. In short, the report was mainly a
conventional news report of a journalist reporting from the field without any special mention
given to his social media activity.
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Hungarian camera woman
Many of the news texts promoted professional journalists by introducing them, naming them
and actively encouraging audiences to follow them. In one instance, though, it was the
disappearance of the journalist from the news content they provided that appeared to
emphasise the value of the independent observer. This image of independence and apparent
autonomy is often embodied by the foreign correspondent, who supposedly lacks ties and
subjectivity and is therefore free to report events as they really are.

A short video by a German reporter and shared on Twitter became the focus of several news
items by each of the news organisations, revealing the hierarchy within the profession. The
footage itself was filmed by a correspondent for German TV broadcaster RTL, while the
subject of the footage was Petra Laszlo, a camerawoman for Hungarian news outlet N1TV. In
the footage, she is seen tripping up a male refugee carrying a child as hundreds break through
a police line at a collection point in Roszke. The video was the focus of four BBC news texts,
four France 24 news texts and two Al Jazeera news texts, making it a particularly prominent
piece of social media-sourced content. Unlike the previous examples of prominence given to
journalists’ coverage, the source of the footage received no special mention, except in the
attribution of the footage. There was an inversion of the trend to give greater importance to
journalist personalities, whereby he assumed the traditional representation of the professional
journalist: impartial, objective, invisible.

While local reporters were mostly absent in the journalist user group of all three news
organisations, the news texts involving this video were particularly focused on scrutinizing
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and commentating on the camerawoman’s local Hungarian media outlet. Laszlo’s employer
was given prominence and always described in terms of its political affiliation. Description of
N1TV ranged from “Internet-based television station close to Hungary's far-right Jobbik
party” (Agence France Presse, 2015), “It supports anti-immigrant party Jobbik” (BBC, 2015)
to “part of the far-right Jobbik party’s media empire” (AJPlus, 2015). By stressing the link
between N1TV and Hungary’s ruling anti-migrant Jobbik party, the news texts devalued the
camerawoman as an independent and impartial observer and the video itself clearly displays
her bias. Laszlo is relegated to a servant for anti-immigrant demagogues. In other words she
was shown as embodying the worst traits of journalism. Falling from the privileged position
of the decent journalist, she became the manifestation of the public mood – neither objective
nor impartial – and was widely condemned as deviant. In France 24’s Media Watch
programme Laszlo is even described as “a bit of a hate figure of the European press”. The
Media Watch programme shows that what is at stake in the editorialising of this news events
were journalistic values and the professional code of ethics. Both the overt political affiliation
of her news outlet and her personal intervention in the news event break drastically with
professional journalistic practices. By becoming the story, Laszlo is framed not just in terms
of the moral value of her actions – tripping up a refugee carrying a child – but what it means
to be a good journalist. This makes the treatment of the camerawoman in the news texts a
stark example of how deviance, and the exclusion it implies, were applied and reinforced in
boundary work (Carlson and Lewis, 2015).

Contrary to the aforementioned examples of journalists’ social media content being used to
promote the individual, the journalist in this case was the fly on the wall. In all of the news
texts, he was neither seen nor heard allowing his content to appear objective and impartial.
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And it was in this role that professional journalism was vindicated, and specifically the value
of the foreign correspondent as independent observer. A journalist who will overtly help the
police during a news event cannot be perceived as independent and much less as ‘speaking
truth to power’ as the enduring myth of professional journalism states. The presence of
foreign correspondents to cover the fate of refugees was therefore seen as elemental to
covering the refugee crisis appropriately as they were the untarnished and impartial observers
that could discover and report the truth as a public service.

Although the source of the content remained largely out of view in the coverage, his ability to
grab widespread attention on social media was cited as a reason for the mainstream media
attention. The video was framed within the context of ‘going viral’ online and eliciting a
‘global public outcry’. Again, it was the reaction by social media users that was used to
explain the broad coverage of the video, and which ultimately led to the firing of the
camerawoman. Professional journalistic values were vindicated first through the ‘global
public outcry’ and finally through the exclusion of Laszlo from the profession. The sacking
of the Hungarian reporter contributed to boundary work in professional journalism, not just
through reinforcing the ethical code of the profession but by also implying that
professionalism is intact.

Alan Kurdi
On 2 September the lifeless body of a Syrian toddler was discovered washed up on a beach in
Turkey. The boy, Alan Kurdi, drowned along with his mother and brother when their boat
capsized. Photos of the boy were widely shared and discussed on social media before being
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splashed across front pages and news broadcasts around the world. All three organisations ran
several news texts about his death.

It was Turkish photojournalist Nilüfer Demir (2015) who captured the images that went on to
go around the world but was given no special mention alongside the iconic photographs.
Instead, it was the tweeting of three of the photographs by the Human Rights Watch
emergency director Peter Bouckaert that became the subject of a number of news texts.
Bouckaert, was categorised in the data set as an expert source. Arguably this is only partly
applicable as he can be said to be independent but not disinterested given his position inside
an advocacy organisation. However, in this case his bias is considered to be outweighed by
his perceived independence. Both Al Jazeera and the BBC cited Bouckaert directly in their
coverage. Although France 24 also covered the images extensively in their news coverage it
did not cite him explicitly in any of it.

Research (D’Orazio in Vis and Goriunova 2015) tracked the spread of the images on Twitter
after initial Turkish news reports featured several photos of the tragedy, including four of
Alan Kurdi. The first tweet34 that showed the toddler lying face down in the surf at Bodrum
was published by Michelle Demishevich, a Turkish journalist and activist. While a small
number of Twitter users from Greece and Spain shared the photos as a result, the audience
remained mainly in Turkey before several users in the Middle East picked up on the images
and began tweeting them. Bouckaert, who was based in Geneva, was identified as the first
user to tweet the images with considerable impact outside the MENA region. However, while
his tweet was retweeted hundreds of times, it was in fact the Washington Post’s Beirut Bureau

34

The tweet was could not be accessed at time of writing.
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Chief, Liz Sly (@Lizsly) who’s tweet about Kurdi really stood out as the most widely spread
globally with over 7,000 retweets. Nevertheless, Bouckaert was cited in news texts both by
Al Jazeera and the BBC. A comparison between how both organisations used this source
shows substantially different approached and representation of Bouckaert.

In an Al Jazeera video report, Bouckaert was interviewed about how his tweet went viral and
asked what his personal response was to the impact that his tweet had. His involvement in the
spread of the images were reflected in a positive way, and presented as a catalyst for change
in public opinion about the migrant crisis. As such he was presented as a source of the
photographs. A BBC news text cited Bouckaert as the author of a blog post explaining why
he decided to tweet the photos of the dead toddler. Both of the reports focused on the ethical
questions around the sharing of graphic imagery. The interest in Bouckaert was framed in the
context of i) his ability to reach a large audience with his tweet and ii) the timeless issue of
ethics in photojournalism with regard to the portrayal of death and victims of violence.

Al Jazeera:
Bouckaert was interviewed for an episode of Al Jazeera’s Listening Post published on 12th of
September about how the photos of Alan Kurdi shifted public opinion to become more
sympathetic towards refugees. In it, Bouckaert described how he felt about the impact that
his tweet had.

The almost seven and a half minute report starts with describing the anti-refugee stance of the
Hungarian government and much of the country’s media coverage before claiming that the
photos of the boy had a profound effect on how Europeans viewed the refugee crisis.
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Narrator: However, a single tragedy captured by a lone photographer on a Turkish
beach undermined their arguments and shifted the debate as well as the news
coverage. The photographer works for Turkey's Dogan News Agency and her images
went global after they were tweeted out by Peter Bouckaert of the NGO Human
Rights Watch.
Bouckaert is shown at a laptop simulating typing the tweet that was so widely shared
Bouckaert speaks to camera: I wasn't surprised that it went viral on Twitter. I had
expected that. I was taken aback by the fact that so many people came out on the
streets and said, 'enough is enough. I'm going to do something to make sure these
refugees get to Germany.' Two thousands drivers in Austria alone drove into Hungary
to pick people up and I think that's a very beautiful reaction.
The report then continues with interviews with a lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of
London, about the symbolism of the photos and a Hungarian journalist arguing that it is
important for these types of images to be shown. The Al Jazeera report focused on the ability
of a non-journalist, in this case an NGO worker, to make a profound impact on public opinion
and galvanise civic engagement with his tweets. There is a positive representation of this kind
of public speech as he is framed as empowered to reach potentially huge audience and have a
real-world impact. The ethics of the publication of the graphic photos becomes the subject of
the report. The viewpoint that is presented is one that is supportive, arguing that it is
necessary to depict the gruesome reality that migrants face in order to provoke a public
response.

BBC
In a BBC Trending report headlined “Alan Kurdi: Has one picture shifted our view of
refugees?” a hyperlink leads to Bouckaert’s blog post explaining his reasons for sharing the
images.
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3. Is it even right to share this image?
The BBC has chosen to publish only one photograph of Aylan, in which he is being
carried by a Turkish police officer and is unidentifiable. However, several news
organisations have published more graphic images of the boy.

Image copyright AP, Image caption The boy's lifeless body was captured in a series
of images released by a Turkish news agency
On social media there was a similar debate about what purpose was served by
retweeting or sharing such a graphic image. A blog post by human rights watch was
widely shared, arguing the image being shared might influence European leaders. But
many others urged people not to share the image, as it was too heartbreaking and
graphic to take in.

In contrast to Al Jazeera, the BBC took a more critical approach to the decision to tweet the
images and implicitly questioned the ethics of sharing graphic photos of a dead child.
Preceding the extract featured above was a section in the news text describing calls by the
toddler’s aunt to share images taken of him when he was still alive. In response, photos taken
when the boy was still alive were tweeted, especially by journalists (Vis 2015). A tweet by an
American journalist of one such photo, said: “Aylan Kurdi, the 3 yr old who washed up at
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Antalya and captured the world’s attention, as he should be remembered:”. The BBC frames
the issue as a discussion on the ethics of anyone sharing the images and positions itself as
authoritative voice in shaping that discussion on what it means to act ethically in the
alternative news environment of social media platforms. The broadcaster also used this
discussion to set itself apart from other news organisations. The photos had in fact been taken
by a photojournalist and were originally published by a professional news outlet, followed by
many other news organisations around the world. So, whether intentionally or not, the BBC
did not only argue against the widespread sharing of the photo by non-journalists but by
professionals as well, reflecting a struggle to dominate in defining professional conduct in the
global news flow on two fronts.

Bouckaert is not mentioned in the report by name and his blog to explain his motives for the
tweet, which was widely seen as contributing significantly to the spread of the image, is
summed up in one sentence and no quotes. It is positioned between calls for sharing photos
showing Alan alive, the BBC’s own editorial position on what is ethically right, and a
hyperlink to a tweet criticising the spread of the graphic photos. The blog post is not
primarily represented to discuss Bouckaert’s views or considerations of ethics but contributes
to constructing the BBC’s argument on publishing the photo. It presents the BBC as having
taken the views expressed in the blog into account in its own editorial decision, while also
distancing itself. The final say on what is deemed ethical lies with the news organisation
reinforcing its position as authoritative. The social media debate about the images is taken as
a cue to provide transparency about editorial decisions that validate professional practices.
The fact that Bouckaert and other social media users are sourced for a news text that reflect
on an ethical debate in news coverage is particularly interesting as they ultimately serve as
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representing ‘the other’ to professionalism and also draws on the idea of deviance. Since the
professionalisation of journalism was characterised by the emergence of a code of ethics and
a code of practice, the text can be read as a reflection on how the BBC’s coverage of the
image is of a higher value than the distribution of the images by thousands of users. The blog
post is used as a means for the BBC to explain how it considered different sides of the
argument and to claw back authority as a leading voice in defining the ethics of how such
sensitive material should be presented to a news audience. In this scenario Bouckaert’s voice
and reasoning, as expressed in his post, carries much less weight than in the Al Jazeera news
text. However, I argue that as a means for showcasing deviant behaviour it was not nearly as
successful as the video of the Hungarian camerawoman, because the position among all three
news organisations differed in this case. The BBC took a different position, not only against
the social media habit of non-journalists but against their peers, revealing the difference
inside the professional group that could easily seem like a power struggle among news
professionals.

The Al Jazeera report also addressed the issue of ethics but in a way that focused on
galvanising a public reaction that would force political change. Bouckaert’s decision to tweet
the images taken by a Turkish journalist, is supported by a Hungarian journalist, who is also
interviewed for the report. He says: “We must share these kind of pictures. Without them we
cannot truly understand this refugee crisis. In the last couple of weeks the intense tragic
developments did affect public opinion in a positive way. No longer is the entire narrative
focused on the imagined danger that the refugees pose.” The sympathetic approach to
Bouckaert’s voice and message, and positive reflection of the impact that tweeting of the
images had on media coverage and politics, is consistent with the Al Jazeera’s overall
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approach to represent itself as facilitator of social media debate and discussion, that gives
such voices prominence. Engaging in a form of activism, Bouckaert represents the
empowerment of individuals to spread messages through social media. If nothing else, the
case of Alan Kurdi’s death showed that universal ethics in journalism can be evasive and the
struggle to define them are not only between news organisations and non-journalists but
inside the circle of professional news organisations as well.

What about Bouckaert’s identity as a user? Bouckaert straddles two identities; those of expert
and activist. Expert, through his work for a human rights NGO, and activist for the same
reason. Above that, he shares characteristics of the professional elite journalist that may have
qualified him as an appealing source. He filled the journalistic role of simply reporting
information sourced from elsewhere and capitalising on the influence he yielded on Twitter to
distribute it. Overall, like many of the elite journalists he was an outsider to the events and
reported on them from afar. In a way he became a gatekeeper, or rather a ‘gate-opener’, as his
personal involvement in spreading the message was central in precipitating a public outcry.
Despite the Washington Post correspondent’s much wider reach in tweeting about the toddler,
it is Bouckaert that gets to speak about making an impact with his tweet in the report. He is
both different from journalists but clearly a polished communicator who can adopt the role of
an accredited voice. His identity is not so wildly different to those that audiences would be
used to that it was easy to integrate him into some of the coverage as an equal user.
Therefore, the extent this really reflected a greater involvement and access to non-journalists,
even by Al Jazeera, is debatable
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Palestinian pen seller
The blogger tweeting under the handle @GissiSim was one of the few citizen users who
attracted enough media attention to become the main source of several news texts by both
BBC and Al Jazeera. According to his website, gissisim.com35, the man behind the account is
Gissur Simonarson, a web developer and consultant living in Oslo. He also runs the Conflict
News website (“About Conflict News,” n.d.), an independent news website that gathers and
curates social media content from conflict zones. On 25 August, Simonarson tweeted photos
he obtained showing a Palestinian man from Damascus selling pens on the streets of Beirut
while carrying his sleeping daughter. The tweet received a huge number of retweets and
elicited a surge of commentary on social media platforms. In response to the public interest
that the photos generated, Simonarson set up a crowdfunding campaign for the man and set
out to track him down. Through his network of social media connections, he was soon able to
locate the man and present him with the money that was raised. In both the BBC (Fig. 18)
and the Al Jazeera (Fig. 19) news texts the content was presented as an example of the power
of social media as a tool to generate public action which will have a real-world impact.

35

No longer available at time of thesis submission
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Simonarson was acting as a private citizen but he has some common characteristics with a
foreign correspondent in that he too had an outsider status. He was personally unaffected by
the Syrian conflict and had no obvious personal interest, which reflects the idealised
impartiality of professional journalism. There was a sense of purity in his actions. On the
other hand, his efforts to find the man in the photos in order to present him with the money
gathered through his crowdfunding campaign moved him into an area of activism meaning
that he did become personally involved. His appeal as a source may therefore have been in
his identity as impartial observer and distributor of information, which brought him in line
with journalistic ideals. The photos are presented as visual quotes of an unbearable situation
which Simonarson framed in his social media posts and managed to distribute to a wide
audience. What followed from this position of impartiality in a situation far away, were
emotions of empathy that led to acts of altruism.

Both the BBC and Al Jazeera treated Simonarson quite differently as a source in their news
texts. In the BBC texts he was given the space to speak about his crowdsourcing experience
and was given similar prominence to the aforementioned journalists, whose images went viral
on social media. The Al Jazeera coverage focused on the subject of the photos, Abdul Halim
Attar, and the impact his unexpected fame on Twitter and the crowdfunding campaign had on
his life. Attar’s own personal experiences were framed in a wider discussion of how Syrian
refugees lived in Lebanon (Fig. 20), while Attar was also given room to express what he
planned to do with the money and help he received. The social media source for this news
story therefore directly led to another source to emerge. In this case, the social media content
was a way to reach those individuals with the least opportunity to communicate to large news
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audiences. So, while the BBC coverage ended with the blogger given a greater platform to be
heard by BBC audiences, the Al Jazeera coverage used him primarily to reach another source.

An interesting contrast emerges between the coverage by the BBC and Al Jazeera in this
example and the previous one of images shared of Alan Kurdi. While Al Jazeera gave voice
to Attar in this case, it gave voice primarily to the NGO director who was partly responsible
for the spread of the photos of the drowned toddler, while ignoring calls by Kurdi’s aunt not
to share the graphic images. In fact, an entire video report was dedicated to justifying the
spread of the images. Kurdi’s aunt, who was reported as living in Canada, was not
represented.

On the other hand, the BBC relegated HRW director Bouckaert’s voice on his reasons for
sharing the images to a link to his blog and without mentioning him by name. Kurdi’s aunt’s
stance was used show the debate generated around the ethics around sharing graphic images.
Her call for people to share images of the boy when he was still alive, chimed with many
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western journalists, among whom the use of graphic imagery in news reporting is often
deemed more problematic. In both cases, the debate was centred around ethical issues of
spreading the images and in both cases the organisations used sources to prop up their own
stance.

Al Jazeera’s claim to give ‘voice to the voiceless’ is framed as reflected in sharing photos of
the ultimately voiceless; the dead refugee child. The reasoning is that not to show the tragic
outcome of this little boy’s journey to reach Europe would be to silence him and the
thousands of others who drowned trying to make the crossing. By the same token, the BBC’s
reason for citing Kurdi’s aunt and several journalists attempting to counter the spread of the
photos with images of him alive fell in line with upholding western journalistic ethics.

In the case of the pen seller, Attar was arguably far more marginalised and voiceless than the
tech-savvy and comparatively affluent web developer and blogger Simonarson. Except for
the fact of his tweets drawing attention to the plight of Attar and his family, he was not given
much space to speak in the Al Jazeera coverage, while his Twitter activity was used to direct
the focus on its subject. The BBC’s focus on the blogger over the subject of the photos he
shared, instead throws the focus on the perceived impartial distribution of news content by an
outsider and how this can spark positive public engagement with a real-world impact. Despite
the use of a citizen user by these two news organisations, the representation of Simonarson’s
social media material underscored the overall trend found in the sourcing practices in the
quantitative analysis whereby Al Jazeera focuses its social media newsgathering to source
content that is seen to offer a platform to marginalised individuals and groups, while the BBC
emphasises entrenched professional routines. Simonarson’s treatment as a high-impact source
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in his interview, similar to that of some BBC journalists, suggests under certain
circumstances some non-journalistic unaccredited sources can cross the boundary between
blogger and established mainstream media but that the characteristics of such a user overlap
with those of a professional.

The Kempsons
A video report by France 24 Observers documented volunteers helping refugees arriving on
the Greek island of Lesbos, which was one of the busiest arrival points for refugees coming
to Europe. The report featured the Kempsons, a British couple living on Lesbos, who were
heavily involved in raising awareness about the plight of refugees on the island and put out
calls for donations through their social media accounts. The 12-minute report features Julien
Pain, a France 24 journalist, visiting the island to interview the Kempsons and follow them as
they help new refugees arriving on the island. People interviewed in the report are sometimes
identified with graphics as seen below, mentioning their Twitter handles, where available.
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The report also features several short interviews with refugees as well as ordinary Greek
residents. In the context of this research the Kempsons were categorised as citizen users, and
they were counted among the Facebook users and Twitter users in the samples but most of
their material was published on Facebook. One of the themes is the Kempsons’ use of
Facebook to mobilise aid and other support, although none of their actual social media
content is featured. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that it was their social media activity that
raised their profiles as users of interest for a news report. The repeated mention of the
Kempson’s Twitter handle accompanying their interviews shows news audiences how they
can follow the couple and perhaps respond to their calls for support. Together with the
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interviews and the glimpse into their voluntary work, the couple are framed as a legitimate
source for updates on refugees’ lives on the island.

A number of other sources emerged from the interview with the Kempsons, including
refugees, Greek residents on Lesbos and the mayor of Lesbos. Of course, all of the
organisations in this study featured reports interviewing these types of sources throughout
their coverage. Nevertheless, in this particular news text, the Kempsons’ ability to attract
mainstream media interest through their citizen journalism and activism on social media was
also found to lead to the inclusion of voices with the least ability to gain representation in
mainstream media.

Summary
The comparatively diverse use of social networks in collaborative newsgathering in this case
study compared to the previous, showed that platforms were used to gather different types of
content. While Twitter was used to source ‘opinion makers’ that are more traditionally elite,
Facebook was used almost exclusively to source citizen users and to represent the public
mood or opinion. However, professional journalists remained those with the greatest source
power overall and Twitter was still the dominant platform for collaborative newsgathering.
While platforms host different types of users and it would be wrong to assume that Twitter
necessarily results in the prominence of elite source. Al Jazeera maintained its focus on
citizen users across platforms, setting it apart from the BBC and France 24 approach to social
newsgathering. The migrant crisis was a news event where news organisations could easily
dominate given the inaccessibility of many of the locations to ordinary citizens. For France
24, this meant that it used relatively few Twitter users, rather relying on its own reporters to
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produce online news text that followed traditional formats. At the BBC, in-house journalists
were promoted as reputable and authoritative voices on Twitter for audiences to follow.

Discourse on ethical content and ethical behaviour in journalism was found across all three
news outlets, showing that they were all involved in boundary work (Carlson and Lewis,
2015). For example, the BBC attempted to assert its authority and set itself apart from other
news organisations and ordinary users. While discussions of ethical codes attempted to
increase authority, the discourse around the use of the photos of Alan Kurdi showed there was
no consensus on what these codes are. This, in turn, undermines a claim to professional
practices as news organisations and journalists diverged so significantly in their views
(Hanitzsch & Vos 2017). Professional routines and norms were validated and at times
explained through non-professional users at the BBC, while Al Jazeera used their own
sourcing routines primarily to back up its claim to inclusion. As a result, the ethics debate
also highlighted the fissures that undermined notions of professionalism versus amateurism.
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7. Battle for Aleppo: sanctioning amateur journalists
Few news events have seen media activists and citizen journalists relied on by the
professional news media to the extent seen in the Syrian conflict. Since its start in 2011, large
amounts of multimedia material and other information found in international news coverage
originated from networks of citizen activists and fighters, who shared eyewitness material
and updates via social media platforms (Wall & El-Zahed 2015). As Reporters Without
Borders called it the deadliest conflict for journalists, the Syrian war was characterised by a
notable lack of professional journalists on the ground. By March 2017, the NGO recorded
211 journalists and citizen journalists killed since the start of the war (Reporters Without
Borders 2017). Analysis of news texts by the three news organisations in November 2016
examined how professional journalism negotiated the reliance on amateur sources with the
requirements of professional routines.

Eastern districts of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city, had been under rebel-control since
2012. In the summer of 2016 the Syrian army and its allies launched a major offensive to cut
off supply routes and regain control of the areas. On November 15, a one-month moratorium
on Russian air strikes in northwestern Syria came to an end and a major air and ground
offensive resumed to seize control of all of Aleppo from an alliance of armed opposition
fighters within a month. In mid-November an estimated 250,000 people continued to live in
the east of the city and the vast majority of the information that emerged from rebel-held
areas originated from a little more than a dozen citizen activist and rebel sources. In the
almost complete absence of professional journalists on the ground, social media platforms
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such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were used extensively to distribute high-quality
multimedia material and breaking news updates from within eastern Aleppo. The period
investigated spanned eight days from 15 to 22 November, covering the resumption of fighting
in Aleppo after a period of relative calm. During this time air raids by the Syrian army made
headlines on an almost daily basis. News coverage was dominated by reports of hospitals
targeted across eastern Aleppo, which prompted the World Health Organisation (World
Health Organization, 2016) to condemn the air strikes.

Timeline
From 15 to 22 November 2016
● 15/11: A moratorium on Russian air strikes on rebel-held areas of Aleppo ended and
air raids on northwestern Syria resumed
● 16/11: BBC reported a children’s hospital in eastern Aleppo was struck.
● 18/11: Al Jazeera reported another air strike on a children’s hospital in eastern Aleppo
while one of their news crew was inside the facility.
● 19/11: The World Health Organisation reported all hospitals in eastern Aleppo had
been put out of service by the fighting
The period investigated started with the end of a one-month moratorium on airstrikes by
Russia, which led to a renewed push to retake eastern and southern parts of Aleppo from
armed opposition groups. The offensive lasted a month with opposition-held areas fully
brought under Syrian army control by mid-December.
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Sample of news texts
News texts published by all three news organisations were gathered by the same method as in
the other two studies – both through the organisations’ online archives and the specified
Twitter accounts. All relevant texts spanning the eight days from 15 to 22 November were
then analysed for social media-sourced material and all texts without clearly identifiable
content originating from these platforms were disregarded. Based on some of the news texts
in the sample, it could be confirmed that both Al Jazeera and AFP had journalists of their
own inside east Aleppo. In one interview, a BBC Arabic editor said that the organisation was
relying mainly on citizen journalists and state media. However, the BBC also had at least one
correspondent in Syria at the time, although it was not clear if they were in Aleppo.
Nevertheless, all of the three outlets used social media content extensively. This type of
content often captured events at the heart of the fighting in areas that would have been the
most dangerous to access. Therefore, news organisations were not able to rely on their own
reporters to provide coverage, excluding amateur journalists, without missing some of the
most important information and multimedia material to come out of the conflict. This meant
news organisations were forced to integrate reporting by amateurs into their coverage, at
times creating entire news texts solely sourced through such social media users.

Unlike the previous two case studies, it was more difficult to ringfence the social media
sources found in the texts. On the one hand, most of the coverage about the Syrian war relied
heavily on social media users. On the other hand the platforms, or even the users, where the
material originated was often not explicitly stated. Moreover, the news texts investigated in
this case study built on years of news coverage, much of which was also influenced by
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activists sharing material on social media but which was impossible to capture in this data set.
Therefore, it was not possible to trace back all of the information supplied to its original
source. In order to keep the study as focused as possible, the news texts reflected in this
sample explicitly cited specific sources that were known to have primarily used social media
to reach mass audiences. The inclusion of these sources was based on the assumption that the
news organisations would have become aware of them initially thanks to their use of social
media platforms. However, relationships fostered with these sources overtime may have led
to some of the supplied information or content being sent directly to the news organisations.

Similarly, it was not possible to separate the sources by platform in many of the cases as the
users, the vast majority of them activist and citizen sources, used several platforms to share
the same content and hyperlinked from one platform to others or cross posted the same
content on several platforms – for example, on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube or their own
blogs.
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Figure 22. Sample of news texts covering the Battle for Aleppo

Quantitative Analysis
Source power and identities

Over the sample period all three news organisations published numerous news texts about the
renewed fighting in Aleppo. Al Jazeera produced 19 news texts about Aleppo of which 15
contained multimedia material, photographs and text originating on social media. France 24
published 23 news texts of which 14 contained social media-sourced content. The BBC
produced 11 news pieces, all of which contained some social media-sourced content.
Included in the BBC sample was one documentary entitled ‘Inside Aleppo’. The 45 minute
video had been first published in September but was republished by the BBC on 21
November. As such, France 24 had the greatest share of news texts without any obviously
identifiable social media-sourced content, followed by Al Jazeera with almost a quarter of
news texts that did not rely on interactive newsgathering. The prominence of social
media-sourced content in the coverage throughout the period shows the extensive reliance on
amateur and citizen-journalists, who were often but not always described as ‘activists’ by the
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news organisations. The vast majority of social media sources were therefore framed as
having civic qualities.

As already mentioned, the vast majority of sources were neither professional journalists nor
conventionally authoritative or accredited sources but rather citizen journalists and media
activists, publishing content on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. In the context of Aleppo,
this group also included search and rescue volunteers, medics and opposition fighters as well
as fighters aligned with the Syrian army. The sources were not always fully identified in the
news texts. While France 24 and AFP attributed reports by such sources consistently, BBC
and Al Jazeera often simply referred to ‘activists’ or ‘medics’. On some occasions, Al Jazeera
also blurred logos that identified the sources of amateur media. This made it difficult to gain a
comprehensive list of the sources used in the sample. However, it mostly remained possible
to identify these sources as originating on social media and the user group they belonged to.
In some instances the exact source were identified through searches of amateur material
released in the period investigated.

Sixteen different sources could be identified in the BBC coverage, which in total provided
information or multimedia material 35 times. In addition there were 14 references to sources
that could not be identified. This is not to say that there were an additional 14 sources as
some of these, or even all, may have been the same as those that were identified and
attributed in the news texts. Al Jazeera referenced 15 identified social media sources a total of
67 times. A further 19 references were made to unattributed sources. France 24 sourced
content from a total of 18 sources 49 times with no references to unidentified sources.
Quantitatively, the greatest source power was found among sources that were clearly
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sympathetic towards opposition fighters in eastern Aleppo. Given the difficulty in access to
the rebel-controlled areas this is unsurprising. Fig. 23 shows six sources were successful in
gaining entry to the professional global news flow through the BBC, France 24 and Al
Jazeera. They comprised about a third of each organisation’s attributed sources, showing the
dominance of a small group of amateurs. However, cited most regularly by a considerable
margin was the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), which was mainly run by a
Syrian citizen-journalist based in the UK. He recorded death tolls and locations of fighting
and air raids. Fig. 23 lists the most influential sources, meaning they appeared in news texts
of more than one of the news organisations, while Fig. 27 lists the remaining sources that
could be identified and their weight in the coverage of each of the organisations as measured
through the number of times that they were sourced for different pieces of information.

BBC

F24

AJ

6

20

19

6

5

15

Pro-opposition media activists

3

3

6

HNN – pro-opposition media activists

4

2

2

Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
(SOHR) – Citizen journalist documenting
number of casualties and reports of fighting
through network of activists on the grounds
White Helmets in Aleppo- Network of search
and rescue volunteers in opposition-held
areas of Syria
Aleppo Media Center (AMC) –
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Thqa – pro-opposition media activists

2

2

3

3

1

2

1

3

(1)

1

3

Independent Doctors Association (IDA) –
Medics in opposition-held Aleppo
SMART – pro-opposition activists reporting
through network from across Syria
Ibrahim Abu al-Laith – White Helmets
spokesman
Local Coordination Committee (LCC) –
Syrian network of anti-Assad activists

2

Russian Ministry of Defence

1
2

1

1

2

Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) – state
media
STEP – pro-opposition activists reporting
through network from across Syria

1

1

Fatemah Alabed – citizens in opposition-held
Aleppo reporting on events through Twitter

1

1

By far the most influential source across all of the organisations was SOHR. Some of the
news texts in the sample of this case study relied overwhelmingly, even sometimes
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exclusively, on the information provided by SOHR. For example, on 19 November, France 24
published an AFP report under the headlined “Regime bombardment kills 27 civilians in
Aleppo: monitor”. The first four paragraphs cited SOHR and their founder Abdul Rahman on
the latest updates from the fighting in eastern Aleppo, while the remaining two paragraphs
provided some background context about the offensive.

In an interview with the New York Times in 2013, SOHR founder Rami Abdul Rahman (a
pseudonym), was reported to be working out of his home in Coventry, England, together with
four other members inside Syria, collating reports of death tolls from a network of 230
activists across the country (MacFarquhar 2013). According to the same report, he fled Syria
in 2000 over anti-government activism after two of his associates were arrested. Profiling the
group in the early days of the conflict in 2011, the BBC described it as apolitical in nature.
However, at the same time it was also explicitly in favour of Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad stepping down.

It now has more than 200 members and affiliates, covering every province in Syria,
with some volunteers aggregating and publicising information from the UK.
Those in Syria work to confirm casualty reports of people that have come from
activists or been cited in the media, checking with family members, witnesses or
medics on the ground.
As foreign journalists are unable to operate freely in Syria to verify reports
themselves, the media are increasingly reliant on such information.
The group says it is impartial in its reporting, recording the deaths of soldiers as well
as civilians and protesters. (Lang 2011)
The New York Times described the means by which Abdul Rahman gathered death tolls in
the following passage:

216

Activists in every province belong to a Skype contact group that Mr. Abdul Rahman
and his aides tap into in an effort to confirm independently the details of significant
events. He depends on local doctors and tries to get witnesses. On the telephone, for
instance, speaking in his rapid-fire style, he asked one activist to visit a field hospital
to count the dead from an attack.
With government soldiers, he consults contacts in small villages, using connections
from his youth on the coast among Alawites, the minority sect of Mr. Assad, which
constitutes the backbone of the army.
Mr. Abdul Rahman has been faulted for not opening his list up for public access
online, but the world of nongovernmental organizations gives him mostly high marks.
(MacFarquhar 2013)
The reported methods by which the group gathered the death tolls were similar to how news
media and journalists may have gone about collecting such information. Further, the question
of impartiality was addressed the New York Times article as well as the BBC report through
the claim to record deaths on both side of the conflict. Despite Abdul Rahman’s personal
history as a dissident who fled Syria, both reports laid out his work as attempting to remain a
neutral source amid the fighting. Given the notion of impartiality as a cornerstone of
professional journalism practice, it lent authority to SOHR as a source.

In a war where access was extremely limited for professional journalists, some of the work
traditionally done by them was effectively outsourced to amateurs. Stories and passages such
as the ones above created some transparency about the work processes and routines of
SOHR, thus helping legitimise it as a credible source. They also serve to separate the
partisanship from the work that was produced by describing norms and methods that lay
claim to a separation of factual truth and subjective bias. However, the opaque network of the
group meant that most information about how information was gathered came from the
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founder himself. While the lack of transparency may be attributable to concerns for the safety
of volunteers gathering information, it remains clear that an activist source with a wide
network of amateur sources, which by the BBC’s own account the media had become
increasingly reliant on, was referenced consistently for updates on death tolls in fighting, and
became a quasi-authoritative source for such information. The SOHR took on a prominent
role in the news coverage as a source that had adopted journalistic norms and values,
especially with regards to impartiality and accuracy. As such it was seen as carrying out acts
of journalism instead of citizen activism, the latter of which, through its partisan nature,
presents a greater barrier to entry into the mainstream news flow. Frequently, it was referred
to not as ‘activist’ but as ‘monitor’ across all three news organisations, implying a detached
and disinterested character.

The second most influential source was the White Helmets. It shared the same amount of
influence as the SOHR in the BBC coverage and provided content in at least 15 cases in the
Al Jazeera coverage over the eight days. The group (also known as the Syrian Civil Defense)
comprised a network of search and rescue volunteers active across opposition-held areas of
Syria. It also presents itself as an impartial and neutral civil society group but also states that
it only operates in areas outside of the Syrian government control. On the group’s website it
described itself as follows:

The volunteers save people on all sides of the conflict – pledging commitment to the
principles of ‘Humanity, Solidarity, Impartiality’ as outlined by the International Civil
Defence Organisation. [...]
The White Helmets mostly deal with the aftermath of government air attacks. Yet they
have risked sniper fire to rescue bodies of government soldiers to give them a proper
burial.
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Bakers, tailors, engineers, pharmacists, painters, carpenters, students and many more,
the White Helmets are volunteers from all walks of life. Many have paid the ultimate
price for their compassion – 204 have been killed while saving others.
As well as saving lives the White Helmets deliver public services to nearly 7 million
people, including reconnecting electrical cables, providing safety information to
children and securing buildings. They are the largest civil society organisation
operating in areas outside of government control, and their actions provide hope for
millions. (White Helmets, n.d.)
The voluntary amateur nature of the group places it among the citizen user group, while the
claim to impartiality aligns it with qualities sought out by news organisations to fit with
professional routines and practices. This group published high quality videos, images and
updates from Syria’s different provinces across multiple platforms, including Facebook,
Twitter and YouTube. Over the course of the conflict, the social media activity of this group
became increasingly sophisticated. In addition to its main social media accounts that
published content pulled together from its volunteers across the country, there was a second
tier of social media accounts designated to specific provinces that shared content only from
these areas. Local social media accounts from Aleppo, for example, published content only
specific to Aleppo. Some of this material was republished by the overarching White Helmets
social media accounts. This resembled a centralised media network with local outlets
responsible for the reporting of events on their doorstep. A number of spokesmen for the
White Helmets also had a strong social media presence, operating their own social media
accounts. In its structure, therefore, the White Helmets’ citizen journalism outlets resembled
that of news networks or the communications operations of large NGOs. Navigating the sites
and tracing back the origins of the content to specific locations was made reasonably easy
with members of the White Helmets, such as Ibrahim Abu al-Laith (Fig. 23), found
personally giving interviews to news outlets.
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Other citizen journalists ran similarly sophisticated media operations through designated
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter accounts, ensuring that content, much of which was
audio-visual material, was publicised widely. Titles of videos and keywords in tweets made
content easily searchable and identifiable, usually containing the name of the neighbourhood,
city and date. Logos of different citizen journalist groups, such as the Aleppo Media Center
(AMC), Halab News Network (HNN), Thiqa, and others meant that videos were easy to
identify as originating from these users, and ensuring that news organisations could trace
videos back to the source in their verification process. In addition to the logo, a feature of
White Helmets videos was to show its members dressed in their distinctive uniform,
eliminating doubt about who the footage showed. Aware of the requirements of news
organisations for reliable information, citizen journalists took great care to make the videos as
accessible as possible, with a clear labeling format that was replicated across different citizen
journalist groups.

Despite a relatively small sample of identifiable social media users (ranging between 16 and
18 sources) used by all three news outlets the crossover of sources between them was
significant. All three organisations had at least six sources in common, all of them citizen
journalists, activists, and voluntary organisations of medics and rescue workers. For each
news organisation, this represented more than than a third of their social media sources.
Another seven sources were found in the coverage by two of the three news organisations.

Only two of the sources in Fig. 23 were not citizen journalist or civil society groups. These
were the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Syrian state-media outlet, the Syrian Arab New
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Agency (SANA). Both were sourced through social media channels significantly less than
some of the other users. However, these sources were cited many more times in the total
sample of news texts across all of the news organisations but those references were
eliminated from the study as it could not be conclusively traced back to originating on social
media platforms. Information originating from SANA is likely to have been mostly sourced
through its website, while the Russian MOD had more traditional channels to disseminate
their information to news media such as through press releases, press conferences as well as
their website.

The social media users with the most source power were typically outside
government-controlled areas as well as often partial to the cause of anti-government activism.
However, at the same time there was an effort made to present themselves as impartial in
their reporting. Those users with the least source power were, though active on social media,
the warring parties (Fig. 24). These sources’ overt interest in presenting their side of the story
may have meant that they were not deemed suitable except in exceptional cases, whereas the
other sources’ self-presentation as quasi media outlets fit more easily with journalistic
routines and practices.

BBC

France 24

Al Jazeera

Jabhat Fateh al-Sham
Unknown opposition activists Opposition fighters
and citizen journalists (14)
(2)

Other unidentified opposition
activist
(15)

THA
opposition media activists
(1)

Modar Shekho
Nurse in Aleppo
(1)

@AlabedBana
Young girl living in Aleppo
(6)

SHAM Front
Opposition fighters
(1)

Syrian Democratic Forces
Opposition (1)

Pro-Assad activist footage
(2)

Basel Ibrahim
Media activist

@UNReliefChief

Syrian Army
(2)
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(1)

Seraj Aldeen AlOmar
Member of opposition media
activists Al Buraq Media
(1)

United Nations
Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs and
Emergency Relief Coordinator
(1)
Milad Shahabi
Opposition media activist
(1)

Unidentified ‘health’ official
cited
(1)

Ahmed Hashisho
Member of opposition media
activists Al Buraq Media
(1)

Boffle Spoffel
Citizen
(1)

Basem Ayyoubi
Opposition media activist
(1)

Pro-Assad militia
(1)
Free Syrian Army
(1)

Textual Analysis
16th of November

Textual analysis of three news texts published on 16 November across the three news
organisations analysed the difference in how the BBC, France 24 and Al Jazeera framed
activists. Albeit a limited sample, it aimed to investigate the power-relationship established in
the texts between activists and journalists, and activist and other sources.
BBC

Fig. 25 shows 10 stills from a BBC video report titled “More airstrikes on Aleppo”. The order
of the selected stills are indicated by the number in the top left corner. They display the entire
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Figure 25. ‘More air strikes on Aleppo’ by BBC on 16.11.2016
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written text that was overlaid onto the footage. The first image sets the scene with footage of
bombs dropping onto buildings described as located in eastern Aleppo. It was sourced
through the Aleppo Media Center (AMC), one of the most popular pro-opposition citizen
journalist groups that recorded and publishing multimedia material (see Fig. 23). Against
these images as backdrop, the report cites Syrian government and army sources claiming to
be targeting the depots of rebel fighters in their air strikes. It then cuts back to the AMC
framing the attacks as targeting civilians with video material and interviews. Footage shows
young girls walking through rubble and a short interview with one man wearing a jacket
imprinted with the words ‘Syria Charity’ – a Paris-based non-profit, according to its website
– describing the targeting of “civilian areas with barrel bombs” and “medical facilities.”
Subsequently, the report cites SOHR and other activists. The AMC footage is reinforced with
further audio-visual material from another three pro-opposition citizen journalist groups –
Halab News Network, White Helmets, and SMART. In this news text example the
information provided by the Syrian authorities is presented only to be delegitimised in the
narrative constructed by citizen journalists. The activists’ claims remain unquestioned in the
absence of other independent reporting and are reproduced through the piecing together of
content produced by east Aleppo’s pro-opposition citizen journalists, be that high quality raw
video material, interviews, casualty counts and other reports providing information on the
fighting. However, notably absent in this content were the opposition fighters as
citizen-journalists frame the conflict almost exclusively in civilian and humanitarian terms.
Fig. 25 also shows one example of how these pro-opposition sources are legitimised more
than others. The perceived credibility of the opaque information gathering by the SOHR is
boosted with a reference to its casualty count that is described as conservative compared to
that given by activists on the ground. The implication being that the rigorous verification
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practices carried out by SOHR may play down the true death toll. This creates a tier system
of trustworthiness, with SOHR framed as the most trustworthy, while activists may be
somewhat less precise but can be relied on for journalistic material nonetheless.

France 24

“Syria: Russia resumes air strikes in rebel-held East Aleppo after ceasefire” was a video
report published by France 24 on the same date. In Fig. 26 the audio narration is transcribed
on the right and descriptions and sourcing of the video material is detailed on the left. This
textual analysis shows that France 24 relied on a much broader pool of sources, many of them
fitting Hall et al’s conventional primary definers with pro-opposition citizen-journalists as an
alternative view that contributes but does not extensively shape the overall narrative.

Video material

Reporter narration

Jets taking off from an aircraft carrier
(Source: Russian Defence Ministry,
YouTube)

Taking off for battle, Russian carrier jets
take off to pound opposition targets in Syria.

Footage of cruise missile being launched
from aircraft carrier. (Source: Russian
Defence Ministry on social media)

For the first time, Moscow is using its only
aircraft carrier in combat alongside cruise
missiles from its naval frigate.

Footage of Russian Defence Minister Sergei
Shoigu briefing Russian President Vladimir
Putin. (Source: Media or official Kremlin
footage)

Interpreter translation of Shoigu: [...] cruise
missiles were launched from the Admiral
Grigorovich frigates to hit predetermined
targets. Separately Bastion coastal missiles
have been launched to hit targets deep into
the Syrian territory.

Military aerial footage of strikes on targets.
(Source: Russian military)

Russia kept silent about targeting Aleppo
saying its offensive was aimed at the
Islamic State group and the Al Qaeda
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Footage of ground rocket launch. (Source:
Unknown)

affiliated al-Nusra front in rebel-held Idlib
and Homs provinces. Moscow claims no
Russian nor Syrian jet has bombed Aleppo’s
Old City in the past 28 days.

Video of column of dust rising from
buildings. (Source: Aleppo pro-opposition
citizen journalist group Thiqa on social
media)

Three weeks of relative calm was shattered
the same day Russia launched its offensive
as dozens of air raids pounded
opposition-held eastern Aleppo.

Footage filmed in rubble and dust
suggesting recent bombing or shelling of the
area. (Source: White Helmets on social
media)

Residents of the besieged neighbourhoods
believe Moscow’s escalation of the violence
is just a prelude to a major ground
operation. Syrian state TV reported that
regime troops were preparing to attack from
nine directions.

Footage of tanks rolling down a road.
(Source: Unknown)
Footage of opposition fighters’ tanks and
rocket launchers firing. (Source: Jabhat
Fateh al Sham on social media )

In the last four weeks opposition fighters
have rejected repeated Russian offers of
humanitarian pause in fighting to leave the
city.

Video of rubble-filled roads and bombed out
buildings (Source: Pro-opposition citizen
journalists AMC on social media)

No aid has entered the area since July. The
UN warns that a quarter of a million people
trapped in the city’s rebel-held east are
facing mass starvation.

Figure 26. ‘Syria: Russia resumes air strikes in rebel-held east Aleppo after ceasefire’ by
France 24 on 16.11.2016

Compared with the BBC report, pro-opposition citizen journalists’ power to frame the
narrative was curtailed by France 24 reporters through the inclusion of competing narratives
by other sources. A large and leading part of the report was framed by Russian military and
government sources, reproducing their narrative of fighting extremists in Syria. The initial 50
seconds of the report – just over half of the total length – shows footage of military hardware,
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a military briefing and aerial footage of an air strike. The emphasis is placed on the military
aspect of the conflict and the image created by these sources is a largely sanitized one. The
inclusion of footage by opposition fighters showing the firing of rockets and tanks also put
the focus on the conflict as two opposing armed sides. Furthermore, the pro-opposition
citizen journalist narrative – focused on emphasising the civilian cost – is framed not just as
the outcome of Syrian regime and Russian military action but contextualised as also resulting
from opposition fighters’ refusal to accept a ceasefire. This narrative is wholly absent from
the citizen-journalist controlled BBC report. On the other hand, the Russian claim that their
military is not targeting Aleppo is called into question by the content produced by
citizen-journalists which created a counter-narrative that asserts Russian involvement.
Competing narratives are presented to the news audience throughout the report with the
opportunity for different actors to reframe and contest each others’ claims. Unlike in the BBC
report (Fig. 25) pro-opposition citizen journalists could attract the attention of the France 24
producers and succeeded in relaying their claims but this was not uncontested and they were
not dominant in framing the overall news text. As such, citizen-journalists were not carrying
out the journalists’ work in overwhelmingly producing the news text but were treated
primarily as sources. The power to select and contextualise the different sources and material
comprising the news text remained far more evidently in the hands of professional journalists.
The wide selection of sources to counterbalance one another also implies the lack of
impartiality by each actor that requires representation of different sources to produce a more
notionally balanced news text. By contrast, the BBC news text saw responsibility for
reporting on events abdicated to citizen-journalists to the point that it incorporated an
interview staged by them.
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Al Jazeera

The Al Jazeera video report on 16 November gave significant framing power to
pro-opposition citizen-journalists. Fig. 27 also breaks down the audio narration on the right
and stills from the video material on the left with information about its sourcing detailed
beneath them. As seen in the BBC video report, citizen-journalists were dominant in the
framing of the news text but unlike in the BBC news text, their message was largely mediated
through the narration of an Al Jazeera journalist. Although BBC journalists selected the
material and reports for their news text, in many ways this content was left to speak for itself
appearing to show a low level of mediation by professional journalists. By comparison, the
Al Jazeera news text is heavily mediated through narration, albeit sympathetic of the
citizen-journalists’ framing. Moreover, the blurring of the logos identifying the source of the
activist material used implies a sense of ownership and responsibility adopted by Al Jazeera
for this material. The line separating Al Jazeera’s own content from that of pro-opposition
citizen-journalists is blurred as activists are more deeply integrated into the news text. The
narrator reported the claims and reports of citizen-journalists as their own without attribution.

Video material

Reporter Narration
There’s panic on the streets of Aleppo.
Places like Al-Ferdous neighbourhood are
few areas where rescuers can still reach

(Source: White Helmets)

228

Scores of people have been wounded in the
latest round of attacks.

(Source: White Helmets)
These are some of the most intense air
strikes by the Assad government’s jets in
three weeks.

(Source: White Helmets)
Elsewhere in the city, when the suffocating
dust and smoke settled, the destruction
became clear.

(Source: White Helmets)
This is the Haderiya neighbourhood. One of
the nine areas which came under attack in
the besieged city of Aleppo.

(Source: White Helmets)
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This man in the Hanano neighbourhood
says barrel bombs targeted this area. He
tried to save a little girl here but she died.

(Source: Unidentified activist)
Suheil al-Hassan is an important leader of
the Assad military. His troops say they’re
ready to take the city of Aleppo.

(Source: Unknown)
We spoke to one of the rescuers who was
unable to go and help others.
Al Jazeera reporter: “Ismael tell me where
you are and what is happening around you.”

(Source: Al Jazeera)

(Source: Al Jazeera)

White Helmets spokesman Ismail
Alabdullah: “What’s happened, just around
12 o’clock, there was a huge wave of
bombing which started on Aleppo city
targeting many neighbourhoods, actually all
the neighbourhoods. I was trapped in my
apartment until now, and maybe in a few
minutes I will try to go there”
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(Source: Syrian state TV but originating
from Russian Ministry of Defence)

The attacks in Aleppo were timed with
Russian strikes on Idlib and Homs.
Pro-government TV uploaded this video,
which it says was shot just before the
Russian aircraft carrier Kuznetsov was used
for the first time. Russia’s defence ministry
says it will be targeting [Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant] positions and Jabhat
Fateh al-Sham, a group formerly known as
al-Nusra Front. Many see this as Russian
muscle flexing of its military might.
Since last year, the military support for the
Assad government has turned the tide and
reversed opposition gains.

(Source: Unknown)

(Source: Al Jazeera)

Reporter: “Rebels say they are being
attacked by Syrian, Russian, Iranian and
Lebanese forces. People in the city of
Aleppo say they knew these attacks were
coming but could do little to prepare and as
world leaders have failed to provide a
solution the people of Syria continue to
suffer.”

Figure 27. ‘Syria war: Aleppo pounded by air strikes as pause ends’ by Al Jazeera on
16.11.2016

For the first 38 seconds (of 2’05”) video material is largely provided by the White Helmets.
The reports by its members’ and other pro-opposition citizen-journalists is cited throughout
without attribution even though the only Al Jazeera journalist seen in the footage is located
across the border in Turkey’s city of Gaziantep. Mediated through the journalist’s voice it
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conveys a sense of objectivity – a problematic but persevering value of professional
journalism (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007; Muñoz-Torres, 2012; Skovsgaard et al., 2015). In
fact, the news text illustrates citizen-journalists becoming primary definers as they provide
the majority of the information, while also merging with secondary definers – the news media
– as they adopt the role of the reporter themselves. Al Jazeera’s news text is the starkest
example of the break-down of the separation between citizen-journalism and professional
journalism as the two are not only in a symbiotic relationship with one another but the
division becomes all but invisible. By contrast the BBC provided the platform for the
narrative and content of citizen-journalists to be reproduced without adopting the same extent
of responsibility and ownership of this material. Afterall, such sources were typically
described as activists – a term that implies strong partisanship and runs counter to notions of
the Anglo-Saxon media model’s emphasis on neutrality and impartiality. As such it fell short
of attributing full professional journalistic values to these sources despite efforts to legitimise
them for the purpose of the news coverage. Nevertheless, at the same time, these sources
were presented as providing journalistic work and the BBC became strongly reliant on them.
In fact, the term ‘activist’ did little to diminish these source’s value, if not, in fact, elevated it.

Claim to Impartiality
Sources are typically not expected to be impartial. In fact, most of the sources listed under
Hall et al’s (1978) primary definers are political actors, social institutions and civic groups
with interests that at times compete and at other times are aligned. The only exception is the
expert, whose value lies in their perceived disinterested expertise. However, notions of
impartiality lie at the heart of journalism practice, as most journalists pride themselves at

232

least on applying routines designed to provide impartiality and a level of autonomy that
enables their work to be untarnished by interest groups (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007).
Therefore, it is particularly noteworthy to see impartiality mentioned in relation to these
sources, suggesting they are viewed not only as journalistic sources. In the absence of
professional journalists on the ground, these users provided many of the components of the
news coverage, in terms of audiovisual material and news updates. While the news coverage
often did refer to pro-opposition citizen journalists as activists, the White Helmets were also
referred to by the more neutral term of medics, while SOHR was frequently referenced as
monitor, suggesting a disinterested character. These sources were therefore partly legitimised
through the appearance of neutrality. Furthermore, while the term ‘activist’ was used
frequently to describe pro-opposition citizen journalists, this did not prevent them from
receiving a prominent role in many of the news texts, and often being cited in the first
paragraph.

Below are the first paragraphs of two of the BBC news texts:
Syrian opposition activists say at least five people have been killed after Syrian
government aircraft bombed rebel-held
eastern Aleppo. (BBC, November 15, 2016)
At least 25 people have died in a third consecutive day of Syrian government air
strikes and shelling on rebel-held
parts of Aleppo, activists say. (BBC, November 17, 2016)
On 16 November, the BBC published a news text entitled “Aleppo: Mother films bombing
from rooftop”. It featured the footage of Fatemah Alabed, a woman living in Aleppo, filmed
from a rooftop showing the bombing of buildings as she spoke into the microphone. The
entire text was contextualised by the BBC only through the headline and the following
accompanying paragraph: “ Fatemah Alabed is an English teacher living in East Aleppo – she
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has three children. Standing on her rooftop, she filmed the scene as Syrian jets resumed their
bombing of the city after nearly a month's break.” Initially, Alabed attracted the interest of
mainstream news media through a Twitter account allegedly used by her seven-year-old
daughter Bana for tweeting her experience of the war. Located in the opposition controlled
area of Aleppo, the tweets painted an emotional picture of living under threat from
bombardment. In November 2016, the account, @AlabedBana, had more than a quarter of a
million followers.

While Alabed said she managed the account, sometimes tweeting her own updates,
others were described as sent by her daughter. All of the tweets were sent in English,
prompting some to question the level of influence and control yielded by adults in what Bana
posted. Regardless, Alabed’s obvious attempts to reach large audiences together with her
daughter through their savvy use of technology attracted the interest of mainstream media
and
arguably put her into the role of an activist. In the news text “Aleppo: Mother films bombing
from rooftop”, a huge level of control was placed with Alabed in producing the news text,
with only minimal amount of input by BBC journalists themselves. In the short paragraph,
the BBC reference to Alabed as a mother and resident of Aleppo, suggests a more neutral role
as citizen witness. The text does not reference the means by which she came to the news
media’s attention – primarily through the Twitter account in her daughter’s name portraying
the conflict as the Syrian army attacking vulnerable civilians — a child, in this case. Other
video reports also relied overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, on footage provided by citizen
journalists.
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To a large extent, the coverage from inside eastern Aleppo was placed in the hands of
extremely social media savvy users, who did much more than simply act as a source. Instead
they stepped into the role of the journalist themselves, which explains the tendency to
legitimise their voice through the values of professional journalist routines. As the BBC at
times attributed professional practices to such users, elevating the value of their content, it
created room for these users to provide the news coverage that was hard to obtain through
other means. And yet, by assuring that methods of newsgathering and reporting by these
users was coherent with professional practices, it did so without undermining the value of
professional routines as a whole.

However, attempted impartiality is generally at odds with the role of the citizen journalist.
For example, blogs, a popular forum for citizen journalists before social media truly came
into its own, have been specifically described to “not follow the canons in factchecking,
seeking out alternative or opposing views, or attempted impartiality” (Halavais 200, p.: 29).
Other content analysis studies of citizen journalism have also shown it not to hold true to
professional understanding of objectivity (Carpenter 2008; Paulussen & D’heer 2013).
Despite attempts to bestow the values of professional routines on some of the citizen
journalism used, the BBC clearly grappled with the contradictions and sought to address
potential criticisms of imbalance in the news coverage created by the dominance of
pro-opposition citizen journalists. Speaking on the BBC Outside Source programme on 16
November, presenter Nuala McGovern asked a BBC Arabic journalist about the reliance on
‘activists’ in the news coverage of Aleppo. This interview followed directly after a 2 minute
and 15 second segment in which McGovern interviewed a member of the White Helmets.
McGovern introduces the White Helmets interviewee as located in the Turkish city of
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Gaziantep but in contact with other volunteers in Aleppo, presenting him as a spokesperson
for the organisation. The interview then goes on to discuss the alleged casualties of overnight
air raids attributed to Syrian and Russian forces, with the interviewee stating a precise
number of warplanes and helicopters. During the interview McGovern probes her interviewee
about the origin of the information.

BBCOS presenter: Where do you get your figures from? Who tells you
who has died?
White Helmets spokesman: Our teams. Syrian Civil Defense teams. As you know,
we are the only one responding to the attacks. So we have about 120 volunteers
inside eastern Aleppo city.
The answer is noteworthy for three reasons. Firstly, words such as ‘responding’ and
‘volunteers’ suggests an altruistic dimension to the group’s work akin to that of nonprofits.
The use of material provided by NGOs in news production has long been normalised with
non-profits adopting a media logic that mimics journalistic norms in order to increase their
chances of mainstream news media integrating such material in their coverage (Cottle and
Nolan, 2007; Fenton, 2009). However, news organisations themselves form “new
legitimating rationales” (Wright 2014, p. 396) around their dominant moral values that gives
preference to some non-profits over others. Research into the use of NGOs’ multimedia
material by mainstream news reporting on Africa, found the BBC World Service “blended
ideas of ‘public service journalism’, including notions of ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’, with a
Reithian approach to the educative purpose of media consumption; and an ‘African service
ethos’ which privileged representing ‘ordinary Africans’” (Wright 2014, p. 397). Similar
legitimating rationales are extended to the use of citizen-journalist material from Aleppo that
blurs the lines between how to identify these actors – it is not clear if they are seen wholy as
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NGOs or citizen-journalists. While the answer above emphasises the voluntary non-profit
nature of the group, for whom a framework of legitimation already exists through perceived
execution of journalistic routines, it also plays on the notion of ‘ordinary citizens’ on the
ground to provide independent reports. Therefore, attempts to legitimate the reliance on these
sources combine the argument of impartiality with the representation of ‘ordinary citizens’.
By stressing the voluntary nature of the work done by the White Helmets, combined with a
wide network of 120 members, it implies a level of independence and autonomy by these
actors who are presented as not beholden to the organisation for financial gain and able to
report truthfully what they see and experience. However, perhaps most glaringly, the
interviewee states in his pitch for his organisation that the BBC have little choice in who to
source their information from. Therefore, in a further attempt to legitimate the reliance on
such sources, notions of balance are discussed in the subsequent interview segment between
the BBCOS presenter and the BBC Arabic journalist.

BBCOS presenter: Do we always have to rely on activists that are there? Is it ever
possible for reporters to get in, in this particular instance and what’s happening with
air strikes?
BBC Arabic journalist: It is very problematic for the reporters to go there actually
because either they go with the one part, either they’re embedded with the Syrian
regime troops and these will show you what’s happening in the western part or you go
embedded with the Free Syrian Army let’s say or Jabhat al-Nusra, Jabhat Fateh
[al-Sham]. Now, and this is a problem as you will see what’s happening in the eastern
part. This situation is very loaded in terms of sectarianism, very loaded with terms of
political division. It’s very hard and difficult in a devastated situation like in Aleppo –
in all Syria, actually. Activists are one source erm, ah of the sources, as well as the
official line. So we try to balance and listen to both stories. (BBCOS, November 11,
2016)
Noteworthy is that the threat to journalists’ safety in accessing areas of conflict in Aleppo is
not addressed directly in the interview despite it being perhaps the most compelling practical
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reason for the lack of on-the-ground reporting by professional journalists. Rather surprisingly
perhaps, the argument being made is that on-the-ground reporting in this instance has become
redundant due to the volume of information released by both sides. The interviewee mentions
“political divisions” and “sectarianism”, along with the need to embed reporters on either
side, as reasons why the potential work done by them would differ little from the information
already emerging from the conflict. The barriers facing journalists in assuming an
autonomous and impartial role once embedded with a warring party have been made by
veteran war correspondents such as Patrick Cockburn, who writes, “Journalists cannot help
reflecting to some degree the viewpoint of the soldiers they are accompanying. The very fact
of being with an occupying army means that the journalist is confined to a small and atypical
segment of the political-military battlefield.” (Cockburn 2010) As Cockburn asserts, one of
the main flaws of the practice of embedding is that journalists come to view the conflict only
in military terms missing the broader picture . Nevertheless, there are also defences for the
practice as “[a]ccompanying armies in the field is usually the only way of finding out what
they are doing or think they are doing.” (ibid. 2010) Criticisms of embedded journalism
typically reflect the view that it provides a limited and controlled view of a small section of a
conflict that is not necessarily reflective of the wider picture and sees journalists turn into
spokesmen for the military (Al-Kindi 2004). The practice is tainted by journalists’ instinctive
sympathy for those they are reliant on for their safety, leading to a symbiotic relationship – as
demonstrated by Gordon Dillow’s account of embedding with US Marines during the Iraq
war (Dillow 2003). Nevertheless, a survey of embedded journalists in the Iraq War have still
found them to view their role as beneficial to journalism (Fahmy & Johnson 2005). This view
was dependent on the understanding that their main task was simply to reflect a narrow and
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incomplete view of the conflict that could contribute to the broader picture when
complimented by the work of non-embedded journalists.

The idea that embedded journalists do little more than the public relations work of the army
they are embedded with has also been contested. Reviewing the practice of embedding
journalists with the US military, Buchanan (2011) argues that there are push and pull factors
that can lead the media and military interests to diverge. The media’s reliance on ratings and
audiences means ultimately they are not entirely beholden to the interests of the military and
will seek out more autonomy and independence when viewers tire of the dominant narrative.
This paints a much more complex picture of the benefits and drawbacks of the practice of
embedding journalists than what the BBC Arabic journalist concedes in the interview.
Arguing, as he does, that journalists would merely be used as pawns by the warring parties,
he suggests that balanced reporting can be obtained by simply weighing up the information
released by opposing sides. The burden and responsibility of reporting is then shifted onto
actors in the conflict and activists on the ground while their information is ‘managed’ by
BBC journalists in remote newsrooms. Reverting back to the pro-opposition activist users
relied on so heavily for the news coverage, they are much more than mere sources but relied
on and legitimised to do the actual work of journalists. Moreover, as professional journalists
are distanced from the events they are tasked with covering they become less able to
contextualise events independently, leaving activists and citizen journalists to fill not just the
gap of reporter but also of expert. As such they emerge as primary definers through their
supposed expertise, while their reporting role, together with their means to create high quality
multimedia content, defines the narrative and framing of events. His explanation does leave
one question open, which is supported by the cited research and argues that while embedded
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journalists may only be able to provide a narrow view of conflicts from within their relatively
controlled space, it can contribute to more complete coverage when read in tandem with
coverage by other journalists. Therefore, the BBC could have embedded journalists on either
side to build up more balanced reporting but chose not to likely due to the increased targeting
of reporters by insurgents, the rise of which was already recorded in conflicts in Afghanistan
and Iraq (Buchanan 2011, Cockburn 2010), and were also a hallmark of the Syrian conflict.
However, explicitly acknowledging this state of affairs may have undermined the
representation of pro-opposition activists and citizen-journalists inside rebel-controlled
districts of Aleppo as carrying out acts of journalism compatible with valued professional
practices, especially with respect to notions of impartiality and autonomy. Media activists’
freedom to report from east Aleppo while the area remained too dangerous for many reporters
at least raises questions about their interest in controlling the emerging narrative.

The BBC’s claim to balance by sourcing information from both sides is not supported by the
data set, which shows an overwhelming preference for pro-opposition social media users. In
fact, all of the social media users identified in the sample were sympathetic to the rebels.
Syrian army and Syrian state media were cited in the news texts though their content was not
primarily distributed through social media and therefore is not part of the sample studied in
the research. Nevertheless, only one of the news texts analysed led with the information
released by the Syrian government or a source sympathetic towards the Syrian government.
The remaining news texts all led with activist sources, or juxtapose activist sources with
pro-government sources creating a frame that undermines the latter.

Objectivity
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Above all else, the findings in this case study raise questions about the autonomy of news
organisations in the newswork. Where does the treatment of openly partisan sources as
journalist-like leave the objectivity norm? Objectivity as a normative practice in journalism
emerged in the early part of the 20th century and is based in a scientific approach (eg. see
Janowitz 1975; Shoemaker & Reese 1996) to determining an objective truth about events that
are deemed newsworthy. “The objectivity norm has been the means employed by journalists
to convince receivers that they produce reliable and valid descriptions of reality. This
legitimating function has made objectivity a beacon which guides the work journalists do –
when they select, collect, and present the news.” (Skovsgaard et al. 2015, p. 24) The claim to
objectivity has been criticised on several counts but nevertheless the ambition to report
objectively persists as a cornerstone of professional practice. One obvious flaw is the inherent
subjectivity of the individual that critics argue reduces objectivity to an unachievable ideal.
Nevertheless, the development of normative practices in journalism sought to create a method
which removed journalists’ subjectivity from the output of their work in order to permit a
claim to neutrality and objectivity. Emphasis was put on the practice not the individual and
what was developed was “[u]nity of method rather than aim” (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007:
84). By recognising the inevitability of personal and cultural bias, a code of practice allowed
subjective individuals to produce work that was not just deemed objectively true, but also
permitted subjective views to be argued in a manner that would stand up to scrutiny.
Therefore, the objectivity norm did not only set out to report in a neutral way but also to
allow a method by which arguments could be formed. By emphasising the manner by which
sources produced their information rather than the beliefs, views and motivations of the
sources themselves, the BBC, for example, could present the SOHR as a reliable source
despite the founder’s personal history as a dissident. In short, the description of his impartial
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methods served to legitimise him as producing valuable journalistic work. The discussion of
the sources’ newsgathering practices served to lay claim to a commitment to professionally
sound, approved practices36.

However, the claim to objectivity evidently still remained an issue for the news organisations,
judging by the loaded term ‘activist’ frequently used to describe the users that much of the
reporting was effectively outsourced to. As the objectivity norm diminishes in news content
with the spread of amateur and citizen-journalism (eg. see Carpenter, 2008), news
organisations are at pains to elevate their value through claims to professional practices.
Therefore, another method of legitimising their reporting was with the claim to providing
balance – another professional practice aimed towards producing objective reporting
(Shoemaker and Reese 1996, p. 15). In this case, the role of the news organisation itself was
emphasised to argue it met the requirements of professional practices. In the BBC Outside
Source interview, for example, a claim to balance was made by arguing readers were
provided with the different sides of the story through information released from both
anti-Assad and Syrian government and military sources. By producing ‘balanced’ reporting,
meaning a range of opposing views are represented and heard, journalists adopt a passive role
in creating meaning. Rather than steering audiences through value judgements made by
journalists, audiences are provided with an array of information from which to form their
own opinions. Balance through the mere presentation of opposing voices, however, is not
considered sufficient to provide good reporting. The claims made by them have to be
scrutinised and critically engaged with to test them for validity (Ryan, 2001; Skovsgaard et
al., 2015). Only then can audiences reach informed conclusions. Therefore, journalists are
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Despite much academic research providing evidence to the contrary.
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still called on to do the work of gathering hard facts and considering opposing claims and
arguments. In terms of social media-sourced content that clearly dominated news coverage of
events in east Aleppo, these hard facts could in most cases not be obtained independently
through journalists reporting as detached observers from the ground, or from what would
constitute an independent source. Aside from the data showing a preference for
pro-opposition activists in sourcing multimedia material and news updates, suggesting
balance of viewpoints was often not achieved, critical engagement with sources was almost
impossible. This risked reducing coverage to unverifiable claims and counter-claims.

The departure from the objectivity norm in online news was already predicted by Bruns
(2003) who argued that gatewatching, rather than gatekeeping, would become the method by
which information is vetted and distributed to wider audiences. As news organisations
grappled with their obligation to produce coverage in line with their professional standards
while outsourcing much of the reporting to amateurs, the gatekeepers ultimately became
gatewatchers, choosing which sources would be elevated to prominence for their audiences.
Bruns (ibid) argued that interactive newsgathering will make objectivity an obsolete ideal and
normative practice. With the abundance of information available online the onus is no longer
on a limited number of news outlets to produce objective journalism. Rather, the information
saturation rather than scarcity means gatewatching replaces gatekeeping. Hereby, groups of
“online librarians” survey relevant and reliable information emerging and point those seeking
this information towards it.

Online news operations are therefore not primarily charged with an obligation to
report objectively and impartially, or to work to a set amount of column inches or
airtime, but rather with the task of evaluating what is ‘reliable’ information in all the
topical fields they cover. Due to the abundance of potential news sources in the
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networked environment of the World Wide Web, such information evaluation
becomes a critical task, and for many online newsgatherers their role is less similar to
that of the traditional journalist than it is to that of the specialist librarian, who
constantly surveys what information becomes available in a variety of media and
serves as a guide to the most relevant sources when approached by
information-seekers. This ‘librarian’ position contrasts markedly with that of the
traditional ideal of the ‘disinterested’ gatekeeper-journalist – instead, Internet
‘librarians’ (if we accept this term for now) are usually personally involved, ‘of the
people’, and partisan; they support the case of those seeking information rather than
that of the information providers or controllers. (ibid)
Bruns is clear, however, that these librarians are not reporting, rather they are collecting texts.
He predicted that newsrooms themselves will host a collaboration between traditional
journalists and such gatewatchers. This integration of the gatewatcher into newsrooms is
supported by the evidence in this case study. As the BBC Arabic editor himself suggests in
the interview, journalists adopted primarily a gatewatching role, gathering texts released on
both sides of the conflict. The news texts by France 24 and Al Jazeera showed a similar
reliance on such material. In addition to carrying out the work of the gatewacher, newsrooms
also relied heavily on other non-journalist gatewatchers such as the Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights. In this case study, in fact, the journalists largely abandoned their traditional
role as those reporting the news but acted as the conduits through which other sources’
information was distributed. Gatewatching was deemed sufficient to produce coverage to
professional standards.The editor in the interview expressed a striving for balance that he
asserts is provided by listening to voices on different sides of the conflict. While balance is
generally not considered equivalent to the idea of impartiality and objectivity (Kovach and
Rosenstiel 2007) the sourcing in news items also showed an extensive reliance on
pro-opposition activists and citizen-journalists that, at least in the period investigated, did not
support claims to balance. As Bruns argues though that the role of the newsgatherer is not to
ensure impartiality, balance or objectivity in each text they help distribute further. Rather
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gatewatchers help collect as wide a range of reliable texts as possible, which viewed as a
whole may provide the greatest and most up-to-date amount of information on a given topic.
However, in the case of the Syrian war, the ability to release information was arguably
limited, not least with regards to the technological means and know-how to produce and
distribute their own material in a way that made it widely accessible. The lack of
transparency in the sources themselves also meant that the “specialist librarians” – meaning
the newsroom editors using the content – had little means to assess the worth and reliability
of the texts. Implicit in the online news environment that Bruns describes is the expectation
of extreme diversity as well as freedom of speech, which replaces impartiality. Yet, again
there was no way to be sure that either such diversity or freedom of speech existed. As
veteran Middle East correspondent Cockburn (2016) pointed out, it seems implausible that in
an area largely off limits to independent journalists, citizen journalists would be granted any
autonomy to report independently37. This is not to argue that the reporting by activists was
without merit or accuracy but that the information released may have been tightly controlled
and incomplete.

As Hall et al. (1978) argue, creating authoritative and accredited sources is vital to satisfying
professional routines in journalism. This systematically implants bias in favour of these
sources into news texts as they are influential in deciding which issues are problematised and
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Others have questioned widespread criticism of some of the activists reporting, specifically White

Helmets, uncovering a concerted effort to delegitimise the group through online campaigns (Solon,
2017). However, the issues raised here are not in reference to misinformation campaigns against the
White Helmets but rather how much the reporting done by the group can credibly be argued to step in
for the absence of independent professional journalists.
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how they are framed and discussed. A number of activist sources achieved this position to the
extent that they were elevated above sources that may have been more conventionally
considered primary source such as the Syrian government or army. While the Syrian
government was understood and portrayed as inherently biased, activists adopted a hybrid
role of the disinterested expert/war correspondent, which gave them a powerful voice in the
news coverage. By framing these sources in such a way, the news organisations managed to
not only produce large volumes of news coverage on events that were practically off-limits
but could use it as a chance to advocate for professional practices by bringing the issue to
audience’s awareness.

Summary
Holzscheiter (2005) differentiates between power in discourse and power over discourse. In
this study, power in the discourse of the news event was often held by activists. This also
largely held true of the power over the discourse as activists were almost the only sources
who were able to report from inside east Aleppo. If the news organisations covered the events
in east Aleppo, they had to relinquish much journalistic control to activists, who provided a
large extent of the material that comprised the news coverage. However, power in the
discourse of professional journalism in collaborative news production was dominated by the
news organisation, and this was achieved through the admission of citizen journalists who
were perceived to carry out acts of journalism according to professional norms. Therefore,
the hierarchy of the concept of professionalism over amateurism was maintained through the
legitimising of citizen journalists through professional norms.
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Citizen activists oftentimes took on the role of reporters in the coverage of the Battle for
Aleppo and were required to appear to adopt journalistic norms, such as impartiality (Yousuf
& Taylor 2016), as well as a level of transparency around the origins of their news content
(Andén-Papadopoulos & Pantti 2013). Although they were frequently described as ‘activists’,
there was little discussion of what this term meant and especially in the BBC and Al Jazeera
coverage was no barrier to heavily influencing the news narrative. As such citizen activists
were very powerful not just as primary definers but also secondary definers as they were able
to select what information and sources inside east Aleppo were given coverage. For example,
they often gave prominence to images of the civilian cost of the conflict, while giving little
insight into the military activity of the opposition fighters.

While the news organisations acted as secondary definers by providing access to the global
news flow, media activists already possessed this access through social media alone. News
organisations, in fact, had very little power to mediate these messages. The extensive use of
news content produced by media activists and the legitimising of this content through the
discourse of professional journalism meant they took on more than a simple primary definer
role. In a collaborative news environment such as this, the news production by professional
journalists could not be isolated from that of the citizen activist. While steps were taken to
make news content accessible and valuable to mainstream news media the personal
motivations, connections, circumstances and sources of citizen activists usually remained
opaque. This differs from traditional ideas of primary definers such as ruling politicians.
Primary definers, with the exception of the ‘expert’, are not deferred to for their perceived
adoption of journalistic ethics and values. Whereas the Syrian regime, its state-controlled
media and the Russian government were framed as biased with narratives that could be
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contested by others, the framing of citizen-activists’ content as providing impartial and
authentic reports framed them not only as more valuable sources but also as fellow
journalists.
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8. Interviews: making sense of networked journalism
Interviews with editors at the three news organisations attempted to investigate the role that
interactive newsgathering played in news production in each of the newsrooms. Analysis of
the themes and issues raised by the editors in these interviews aimed to help me interpret the
findings in the previous three chapters. The questions discussed revolved around the aim and
purpose that was pursued with networked journalism, and what defined the rationale behind
interactive newsgathering in professional newswork. Specifically, it explored whether news
organisations acknowledged the use of social media-sourced material as a means to involve
audiences and foster participation. Consistent with the methodology throughout the case
studies, the interviews compared the organisations’ perceptions of their use of collaborative
newswork in the context of their respective media models and culture. Therefore, it compared
and contrasted how editors responsible for defining the processes behind networked
journalism were led by the media model of their organisation. In doing so, the interviews
attempted to investigate the differences found in the case studies. To a large extent this meant
discussing how professional routines were adapted to the practice of interactive
newsgathering and explored power-relations between non-journalists and the news
organisation. Most importantly, it sought to explore how editors viewed their role in
managing these interactions. Since this research investigates the potential shift of power in
who can influence and participate in the global news flow, the interviews sought to explore
how the news organisations perceived their position in managing audience participation and
to what end. A particular focus was placed on the process of gatekeeping and how routines
were adapted to create hierarchy in source power. So, for example, did editors perceive
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interactive newsgathering primarily as a way to gather information from accredited sources?
Was collaborative newswork understood foremost as a means to engage audiences? Or was it
perceived as a means for pooling – or crowdsourcing – information from peers in a fast paced
real-time news environment? Particular attention was paid to the perception of audience
participation in interactive newsgathering, which meant the participation of users that were
not accredited sources or professional journalists. What role, if any, could they play in
agenda-setting and how were they most likely to draw the attention of news organisations?

Exploring gatekeeping practices at the organisations was the main focus to determine the
power-relationship created in interactive newsgathering. Therefore, questions asked included:

1. Has social media, in your opinion, broadened access to news coverage for specific
groups over others?
2. What qualities should social media content possess to access the mainstream news
flow?
3. What are the main impediments to the use of user-generated content in news
coverage?
4. If you were to define how a citizen journalist or eye-witness was to most easily gain
your attention with their content to have it covered, what would that be?

Interviews are an established method in journalism research and can serve to “explore and
analyze the various ways in which [expert professionals] give meaning to their everyday
work” (Deuze, 2005). The use of interviews assumes a degree of reflexivity in how
professionals view the role of social media in newsgathering and news production. They were
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considered a suitable way to investigate the editors’ perceptions and intentions, and provided
a means to investigate how these were reflected in the findings of the case studies. The
findings of the case studies were used to explore how consistent the news texts were with
how professionals rationalised networked journalism practices. In turn, this made it possible
to investigate divergences between the findings in the case studies and the reflection on the
use of collaborative newsgathering.

Questions posed to the interviewees especially explored issues around power-relations
between social media sources and news organisations by discussing gatekeeping practices,
audience participation and agenda setting. This tied into the three research questions set out
in the methodology chapter.

RQ1: Is social media sourcing affecting the identities and power relationship between
primary and secondary definers?

RQ2: How do professional journalists create and articulate professional boundaries in the
participation by non-authoritative citizen voices/audiences?

RQ3: What mechanisms do professional journalists use to maintain their gatekeeping role?

The interviewees were asked a mix of general questions about the approach to interactive
newsgathering by their respective organisations, and questions exploring some of the findings
of the case studies that were tailored to each of the news organisations. General questions
posed were, for example, whether there was a strategy or process in place for how each
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organisation approached collaborative newsgathering. They explored how these processes
may or may not tie into the media model or culture of the respective organisation, and
whether there was an explicit commitment to uphold this culture in networked journalism
routines. As laid out in the methodology chapter each news organisation is embedded in a
specific media model and ethos and contextualised with this in mind. Therefore, this section
of the interview allowed to compare and contrast the organisations according to those models.
Case study specific questions delved into the differences between the organisations but
explored each organisations’ routines in their own context. The interviewees at the BBC and
France 24 were asked about some of the reasons for relying on conventional authoritative
news sources on social media, whereas the interview with Al Jazeera explored the use of
non-authoritative sources.

The interviews were conducted in the last three months of 2015 and first half of 2016,
following conclusion of the first two case studies on the Greek debt crisis and the refugee
crisis. This meant the Aleppo case study did not feature in the questions. All three editors
were contacted by email and agreed to be interviewed for this research. As the interviewees
were located in San Francisco, Paris and London, the interviews were carried out by
telephone or Viber. They lasted between 25 and 30 minutes and consisted of open-ended
questions.

The first part of the interviews explored topics specific to the respective news organisation,
including the role of the news organisations’ culture in their overall approach to interactive
newsgathering. They also sought insight into the reasons for the findings of the case studies.
The second part explored sourcing criteria of social media content. This included questions

252

about what qualities or attributes were desirable in social media-sourced material for news;
what might prevent certain social media content from being used; and how important the
editors perceived professional guidelines or training for interactive newsgathering.

The interviews were conducted with BBC social media editor Mark Frankel, France 24
Observers editor Julien Pain, and AJPlus executive producer Ethar El-Katatney. Six main
themes emerged. All of them were consistent with the main themes that emerged from the
case study content analysis. They were:

i) An organisation-specific social media strategy
ii) Agenda-setting qualities in social media-sourced material
iii) Audience participation
iv) Format of the professional news product
v) The role of different social media platforms in networked journalism
vi) Verification of newswork by non-journalists

Strategy
The first theme discussed in the interviews was whether each organisation had a defined
strategy or approach to the use of social media and what it comprised. The discussion of a
defined strategy was framed in the context of the organisations’ ethos, as it was discussed in
the methodology, and also analysed with the organisations’ respective media model in mind.
The aim was to explore the main uses and meaning that collaborative newsgathering had for
the organisations. The question was open-ended and non-directed and produced responses
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that described two different approaches to social media use for the news organisations. The
first involved the distribution of the organisations’ own news products to audiences on social
media platforms and the second was about collaborative newsgathering and newswork. From
the editors’ point of view these two uses for social media were understood as distinct and
separate from each other. This indicated that collaborative newswork did not directly entail
the audiences of the news organisations in one sense. In another though, it did not chime with
the findings of some of the case studies that newsgathering and distribution could also be
strongly interlinked when it involved the networked journalists at BBC and France 24. Both
outlets did not only source content from third parties, which was then redistributed through
their own channels. Especially the BBC, and to a lesser extent France 24, used their own
correspondents as social media sources and distribution channels simultaneously. Therefore,
the strict separation between sourcing and distribution could not be identified as BBC
journalists could act both as distributors of their newswork (which is simultaneously BBC
newswork) and act as sources for BBC coverage through their Twitter activity with the same
material. Nevertheless, both Frankel and Pain conceptualised the two uses of social media by
their organisations as separate. In the following extract Pain discussed how different teams
were designated for the different uses of social media.

At France 24, we had basically two teams. There was one team that is more about
community management so they were publishing only articles, videos we produced
and pushing it online and social media platforms and adapting it to every platform,
and then interacting with the audience; answering questions and emmm sometimes
gathering questions from the audience and transferring it to the journalist. But that
was about it. It’s just community management. There was another team, which I
handled, the Observers where we were engaging more with the audience, so meaning
if you take the refugee crisis for example, we were trying to spot refugees who were
tweeting and posting things on Facebook and trying to ask them to sometimes do
more with us; to answer questions, to produce videos – showing their trips, showing
their problems. And then we had a full team of journalists actually editing their
content and producing specific video and text based on these UGC. And that’s really
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two different things; a team of journalists and a team of community managers. (J.
Pain, phone interview, July 5, 2016)

In terms of the internal workflow, the France 24 editor spoke of community management
(meaning news distribution and interaction with audiences through the France 24 social
media accounts) as carried out by a different team of journalists to those engaging in
collaborative newsgathering. Moreover, these two roles are understood as requiring different
expertise and skill sets. This suggests that audience feedback and engagement is kept separate
from the everyday work of journalists who source newsworthy material through social media.
Although some of the feedback may be redirected to journalists and editors, they are one step
removed from this interaction. Interactive newsgathering then is not responsive to the
audience of France 24 and their engagement with the news organisation through social media
channels, but is shaped by a proactive approach by journalists seeking out content deemed
worthy of news coverage. The selection process for content primarily results from the news
values defined by France 24 journalists – although in exceptional circumstances it may be
influenced by the two-way communication with the audience. However, while there are some
allowances made for the audience’s feedback, the audience is managed and kept at a distance
from newswork process. Professionals can often refer to social media users as audiences in a
general term (see Frankel), but the audience targeted by community managers and referred to
by Pain is solely the audience of France 24’s news products. This audience is clearly defined
through, for example, the number of followers of France 24’s Facebook or Twitter accounts
but may also grow and change for each news item that is shared by followers. While there is
some receptiveness in these interactions, the primary objective for community managers is
the marketing of news products on social media since community management in most cases
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entails distributing France 24’s newswork and engaging with responses to them to foster a
relationship with audiences that may encourage audience loyalty. Largely, users among this
audience are not those that news content is sourced from. In this scenario, community
managers navigate social media mainly as a “many-to-many” broadcasting platform (Kwak et
al, 2010) where the main flow of information is uni-directional. The separation of audience
engagement and collaborative newsgathering, both in professional roles and workflows,
shows the structural limitations to the two-way flow of information between the news
organisation and its audience. With one eye on audience responses to engage where necessary
or desirable, actual audience participation in news production remains the exception with
mechanisms in place to enable effective gatekeeping. This is not to say that these mechanisms
are only deliberately limiting audience participation but could also result from a lack of
resources to monitor and relay feedback to journalists. However, the fact remains that
throughout the case studies, there was little evidence of responsiveness to audiences in the
news items themselves or the inclusion of content produced by France 24’s social media
audience. Being an engaged member of France 24’s audience on social media platforms
therefore offers little opportunity to be heard by its newsroom and influence news coverage in
a way substantially different from how TV ratings do.

The BBC social media editor also described two distinct roles for social media in news
production. Again, one of them is the distribution of BBC’s news content and the other is the
sourcing of user-generated content for its news coverage. However, Frankel also described
interactive newsgathering as audience involvement. This suggests that, unlike France 24, the
BBC conceives of collaborative newswork in itself as a form of community management by
involving audiences. Yet, as the case studies showed, there was little evidence of directly
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involving BBC audiences on a particular piece of news coverage. Rather social media users,
some of whom may be considered the wider target audience of the BBC World Service, were
represented in the news texts. There was no identifiable link between the users and the BBC.

I think that there is a sort of misnomer about UGC, that UGC is all about something
that is just of the moment. Actually, no, UGC is the audience. It’s involving our
audience in any aspect of our journalism. So that can be both planned or reactive. (M.
Frankel, phone interview, July 29, 2016)
While the BBC had mechanisms by which it invited comment and engagement from
audiences on social media, there was again little evidence of this content being used in the
news texts of the Greek debt crisis and refugee crisis case studies. In part this may have been
because there was little response to the BBC’s calls for engagement. Therefore, Frankel’s
description of audience involvement may more accurately describe the incorporation of
content created by users who have no identifiable reason to be involved. In that sense, like
France 24, journalists retain full control over gatekeeping as users are unable to determine
how their content is used in newswork. This type of user involvement cannot be described as
citizen participation in the normative sense as it would require the users’ own deliberate
involvement in the newswork and power for them to directly select news topics and frame
news texts. Therefore, to a great extent audience participation in news production appears to
be about animating and engaging users who the BBC wishes to attract with its news
coverage.

In the first two case studies, power to select content remained solely in the hands of the news
organisations and involvement of non-elites was ad hoc. By contrast, in the Aleppo case
study, the power to select information and frame the conflict was significantly weighted in
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favour of amateurs. Framing has been described by Tankard et al (1991) as ‘‘the central
organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is
through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” (Reese 2001, p. 10). The
content creators were clearly seeking out access to the global news flow and were presenting
and distributing their multimedia material targeted at international news organisations.
Collaborative newswork was deliberate and power in this relationship was not necessarily in
the hands of the news organisations. However, it is difficult to argue that these users can be
understood as audiences of the news organisations in question. The BBC was likely not trying
to speak to a predominantly Syrian audience when covering events in Syria. If the findings
of the case studies are applied to the concept of audience involvement, this concept is
arguably so loose to render it meaningless. It is not clear if these are BBC audiences, or
anyone who may be part of a news audience anywhere at any time. If audiences involvement
was the driving factor behind the findings of the first two case studies, this audience would
primarily consist of professionals journalists and accredited sources, followed by
non-accredited sources. Therefore, the term audience involvement appears to have been used
as little more than a catch-all phrase without much analysis of what it means in practice and
whether it is applicable. Nevertheless, it may signal an intent. The use of the term ‘audience’
throughout the interview strongly implied that this group is largely perceived to be private
non-accredited sources — in other words non-elite voices. Frankel described the emergence
of audience involvement as a response to the abandoning of traditional forms of news
consumption that has resulted in a lack of audience loyalty and forced news organisations to
find new ways to engage with audiences. Specifically, this means an awareness of the shift
from a one-to-many news distribution model as seen in broadcasting, to a news environment
where outlets need to actively seek out new audiences through engagement on social media
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platforms. This suggests that audience engagement through social media is not only
understood as using new technological platforms to distribute news products but also as
building new relationships with news audiences, entailing their involvement and reciprocal
communication.

I think the way to look at it is to say that people’s approach to information has shifted,
in that there isn’t this kind of complete loyalty to one medium. If you were to go back
20 or 30 years people were very loyal television users or radio consumers, or the
paper industry was in ruder health in those days. And I think that’s changed or being
challenged [...] especially amongst our younger audience, there is no longer that
loyalty [...] to one form of news distribution and increasingly people have seen [...]
the smartphone’s growing predominance both as a phone and as a computer, if you
like, as a portal to the outside world, become less committed to the consumption of
news in a traditional; and linear way. And we’ve had to think of a whole host of
different ways of reaching and engaging them. One of those is through social media
and so social media is a bigger part of our world as a consequence. (M. Frankel,
phone interview, July 29, 2016)

According to Frankel, the ability not just to speak to audiences through social media
platforms but the willingness to listen and be influenced by them is what it takes to remain
relevant in the digital news environment. Engagement and involvement of users is not only
planned but also reactive. Social media-sourced content is used especially to show audiences
are heard and responded to. Although the interaction with audiences was described as
reactive at times in order to show willingness to engage there was no clear definition of how
users might be able to prompt a reaction and engagement from the news organisation. The
selection of multimedia material or other social media content was broadly based on
journalists’ and editors’ own prioritisation of what they deemed interesting or newsworthy.
This is not to say that non-authoritative social media users were not used as sources since the
findings of the case studies show they clearly were. Rather, there was little evidence that
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these users did anything to actively gain the attention of these particular news organisations
and were not selected because they approached them. Even Letters to the Editor have to be
directed to a newspaper before they can be selected for publication. The interview with
Frankel showed how audience engagement and participation is largely directed by editors
with little scope for users to get the attention of the newsroom and actively participate in
newswork. Instead, non-authoritative voices were selected because their content fit with the
agenda of the journalist selecting them. Asked about the use of citizen voices that had no
direct experience of a news event or were not personally affected, Frankel said these voices
may have been sought out for a number of reasons, be that to reflect a wider global
conversation around the topic, or “that they had very interesting things in their own right to
say.”
It could be to reflect the conversation that’s wider. It could be just to ensure that there
were other people coming to the story that we’re recognising that it wasn’t just a
narrow constituency that we’ve reflected or were talking to. It could be that they had
very interesting things in their own right to say that we haven’t found another way of
bringing to light or we felt that was the best way of illustrating that perspective on the
story exactly through their voice. You know, it could be a number of reasons. (M.
Frankel, phone interview, July 29, 2016)
There was a strong gatekeeping element in how BBC journalists maintained their complete
control over what was deemed worthy of participation. Ultimately, what was considered
interesting remained the decision of the journalist who chose these messages to amplify.
However, there was also an understanding that audience participation was necessary as a way
to engage and maintain audiences. Therefore, in the case study of the Greek debt crisis, it
may have made more sense for journalists to seek out voices from demographics that were
indeed BBC audiences than those that were not. Greek citizens affected by the day-to-day
reality of the debt crisis were more likely to be seeking out their own national news media
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rather than the BBC to learn about the latest developments. The BBC was not speaking to
Greek news audiences but rather English-speaking audiences around the world. From the
point of view of community management, speaking to these users would serve the goal of
audience building better. Therefore collaborative newsgathering did not necessarily serve to
help relay the experiences of ordinary Greek people, but to reproduce the views of social
media users elsewhere shaped by the global news flow. This type of audience involvement
may in fact contribute reinforcing the views of international audiences that were likely
shaped by news coverage of the global news media such as the BBC.

The symbiotic partnership between community managers and those carrying out collaborative
newsgathering also creates a type of ‘produsage’. The joint newswork feeds into what
Hermida (2010) defined ambient journalism or Papacharissi (2010) called affective news
streams. Those involved in collaborative newsgathering adopt, transform and interpret
material filtered out from these news streams, before community managers redistribute the
‘prodused’ news products to news audiences. As such, the newsrooms insert themselves into
the news stream through the distribution of their networked newswork on social media (or
their journalists’ activity on these platforms) with the goal to form and influence the
conversations. Based on the findings in the analysis of the Greek financial crisis and the
refugee crisis, interactive newsgathering and redistribution of this content usually entailed an
aim to shape news streams for the audiences that interact with them both at the BBC and
France 24. The only news texts that deviated from this approach were the webcasts by The
Stream, where a large number of users engaging with the news topic were incorporated in the
coverage and had the power to shape the discourse of the news topic. The case studies
showed that almost all users who took part in the discussion on the topics featured were
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reflected in some way throughout the programme, suggesting a very low threshold in who
could enter the mainstream news flow with their content.38 The format of the programme
fostered a discussion between different users that was hosted but remained largely unedited
by The Stream. It did not interject in the news stream on Twitter with its own staff’s
expertise, but rather used it as a way to engage and recreate another similar news stream in its
webcast. The participating audience in the webcast did so knowingly and deliberately. Many
responded to calls for comment by producers and journalists on Twitter and engaged in a
conversation with them. This means they were in fact a clearly defined Al Jazeera audience
that set out to be included in the discussion. They were not reported on but had the ability to
shape the news texts deliberately. Of course, this too can be understood as a form of
community management and audience building. The audience involved was also mainly
global, although, as described in the Greek case study, there was a hierarchy of power and
authoritativeness in Al Jazeera’s coverage that elevated Greek sources over others. But there
was a commitment to empowering Greek voices to tell and frame their experiences to a
global audience, and it was not primarily a way to reflect audiences of The Stream back to
themselves.

The Stream is one Al Jazeera product that reflects the organisation’s approach to social
media, while AJPlus is another and produces content that is often the product of collaborative
newsgathering as well but that is also designed to be distributed on social media. Its news
content is published exclusively on social media. While it often draws on content on social
media, its journalists have greater input in selecting and framing it, and there are no
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This was determined in the analysis of the data by looking at all the responses received by The

Stream to their call for comments and participation on Twitter.
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invitations for participation. The resulting news product is therefore also shaped by the
gatekeeping practices of the journalists, albeit with a particular slant characteristic of Al
Jazeera.

So, just to backtrack a little, so Al Jazeera is the voice of the voiceless is a very Al
Jazeera ethos.
[...]
We are a newsroom but we’re not a very traditional newsroom in the sense that we
don’t have a newsdesk, a planner. We’re a small editorial team who actually create.
[...]
So we’re in this unique position that we have really great reach but we’re also very
limited in the number of stories we can do a day. We never push more than like 10 a
day. And that’s combining, you know, the different formats. (E. El-Katatney,
conference call interview, December 14, 2016)

Unlike with The Stream, there is very little community engagement on the AJPlus accounts
across social media platforms. However, the engagement that does exist was mostly
consistent with the community-management approach seen on the BBC and France 24
accounts, and that is largely limited to publishing news texts. So, while The Stream is focused
on building communities around its brand to foster conversation, AJPlus is primarily
producing content and distributing it straight through social media. It presumably also aims to
foster conversation but that conversation is mainly between audiences around the content it
produces. So, it too, acts more as an ‘influencer’, inserting itself into the news stream with its
own ‘prodused’ and branded content than encouraging participation through social networks.
However, the angle is arguably a different one, taking major news events to a more local,
human-interest level.

So we have a lot more room to think more creatively and think a lot beyond what’s on
Reuters and what’s on AP, right? Cos that’s what a lot of traditional media does, right?
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They just pull from the wires because that’s right there. We’re not trying to compete
with that and we’re not trying to be the place where you come to us for the news.
[...]
I’m tracking a lot of different other more local, especially different regions. (E.
El-Katatney, conference call interview, December 14, 2016)

AJPlus also differs from BBC and France 24, as it does not have its own proprietary platform.
Therefore, the way that content is distributed is firstly through its own social media accounts,
and then relying on shares and retweets by other users to help spread it. The difference
between publishing to a website, and using social media as one of several means of
distribution, such as search engines or news aggregators, is that the content has to be tailored
to social media in order to give it the furthest possible reach. It has to resonate with different
audiences, tapping into existing communities around the topic discussed. While this is also an
aim by news texts linked to on social media by the other two news outlets, it is not the sole,
or even primary concern in producing news content. AJPlus journalists are likely more
embedded with social media communities and even if they do not stand out as individual
actors in these communities they are lurking and listening, taking the pulse of what interests
and resonates with these communities, in order to then contribute and shape the
conversations.

In the talk of audience involvement and participation lies the promise of ordinary voices of
private citizens being heard and represented. It resembles the practice of collecting and
recording vox pops, especially when the material that is published through social media is
framed as reflecting an aspect of the public discourse around a specific topic. Vox pops are
the inclusion of “interviews with the ordinary man or woman on the street” (Beckers 2017a,
p. 101) and are often reflective of individuals' opinions on certain topics. Vox pops usually
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involve individuals who do not have a representative function and have no expertise on the
news topic (Kleemans, Shaap & Hermans 2015). They are most often represented in
audio-visual news texts and are deemed a means by which to encourage public involvement
but are also viewed as the least valuable content by journalists (Beckers, 2017b). However,
the amount of vox-pops in traditional news reporting – including through social media
content — has increased significantly over the past 25 years, while the use of “citizens as
agents or active contributors of relevant content” has not, according to research conducted in
the Netherlands (Kleemans, Shaap & Hermans 2015, p. 14). Twitter, especially, has been used
to gather vox-pops published by citizens themselves (Beckers, 2017a).

Agents and affected citizens were less prominent; in particular, the prominence of
affected citizens has declined over the years. This implies that journalists do not give
citizens a substantive active voice in public debate but that citizens are largely and
increasingly used as mere illustrations. (Kleemans, Shaap and Hermans 2015, p. 14)
The case studies too showed a substantial use of citizen sources for vox pops, which were
oftentimes shown in order to reflect a discussion that was framed as public opinion. The use
of citizen sources as active contributors in the news production process was far more limited.
However, this reality shown in the case studies mostly did not reflect the interviews that
focused predominantly on social media newsgathering as the a means for accessing
eyewitness material and fostering non-journalist’s active participation in the newswork.
However, limited vox pops may be in transferring power to non-elites in news it does still
possess value as a means for the public to access the news flow. Finding out what individuals
feel and think about news events is an important way to represent the opinions of those other
than the elite. Yet, in a globalised news environment the values in vox pops might be more
difficult to pinpoint. How valuable is it to represent opinions by individuals unaffected by a
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news event and who are forming their opinions primarily on the news coverage of global
news media? One may argue that this effectively undermines the opinions of affected
citizens, essentially levelling non-elite voices regardless of their circumstance. Therefore, the
quality of the vox pops is important in producing meaningful coverage of the discourse that is
taking place. Vox pops of citizens directly affected by a news event could be rightfully
considered empowering to ordinary citizens, as it may raise ideas, opinions or concerns
which the news media then need to address in their news texts. However, research has shown
that journalists’ attitude towards vox pops is mainly negative (Beckers, 2017b), which
suggests that many journalists might not take great care in the voices they choose to
incorporate in their news coverage as they consider them of inferior value to other types of
sources. On the other hand, “[j]ournalists who perceive vox pops as a good public opinion
tool and consider vox pops as increasing audience involvement are more positive about them.
Surprisingly, journalists who use vox pops are not per se more positive about them.”
(Beckers, 2017b, p. 109) It is fair to assume that those who are working for The Stream or
AJPlus are overall more positive in their attitude towards reflecting the opinions expressed by
social media users, since holding a microphone into online communities forms a core part of
their jobs as journalists. Also, public involvement plays a significant role in the successful
dissemination of their news content once it is shared on social media. Therefore, these
journalists are likely to pride themselves on producing a meaningful insight into what the
opinions of citizens affected by a news event are. On the other hand, journalists who do not
consider this to be the core part of their job, may be less inclined to invest as much energy
into reflecting the public discourses taking place on social media. With the exception of the
Aleppo case study, Al Jazeera’s use of social media was particularly focused on its AJPlus
and The Stream news products, while social media played a much more limited role across

266

the Al Jazeera English online platform. With specific news products that were very strategic
and deliberate about the use of social media, the outlet’s editorial approach was a very clearly
defined one. The BBC and France 24, on the other hand, took a much more ad hoc approach
to social media content in the Greek debt crisis coverage, and to a lesser extent the migrant
crisis. The content was largely mixed in with the regular traditional reporting styles.

Agenda-setting
A theme that cropped up in all three interviews was the perceived power relationship between
social media and mainstream media and the ability for social media users to become
agenda-setters in news coverage. Agenda setting was addressed in questions about how
non-journalists carrying out newswork on social media can get the attention of editors and
journalists on issues of importance to them. It was explored both in terms of journalists’
proactive and reactive approaches taken towards the social media users and communities. In
other words, what steps do news organisations take to seek out involvement from news
audiences in setting the news agenda?

Pain’s response suggests a mostly reactive approach to the information shared on social
media, which becomes of interest to news organisations due to its potential to be of major
interest to France 24’s news audiences.

We monitor all the social media to see, what can I get out, also what’s gonna be the
next hot news. That’s what everybody does. (J. Pain, phone interview, July 5, 2016)
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Social media is seen as a ‘beat’ to be covered by journalists mainly because it harbours the
potential to produce content that can attract a lot of interest from audiences. Moreover
though, social media is seen as an environment that sets its own news agenda, and which is
implicitly considered of huge importance to news organisations. Through their participation
on social media, users have the ability to set and frame what is newsworthy and should be, at
least in part, leading the news agenda of news organisations such as France 24. Social media
is therefore understood as having its own news ecosystem that news organisations seek to
exploit for sourcing news for their own coverage. An added value to gathering this news
content is that journalists know that an audience already exists for this material. The material
that is being sourced is usually already generating discussion, so enhancing and repackaging
it before redistributing the ‘added value’ newswork on social media platforms is likely to
drive audiences to the news organisation. So social media is monitored for news that is first
broken on social media rather than by news outlets through their conventional distribution
channels. France 24 then responds by covering this news, integrating it into the global news
flow. In that sense, “what everybody does” is a description of Chadwick’s hybrid media
model, wherein journalists develop an interdependence with non-journalists, giving the latter
greater power to determine the news agenda. It also echoes Papacharissi’s affective news
streams, which argues news is being created in a collaborative effort on social media,
continually mutating and being redefined by its contributors. News production becomes a
contested process, involving both journalists and non-journalists, that does not result in a
final product. Instead it is constantly evolving. However, as already argued earlier, there are
influencers in this process, who are characterised by their greater power to impose a
particular news agenda or frame than others – France 24, with its many followers on all the
major social media platforms being one. Therefore, while Pain looks to social media for

268

news, the selection of newsworthy content by journalists themselves puts them in the position
to also shape what the “next hot news” will be. Therefore, gatekeeping is still under the
control of journalists, who ultimately make the decision about what content to extract and
amplify, and how.

In the first two case studies, the type of content described by Pain was not the main
component of the social media-sourced material found in the texts for either France 24, or the
BBC. While France 24 Observers does focus especially on eyewitness material, it represents
only a very small part of all the social media-sourced material used in the news coverage.
Overall, the news agenda had been strongly defined by professional journalists and accredited
sources, while non-journalist private citizens had the least source power. Only the Aleppo
case study was characterised by extensive reliance on unaccredited and non-journalist
sources, and saw these gain significant agenda-setting power. This only supports the
argument that news organisations hold significant influence in defining the terms of any
collaboration with social media users, and that their decision to embrace some content over
others plays a role in defining what is ‘news’. Control is only relinquished in exceptional
circumstances. With the agenda still often dictated by news organisations, audiences fill in
the gaps. For instance, eyewitness material was mentioned by Frankel and Pain as playing a
pivotal role in how social media is used in collaborative newsgathering in a breaking news
situation. Very often, information about a breaking news event will first emerge on social
media, with eyewitnesses sharing accounts and images. However, what constitutes a breaking
news event is already defined by existing routines, and amateur content takes the place of the
eyewitness account. Eyewitnesses can be approached remotely without requiring a reporter to
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be at the scene, and their testimony is backed up with videos or images captured on their
phone.

[I]f we’re looking at a story where we are keen to find eyewitness testimony on such
as a breaking or developing story, then UGC would be very central to that. Because
obviously we need to get to people who are right there and have pictures and video
and can talk to us about what is going on, so there is definitely a social newsgathering
component. (M. Frankel, phone interview, July 29, 2016)

Social media-sourced images takes on the role of the eyewitness, and offers evidence of what
took place. It does not necessarily set the news agenda in its own right though. For example, a
bomb attack in central Paris would be deemed newsworthy with or without eyewitness
material and produce high volumes of news coverage. The eyewitness material only adds
colour to what would certainly have been high up on the news agenda, not because there are
images of the event but because the event happened at all. The production of eyewitness
material has been described as acts of citizen journalists by several authors (Allen 2013;
Gillmor 2004) where ordinary people are empowered to take part in the production of news.
Recalling the events of 9/11, Gillmor writes, “[N]ews was being produced by regular people
who had something to say and show, and not solely by the “official” news organizations that
had traditionally decided how the first draft of history would look. This time, the first draft of
history was being written, in part, by the former audience.” Yet, the argument that the ability
to produce eyewitness material is necessarily empowering has been contested if this content
only provides the raw material for news organisations to incorporate in their journalism. This
hinges on how we define journalism and if we understand it as selecting, ordering and editing
information into a final news product to give meaning to events. Therefore, “[a] real question
we need to ask is not what is journalism, but where does the journalistic process begin?”
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(Burum 2016, p. 13). Burum distinguishes between user-generated content, the raw content
recorded by eyewitnesses, and user-generated stories which are texts fit for broadcast and that
are produced by ordinary citizens (Burum 2012). Only the latter, he argues, can be considered
citizen journalism and offers “editorial empowerment at the source” (Burum 2016, p. 14).
User-generated content alone, on the other hand, is only a building block used in the
construction of news by professional journalists. In the case of breaking news events, as
mentioned by Frankel, the audience involvement only extends as far as it fits with the
professional routines and values of news production. In essence, technology has enabled
journalists not to be required at the scene of an event in order to report about it as
eyewitnesses are presenting themselves on social media, not only with accounts but with
actual images to back them up. In these cases the value of eyewitness material to the news
coverage is judged by the same standards that journalists would apply to any other piece of
information or content to build their news coverage, which in major breaking news events is
low. In these cases, the threshold for gaining entry into the global news flow is dictated by
simply having been a witness who recorded content of sufficient quality.

Well, when in terms of breaking news the only quality is to be there at the right time.
So if you’re at the right time somewhere and you post a video that’s interesting then
even if it’s badly filmed or, you know, the only thing we have to do is to check that
it’s true and then that’s it. (J. Pain, phone interview, July 5, 2016)

Private citizens are generally most likely to be represented in news coverage in unexpected
news events (Reich 2015), and this professional practice could be easily adapted and
enhanced through the widespread use of mobile phone technology. In fact, it eased the burden
to expend resources on having journalists and entire TV crews at a scene when eyewitnesses

271

could easily provide the raw content directly to newsrooms. This may well have made them
more valuable to journalists as sources but it has not fundamentally tilted the power
relationship between news media and private citizens in their favour. This is not to say that
eyewitness material cannot make an impact on the news agenda. In many cases
user-generated content has recorded human rights abuses or other important issues that have
provoked civic or political action. However, the requirements for entering the mainstream
news flow are stricter and more difficult to meet as news organisations have to take a
proactive approach in seeking out this content as it does not fall into a predetermined news
agenda.

But equally, if it’s a story where we know there is an audience focus because it
involves, you know, not so much something that is breaking or developing but
something that people have direct experience of, so it could be a study that has found,
you know, that people believe or think or feel particular things and we’re looking for
case studies or people who have experienced those things or have been affected by
those issues, then again you’re talking about UGC because you are looking for
members of the public who have direct experience of those... of that particular case.
So, it’s largely dependant on what you’re looking for really. Some of it is the kind of
thing that you can look for in advance because you might be working on a feature that
would involve a member of the public because you’d be that input into your feature.
(M. Frankel, phone interview, July 29, 2016)
Outside of breaking news events, Frankel describes situations where the BBC might
proactively seek out the input from users who are private citizens. The scenario he describes
is again one where the editorial decision on a particular topic was made solely in the
newsroom and users are sought out to fit with the BBC’s own news agenda. Journalists are
decision makers in what is important to audiences and subsequently contact users who may
have experience on this particular issue for an opinion. Journalism practices have long
involved this type of interaction with private citizens on issues tabled by the professional
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news media, while technology has enabled journalists to find such voices more easily. In this
instance also, social media serves as a tool to carry out the same established practices rather
than foster new ones. These do not intrinsically challenge the power-relationship between
news media and audiences, where the two interact. It may be argued that it has enabled a
wider spectrum of voices to be heard as journalists are able to find sources that would have
been outside their reach or off their radar in the past, providing a more diverse discussion of
news topics. However, the type of interaction in the proactive scenario described by Frankel
has remained essentially the same.

For contributors to feature in our journalism, they have to: a) have something that is
worth talking about because it’s newsworthy, and secondly, they need to be reliable
and trustworthy and genuinely there and aware of what’s going on. You know, there’s
a lot of fakery out there. There’s a lot of rumour, there’s a lot of people who claim to
know things or be in places, or have taken footage. So those are the key things that we
would need to establish before we would go even near approaching them or using
their contribution. (M. Frankel, phone interview, July 29, 2016)
Exploring what might be the reason that users’ content is able to enter the mainstream news
flow, Frankel again mentions newsworthiness, personal experience and trustworthiness (or
authenticity) as the main factors. What constitutes newsworthiness appears as a fixed value
determined solely by the journalist. The power to define news values remains in the
professional realm. However, the second criteria suggests the BBC will relinquish a degree of
control over the practice of reporting to users that meet its set of values and expectations.
Once these criteria have been satisfied, users can shape the news product through their
content. This is particularly evident in the Aleppo case study, where media activists (who
were known and trusted to be in close geographical proximity to the events or connected to
those who were) were able to feature highly in the coverage. Journalistic values such as
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impartiality, or even balance were not necessarily mentioned in this context. They were
discussed in depth in relation to the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights and to a lesser
extent the White Helmets but not applied to other sources in opposition-held territory. Rather,
their role was was seen solely as that of an eyewitness stepping in for the absent journalist.
As the Aleppo case study showed, where there is an almost categorical absence of journalists,
this position can be a very powerful one. Without any requirement to adopt any of the other
journalistic values, activism can become a feature in the journalism produced – though steps
were taken to undermine the role that these motivations played in the BBC news texts on the
battle in Aleppo. This creates an interaction between news organisations and users that places
control over the news agenda (what constitutes ‘newsworthiness’) and the users deemed
relevant and suitable for networked journalism with the news organisation. Meanwhile, the
actual newswork done by such users is scrutinised only according to a narrow set of
journalistic practices. Namely, the ability to confirm beyond reasonable doubt that a piece of
content shows what it claims to. On the flip side this can lead to decontextualising content
and the omission of pertinent information to provide a balanced or impartial representation of
events.

In the interview with the AJPlus editor, online communities played a significant role in
determining what content may enter their newswork. The collaborative newswork was mainly
focused on areas that were inaccessible to journalists and highlighted the benefits of
accessing communities that were otherwise difficult to reach. El-Katatney stated the intent of
seeking out news content that was not on the news agenda of elite professional outlets.

Our stories aren’t necessarily tied to places, where journalists can access. We’re still
very reactive.
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[…]
The social media element and UGC works best in stories that the media isn’t
covering. (E. El-Katatney, conference call interview, December 14, 2016)

Part of this is tapping into online communities that discuss and share information of interest
to them. She described collaborative newsgathering in terms of taking the lead from these
communities on what is newsworthy. This may sound similar to the sentiment by the France
24 editor, who describes social media as a tool to find the “next hot news”, but there are
differences. According to the interviewee, AJPlus seeks out communities and their
conversations in order to report on them, which suggests seeking out a news discourse on
particular topics by interested and involved users. The news coverage is explained in terms of
reflecting this discourse rather than shaping the discourse.

Ultimately, the power to decide which communities’ conversations to reflect remains with the
journalists, giving them significant gatekeeping power in the interaction. However,
El-Katatney’s interview suggests there is a strong commitment to represent a news discourse
created by online communities, hence giving them power to define it. This was consistent
with the overall finding in the case studies that showed Al Jazeera was using social media
predominantly to report on the conversations between unaccredited sources, deliberately
seeking out sources who had the least source power but who also often showed personal
involvement and knowledge of the news event. In the Aleppo case study, this went as far as
fully absorbing social media content into Al Jazeera’s news coverage without any clear
distinction between the two, as well as embedding its own journalists with those producing
this content.
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As journalists there is no way, even if we were, you know, the most powerful media
organisation in the world, there is no way you can have access to document
everything that’s happening everywhere. And if you have a system that’s set to, you
know, your workflow is set to how to receive this content, verify this content and
utilise this content, then that means you’ve just accessed a huge network, that’s so
much bigger and can amplify more than you can do. (E. El-Katatney, conference call
interview, December 14, 2016)
El-Katatney expressed a similar use for social networks as a distribution platform with a
ready-made audience. The aim is not to only gather content but also to distribute it again to
users who are already having a conversation around the particular topic and pieces of content
that the news outlet is reporting on. In accessing a community where newsworthy content is
shared, gathering this content and reporting on it, Al Jazeera is taking advantage of a
ready-made audience. Once news texts that involve these communities are distributed they
can receive significant amplification as its members help distribute the texts to their own
networks. In order to do this effectively, it reflects the conversation that is already taking
place, bringing together the different pieces of a scattered discourse taking place across social
media platforms.

The one minute news reports here are very different from the one minute news reports
I did when I worked on TV, you know. They just look very very different. And the
audience doesn’t just want to know what happened, they want to know what the
people there felt like. They want the more emotional connection, they want the more
human interest kind of aspect on it. (E. El-Katatney, conference call interview,
December 14, 2016)
The focus on the human interest story, the eyewitness, and the emotional connection, shows
there is an aim to break down the barrier that exists between news media and the ordinary
private citizen. It is not about finding accredited sources on breaking news events, or guiding
the social media content through journalist sources, but to access the plethora of other voices
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that audiences can connect with on a more personal level.The focus is on content that does
not comprise the normal news flow, but hones in on a parallel new environment that is
created on social media platforms. Examples that were given by the El Katatney still point to
the selection of news content being directed by the news agenda set by the Al Jazeera, and the
overall agenda of the global mainstream news media, which is also symptomatic of the
hybridisation of the news environment, whereby audiences do largely discuss topics and
issues already raised by professional news media that remain a powerful player in shaping
public discourse.

The social media users sourced for coverage are chosen because they have specific attributes,
and, where a news event is set in a particular location, because they have first-hand
knowledge of it. Therefore, the use of social media sources is not to engage the Al Jazeera
audience per se in the way that the the BBC may have been selecting a stereotypical BBC
audience in their coverage, but to tap into the communities that are affected by the event.
Rather, they may consider their audience as fluid and changing depending on what is being
covered. For example, Greek audiences may typically not seek out coverage by Al Jazeera on
the events in their country, but through assessing and reporting on the conversations taking
place in Greek communities, Al Jazeera may not only have relayed this discourse to its loyal
audience base but gained, at least temporarily, new audiences. While Frankel spoke of
building audience loyalty through reciprocal engagement with users, which will ensure brand
awareness and encourage users to return to the BBC for its coverage, the interview with
El-Katatney suggested finding audiences that already exist for a specific news event and
holding a microphone into their virtual forum. The two news outlets share the same intent,
which is to build audiences. The one positions itself as delivering the news to whoever is
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likely to be their core audience, both through social media and its own digital platforms,
while taking note of the feedback that it receives. The other establishes new audiences, even
if only temporarily, by embedding itself in specific online conversations.

No one is coming to AJPlus to see what happened in that train crash in New York.
They’ll come like three hours later to see our story which includes life of the victims
and talks to you and gives you some social media reactions and someone who’s an
eyewitness. (E. El-Katatney, conference call interview, December 14, 2016)
Nevertheless, the AJPlus interview also shows, that social media is used to fuel the existing
news agenda with further content, creating conversation and even an exchange between users
and journalists. But this takes place within the context of a news agenda not set by social
media users. What is valuable is their reaction to the global news flow and their ability to
‘produse’ content that can be absorbed into it. Therefore, the framework within which social
media users contribute is controlled by an agenda that is not set by them. They act largely as
sources rather than collaborators, although their power as sources may have increased
through their engagement on social media platforms.

Platforms
As the case studies showed, there were different approaches to how different social media
platforms – namely Twitter and Facebook – were used in sourcing content and the type of
content they typically contributed to the news texts. The micro-blogging site was used by
BBC and France 24 mostly to gather elite sources. Nevertheless, social media is often treated
as a homogenous environment that enables audiences (ie. ordinary citizen users) to enter the
global news flow (Allan 2013). Asked which voices he thought had gained most from social
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media engagement in terms of accessing the global news flow, Frankel acknowledged the
different user groups that dominated on different platforms and the discrepancies between
what platforms journalists mostly commonly used and those most frequently used by ordinary
private citizens.

[W]e talk about social media as if it’s one thing and it’s very different. For most
people, say in journalism, social media is Twitter. And frankly for most of our
audiences, social media is anything but Twitter. So, you know, Twitter is often an echo
chamber of opinion formers trying to shout their latest, you know, book, policy idea,
thoughts, concept, whatever it is. So you’re not necessarily talking to the people that
you’re wanting to reach or the audiences that you’re most keen on impressing. You’re
certainly talking to other journalists and opinion formers. Whereas Facebook is a
much broader platform in that sense. (M. Frankel, phone interview, July 29, 2016)
Frankel’s comments that journalists are most likely to refer to Twitter to source content,
supported the conclusion drawn from the case studies that identified it as a newsgathering
platform which was most adaptable to established routines, and therefore most likely to be
used by professionals. Broersma and Graham (2012) also supported this with their research
that identified Twitter as a professional network for journalists to stay in touch with their
peers, exchange information and seek contacts. Meanwhile, (Heinrich, 2012) described it as a
type of personalised newswire for journalists. Together with the ‘pack mentality’ of
journalists (Boczkowski, 2010), the disproportionate reliance on the least ‘social’ platform,
creates a high threshold for entry into the global news flow for non-elite users. This research
clearly showed journalists relied particularly on the micro-blogging site, while non-elite
users, described by Frankel as audiences, are the least likely to participate on this platform.
This suggests that journalists actively work to maintain their sphere of influence and control
over the news flow in a way that allows them to dominate. Facebook, on the other hand, was
used almost exclusively to source content from non-elite users. However, it was used to a
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much lesser extent than Twitter despite its significantly larger user base. The preference for
Twitter is more likely to reproduce the opinions and information put forward by elite users.
So, while Twitter as been driving social media access to the global news flow, greater access
of Facebook users might result in a different demographic participating in networked
newswork. Therefore, audience participation in the news environment is largely kept on
social media platforms, where users can ‘produse’ but not have significant access to
professional newswork. So, while Frankel argued that social media has been beneficial in
opening up the news environment to a new set of users, who were previously denied access to
the news flow, this is mostly in the context of the alternative news environment that exists on
solely on social media. The impact that amateurs can have on news audiences with their
newswork is mostly seen to be taking place on social media platforms, which is not
necessarily synonymous with opening up a gateway into the professionally produces news
media.

Having said that [social media] has clearly become a very very important avenue for a
lot of different organisations today that could shift perception and to make an impact.
It’s a much quicker way to reach people that they are perhaps unfamiliar with or find
hard to reach in other ways. And done and used effectively, it can be very potent. It
can be really really powerful. (M. Frankel, phone interview, July 29, 2016)
The perceived impact of social media on communicating with large audiences by
non-journalistic sources is described by Frankel in a general sense and as something that
happens outside the professional news media. While he sees significant power given to
non-journalistic users through harnessing social media platforms the BBC arguably does not
see its role as facilitating voices on social media, but rather as working in tandem with this
alternative news environment.
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Frankel was the only of the three interviewees that brought up how user groups differed
across platforms, and the disparity between the social media platforms most commonly used
by journalists and those used by ordinary citizens. El-Katatney listed out the types of
platforms that journalists were using to source content but phrased it as an issue of tapping
into particular communities. She also mentioned a greater variety of platforms used to source
content, outside of Facebook and Twitter, such as Instagram and closed messaging services
such as Whatsapp and Snapchat.

I think [it is valuable] having a newsroom that is very diverse. We have a lot of young
people here, who don’t even know Britney Spears. That’s how young they are. That
they’re very well plugged in. (E. El-Katatney, conference call interview, December
14, 2016)
The case studies also suggested that Al Jazeera was primarily focusing on tapping into very
specific types of communities. They did not use Twitter to source journalists’ communities or
even opinion-makers, which explains why sourcing practices were not dependent on
platforms at Al Jazeera. Rather they sought out communities that did not stereotypically
participate in the newswork of professional news media but created their own networks in
which they shared information.

Verification
As to be expected, one of the most important factors dictating if social media-sourced
material would be used in coverage by any of the organisations was how easily its
authenticity could be verified by journalists. All three interviewees said the ability to ensure
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the authenticity of a piece of content was paramount before considering any other
characteristics. Journalists therefore applied their practices to any piece of content, either
qualifying or disqualifying it from use in news coverage. How these practices were applied
could change from case to case, and decisions were explained depending on the context of the
content. However, the most common context within which verification was mentioned was in
breaking news events. In this case, the users providing content were primarily used as sources
rather than as participants in the production of news coverage. Even as news organisations are
seeking to integrate this content into their coverage, the shape the interaction takes between
the content producer and the journalist puts the journalist in a position of power over that of
the user. Once a piece of content, usually eyewitness material, is deemed newsworthy, the
question is to what extent the user providing it can meet the criteria set by journalists to
ensure sufficient proof that it is trustworthy. In a breaking news scenario this would first of all
mean proving they were at the scene and did indeed record the material themselves.
Professional journalists explain the need for verification in accordance with their own
journalistic routines and standards as their duty to the public. By extension, verification of
social media-sourced material is to safeguard the reputation of their news organisations.
Failure to implement it sufficiently is seen as undermining a core value of journalism to
represent the truth, and considered detrimental to the profession in the eyes of the public.
Especially in breaking news scenarios – though not exclusively – it is understood as a process
to ensure accuracy and authenticity that is usually limited to providing certainty that the
material originates from the location and time of a particular news event. Other issues such as
the motivation and framing that goes into the production of content is usually given little
importance and is also oftentimes not discussed or overtly represented in news texts that
make use of eyewitness material. A piece of content will, in the most part, be framed and
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contextualised within the news text where it is typically inserted into written text or overlayed
with verbal descriptions by journalists, and juxtaposed with other images. The producer of
the material has no direct role in this process. During the interview, Pain described
verification in terms of breaking news event, which oftentimes are events that would be
considered high up on the news agenda regardless of whether eyewitness material is available
or not.

The first thing is, can we verify the images the guy is sending us or the images we
find online? That’s the first thing, especially in terms of breaking news. In terms of
breaking news, I don’t know, if there is a video coming out after the bombing of the
Brussels airport then we focus on the images we can confirm. So if it’s just like very
short and the guy doesn’t answer our messages we would give up. But if the person
answers and we can ask him a few questions and talk to him on the phone, or if the
video is long enough and we can check and spot things that it was really shot inside
the Brussels airport then we would use it. (J. Pain, phone interview, July 5, 2016)
In this instance, rather than eyewitness material representing a type of audience participation
in news reporting, it is simply a relatively new format in which private citizen sources
provide additional material for news texts. With mobile phones ubiquitous in many areas of
the world, sources are able to provide content to reporters beyond the verbal eyewitness
account that is often a feature in unexpected news events. The tasks of the journalist –
compiling, framing and editing reports – have mostly not been shifted to users. Especially not
non-elite ones. As discussed, the only case study where users took on such tasks was in the
news coverage of the battle for Aleppo, fuelled by the absence of journalists on the ground.

However, in most cases, social media users posting newsworthy content are unsuspecting
news sources competing for the attention of journalists and editors, who select and
appropriate the eyewitness material according to their own criteria. This changes little about
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the power relationship between citizen sources and journalists. The same routines remain
largely intact. Nonetheless, this is not to say that eyewitness material cannot have a dramatic
impact on the news agenda at times. Content that commands a lot of interest in the alternative
news environment of social media platforms is something journalists do want to harness for
their own news products and capitalise on. The fast-paced and highly competitive news cycle
means journalists are keen to find sources that can supply content which reaches large
audiences. This was also shown in the France 24 interview, where Pain said finding the “next
hot news” was the main reason journalists monitor social media platforms. Through the
increase in the value of the material that sources can provide to journalists they are
potentially gaining some power in putting their accounts across. But this power is limited
through the format that high-value content takes; a dramatic video of an incident is far more
likely to attract interest from journalists and deemed “hot news” than a verbal statement or
argument. Equally, a visual piece of content is more easily inserted into news coverage
created by professional journalists.

You know, there’s a lot of fakery out there. There’s a lot of rumour. There’s a lot of
people who claim to know things or be in places, or have taken footage. So those are
the key things that we would need to establish before we would go even near
approaching them or using their contribution. (M. Frankel, phone interview, July 29,
2016)
Frankel also described the primary role of the journalist in sourcing eyewitness material as
guarding against the spread of misinformation. Again, this is understood first and foremost as
ensuring that the user disseminating any newsworthy material is also its producer, or has first
hand experience of the event or topic he is sharing information about. However, this basic
requirement means that users are thought of as eyewitness sources not as ‘collaborators’ or
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‘citizen journalists’. It is not required of journalists to be present at the time a news event
takes place in order to report on it. Although one of the tasks ascribed to journalists is to bear
witness’, this is not necessarily meant in a literal and immediate sense. A journalist is not
required to be an eyewitness, especially in unscheduled news events where being in the right
place at the right time is a matter of chance. Journalists very often arrive late and do not have
any first-hand knowledge of the specific incidents they are sent to cover. The work of
journalists is the reconstruction of what took place through a professional set of routines and
processes that are deemed trustworthy. Usually this involves seeking out and speaking to
eyewitnesses, and representing statements by authoritative and official sources on the events.
Applied to social media, the so-called audience participation offered through social media
newsgathering in breaking news scenarios is mainly limited to journalists sourcing
eyewitnesses remotely without needing to attend the scene to find them. While the eyewitness
material that these sources provide may unveil news events and incidents that would not have
gained any exposure in the past as journalists were not aware of them, or unable to package
into a marketable news product due to a lack of content to illustrate the information, it has not
challenged the relationship between journalists and sources in news production. Non-elite
citizen users have gained power in their interaction with professional journalists primarily
through their value as sources only in as far as this corresponds with professional routines. Of
course, professional journalism and the voice of the public are not anathema to each other,
and can and do interlink. So citizen sources have undeniably been able to enter the global
news flow where previously they might not have been able to and influence the news agenda
thanks to technology. This at times has benefitted both sides with journalists able to get high
value content and scoops, and members of the public able to get the attention of news media.
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Where the event is not a breaking news scenario other factors begin to be considered in the
use of eyewitness material. Contrasting two piece of content – one of an alleged soldier from
Mosul returning home and another of starving children in the Syrian town of Madaya –
El-Katatney described the process behind how some content was chosen over others at
AJPlus.

[A] good example from a couple of weeks ago. It was a soldier in Iraq from Mosul.
He reunited with his mother. Right? So it’s a soldier and he runs up to his mother. “I
haven’t seen you in three years.” Eventually we decided not to run with that story
because it’s almost impossible to verify. Like, I can’t, I don’t even know… the
footage comes from a source that I can in no way verify. How am I going to verify
someone in Iraq? How am I gonna know when this happened? This could’ve been the
liberation in 2004. It’s not that it could be staged. I assume it’s true but the facts of the
story itself are almost impossible for me to know where he is. And there is no other
source. This is a one person source. It’s not like there are several stories of people
reuniting with their families. [...] I don’t know what their agenda is, who put out the
video. All those things. That’s the kind of video that you wouldn’t run with. Unless
there is some way to give that story context or to verify it somewhere else. And it’s
not a Madaya story, right? The Madaya story, even if it came from one source, that’s a
supremely important story of children starving in Madaya, Syria. But even though it
came from one doctor in Madaya, I verified it. The Sans [inaudible] Medical Society
here in US were sending them money but still the very core of that story was one
person. But that was fine for that story because it was an important newsworthy story
that the information coming out of that region was that they were starving. [...] The
facts added up. So that was fine to run with it because it was such an important story
to tell. The other one, the soldier from Iraq. it was a nice story but it’s not a story you
would, you know, you would run with because it might, you know, it doesn’t add a lot
to the story and it’s not supremely along the lines of what AJPlus were trying to do,
like the issue of Syria. One that we were trying to raise awareness of. (E. El-Katatney,
conference call interview, December 14, 2016)
The comparison reveals a number of factors that determine whether a piece of content is
used. In non-breaking news events journalists continue to consider verification in terms of
corroborating information based on multiple sources. This is the ‘two-source rule’ typically
used by journalists according to which at least two sources need to confirm a piece of
information independently of each in order for it to be considered for news reports (Sullivan,
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2017). Alone, the fact that users are considered in this context, shows that journalists think of
them as sources in the conventional sense. Where the location and date cannot be confirmed
from the content itself, it may be discarded for not being trustworthy. Finally, according to the
interviewee, journalists could not establish the motivations of the content producer as they
had no way of finding out who they were and did not have their own reporters on the ground.
The contrast with eyewitness material of starving children in Madaya is particularly
interesting as the footage also possessed no distinguishing features that confirmed location
and date, little was known about the content producer and their motivations and there were no
journalists on the ground. Assuming that neither of the videos were staged, the factors
determining the use of one over the other, was the newsworthiness of the video from Syria in
terms of the dramatic effect of starving children to highlight the plight of civilians living in
Madaya, as opposed to footage of a soldier returning home in the battle for Mosul. The latter
suggested advances by the Iraqi army in retaking Mosul from the jihadist group Islamic State.
Particular efforts were made to verify the video from Madaya, that was considered
“supremely important”. A single piece of footage showing an instance of such human
suffering, could be deemed of paramount importance even in the absence of other such
images, as it was newsworthy in its own right. It was also considered to be keeping with the
editorial agenda of AJPlus, as the interviewee points out, while the footage from Iraq was not.
Audience participation was controlled by the editorial agenda of the news organisation on the
one hand, the ‘newsworthiness’ – as defined by the news organisation – of the content, and
also rationalised through professional routines determining verification practices.

Guidelines
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Interviewees were asked about whether guidelines were useful and should be in place for
interactive newsgathering. The question addressed how professional norms may be
formalised by the news organisations in news sourcing on social media platforms, and
attempted to probe what is deemed an ethical approach to audience participation. Both the
AJPlus and BBC interviewees believed that guidelines were necessary and described what
they entailed at their respective news organisations, while the France 24 interviewee believed
that journalists should be free from any guidelines that could be too prescriptive and therefore
hamper them in their profession. On the one hand, this is somewhat unsurprising as both the
BBC and AJPlus are founded in the Anglo-Saxon media tradition, which attempts to instil a
strong separation between the journalist as a subjective individual and the work they produce
through a raft of routines. As discussed, this separation between ‘objective’ truth and the
subjective opinion is not as prevalent in the Mediterranean media model, therefore efforts to
prescribe a correct way of reporting to journalists is somewhat anathema to the media
tradition that France 24 is founded in. On the other, however, the BBC and Al Jazeera showed
considerable differences in their approach to collaborative newsgathering, which indicates
that guidelines were primarily there to sanction the practice within the profession rather than
vocalise a normative ideology around participation in newswork. The guidelines outlined by
the BBC and AJPlus interviewees were mainly focused on general awareness of how to
interact with potential sources safely and responsibly, so as to protect them, and ensuring
content is verified as accurate and truthful. The focus in guidelines was on methods that
journalists should apply. Again, this fits with the overall approach to social media users
primarily as sources rather than collaborators or participants. The interviewees focused
largely on how professional practices and ethics should be adapted to social media rather than
rethinking what shape audience participation in mainstream news reporting may take through
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the interaction on social media platforms. Therefore, the purpose of the guidelines was to
integrate collaborative newsgathering into the profession and provide a sanctioned set of rules
around it that distinguished journalists from non-journalists.

Oh no, there should definitely be guidelines. There should be guidelines if someone is
inside an attack of, you know, if there are people in a school shooting. And you don’t
message them with your phone. Or in the Pulse nightclub and you’re like, “did you
take this photo? Can you give it to me?” Like we’ve had several training of things you
wouldn’t even think of. If someone is in a situation of danger and you tweet at them it
will make sounds. Like it will ping your phone. You’re putting them in danger. Or
someone, like, “my friend’s just died.” Like the Oakland fire last week here. That’s a
good example of where we were sourcing. And people whose friend’s just died. How
do you talk to these people? There’s a lot of training of how do you actually reach out.
You see so many of these, like, “Hey, I’m a journalist for blah blah, can I use your
photo in all perpetuity?” There is just a lot of worry about how you phrase and how
you reach out to sources. In how to even just broadly verify someone before you, like,
verify who they are, what their bio is, looking them up on other platforms, their name.
There are a lot of ways to verify that you should be trained in and that there should be
guidelines in because there are a lot of ways to cut corners and get quicker to knowing
if this is a piece of content that you should start looking into before you even start.
You know, just a lot of simple tools that all journalists should know. We have our own
guidelines. (E. El-Katatney, conference call interview, December 14, 2016)
The two factors that warrant guidelines according to El-Katatney was attempting to ensure
users’ physical and emotional safety when interacting with journalists at her news
organisation. Ethical sourcing of content meant ensuring that sources are treated respectfully,
with their well-being in mind. Protecting sources – a responsibility that is deemed very
important in professional journalism – is extended to social media. This is understood in
terms of duty of care on the one hand, and in terms of copyright on the other. It is commonly
cited by journalists as an important component of ethical interactive newsgathering (Posetti et
al., 2014; Storyful, 2015; WAN-IFRA, 2014). Duty of care entails recognition that sources
are typically not trained journalists and unpaid when they provide content to news
organisations. Professional journalists therefore have a responsibility to ensure that they are
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not taking advantage of sources in a way that might endanger them only to gain access to
material that is of value to news coverage. Oftentimes, however, this means sources are
patently in dangerous situations that journalists have no access to. The Syrian conflict, for
example, was deemed too dangerous for journalists, who, therefore, relied on amateurs to
provide information and multimedia material. A byproduct of the duty of care argument is
that professional journalists ensure a degree of neutrality and removal in their interaction with
users. Information is shared without journalists’ intervention, and professionals continue in
their role as disinterested observers. This upholds another important tenet of professional
journalism and reinforces the chasm between amateurs and professionals. This same notion
of duty of care is rarely problematised when dealing with young freelance journalists, who
often put themselves in dangerous situations without the benefit of protection from a news
organisation as a way to break into their chosen profession. In part, the argument of duty of
care is what separates professionals from civilians and cements the responsibilities, role and
hierarchy in interactions. On the other hand, the issue of copyright acknowledges users as
publishers. They are treated as news producers in their own right and the ethical way in
which to show this is through giving onscreen credit to them. While this might be seen as
outsourcing responsibility for the content itself to the person who produced it, it also acts as a
quality seal for the news organisation, indicating that efforts were made to verify the
authenticity of social media-sourced material by tracing it back to the original owner. By
absorbing the copyright of users into ethical conduct in interactive newsgathering, users are
in one way treated like journalists with bylines and the potential offer – though usually not –
of compensation, but it also offers transparency in the work of the professionals, indicates
verification, and finally separates the news organisation from the content that suggests a
degree of unaccountability.
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El-Katatney considered guidelines as helpful in implementing work processes that would
speed up newsgathering and verification, and could work in tandem with the training of
journalists. Therefore, guidelines were considered in terms of solidifying how social media
was integrated into routines on a purely operational level but not as a way to fundamentally
integrate audience participation and rethink the relationship between audiences and the
professional news media. Despite the view that social media has profoundly changed the
relationship between professional news media and audiences, the way that it was formally
integrated into professional practices was framed in very conventional terms, where the
journalist carries out gatekeeping according to familiar norms. While the view that social
media has allowed audiences to have a different role in the news environment as active
participants rather than passive consumers was shared by the interviewees the discussion of
guidelines made it clear that on a day-to-day basis there was little effort made to formally
integrate this. Nevertheless, AJPlus did use interactive newsgathering in a way that took
greater notice of non-elite users, which may be ascribed to the culture of the news
organisation. So, whether interactive newsgathering empowered audiences and provided
access to the global news flow was more a matter of the culture cultivated by journalists than
formally linked to social media but rather implemented with its help.

So, for example, we have guidelines we take quite seriously, in terms of how we
approach members of the public, the extent to which we involve them in our stories in
the first instance, rights, obligations, copyright and so forth, the issues around their
own safety and how we credit them and how we signpost to our audiences that the
material has not been filmed or recorded by a BBC journalist. So you know we have
things that we abide by, you know, our own editorial standards and guidelines. But in
terms of how it’s used beyond that largely depends on the circumstances. (M. Frankel,
phone interview, July 29, 2016)
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The BBC interviewee outlined guidelines not only regarding duty of care, copyright and
crediting of sources, but also on the extent to which sources are involved in the reporting. “To
what extent can audience involvement be integrated into professional norms and processes
without undermining them?” is the question that the guidelines seek to confront. The focus in
the guidelines is largely on the interaction between professional journalist and their news
organisation on the one side and the user on the other. It considers how journalists speak to
sources and provides a set of rules and obligations in the exchange of content. Frankel was
the only one of the three interviewees that mentioned guidelines about the extent to which
users are involved in the news reporting, suggesting that there is a formalised demarcation
between the task of the journalist and that of the user, which may be case-dependent. The
ethical code and guidelines are mainly about setting boundaries in the interaction on both
sides, and a dividing line between journalists, who must implement these rules, and the user,
who is mainly brought into the newswork in a structured way through them. For example, the
involvement of users was phrased as limiting access rather than opening access. There is no
mention of editorial considerations in the use of eyewitness material, which are dictated by
circumstance and are therefore left at the discretion of the journalist. This cements the
relationship between users and journalists, where the latter adopts a set of obligations and
practices that then allow them to integrate content into their coverage according to their own
needs and preferences.

Pain from France 24 was the only interviewee who rejected the idea of guidelines for the use
of social media-sourced material, rather suggesting training as a method to foster work
processes around interactive newsgathering. This was because the existing routines and
professional code for journalists was deemed transferable to interactive newsgathering and
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did not require further enunciating. Rather, journalists had to be trained in how these could be
applied. Guidelines were not considered a useful or efficient way to help journalists as they
were either too specific or not specific enough. Interactive newsgathering was considered a
tool that journalists had to learn to use effectively, which could be best served through
training. However, the course of the interview also saw the interviewee speak more about the
relationship between journalists and users, and the way that social media could challenge
existinging hierarchies in source power. This led the interviewee to consider the question of
guidelines in terms of potentially challenging gatekeeping, which he argued would be mainly
brought about through training. In the main, though, the issues that would be addressed in
training overlapped with those listed out in the guidelines at the other two news organisations.
But the fact that each case was specific and may warrant a different course of action was the
reason that the interviewee believed guidelines were ineffective.

Pain: Personally, I’m not a huge fan of guidelines. I think in our profession we have
to adapt all the time and guidelines for me, it makes you dumb. […] For me training is
more important. So yes, I think we should do a lot of training with journalists and
teaching them and showing them how to use UGC. Especially, you’re right, not to use
a comment from an Australian guy on the Greek crisis but explaining to him how you
can use voices from Greece, meaning maybe you use a translator or use Google
Translate if you don't. And how to contact them, how to get more from them and
where to find that comment and I think it’s more a question of training than
guidelines. Because guidelines, you’re going to put up guidelines and then it’s gonna
be either too general and not really useful for journalists or it’s going to be very
specific and then you have to adapt it every week.
Interviewer: Maybe guidelines was the wrong word but you know how you have
certain news values, or you have, you know most journalists are aware of them,
whether they’re overtly aware of them or whether they’re kind of aware of them is
another thing, but you know in kind of like practices. There is a certain idea of you
should be maybe impartial, what you’re doing should have relevance and that kind of
thing. And maybe how that’s sort of adapted to social media.
Pain: That’s for me being too vague. You know your own news reporting should be
impartial. Every journalist on earth will tell you that. It doesn’t mean anything
because then what is impartiality and applied to every case what does it mean
concretely, and that’s what’s important. As I told you, I think, it’s going to be too
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vague or too specific and it would be very challenging to find something that is in
between. It’s also training. “Ok, let’s work on the Greek crisis today with a group of
twenty journalists and let’s see what’s out there and then, well, you explain.” [...] You
could use [guidelines] during the training and then you need to work on it and get
used to it. [...] I think in the long run it would be fantastic if every journalist would
have this capacity of working with UGC and social media and I hope we’ll get there
but so far there is still specific working with it and you develop this capacity by
actually doing it. It can’t be just theoretical. (J. Pain, phone interview, July 5, 2016)

Summary
Collaborative newsgathering with non-journalists and non-elites is frequently understood as
“audience participation” by the interviewees. As the BBC interview revealed, understanding
this type of collaborative newswork as necessarily aimed at involving subjects directly
involved or affected by a news event is a misnomer. Yet, the France 24 interview suggested
that some editors may hold this as an ideal to strive for, though it is not necessarily seen in
practice (perhaps through lack of adequate training). Nevertheless, collaborative newswork
can be viewed as a means to maintaining audiences and building brand loyalty by conveying
a sense of empowerment through participation. Participation is therefore not primarily about
the quality of the collaboration and its outcome, but the appeal to audiences. This is done in
different ways by the organisations, depending on who they are targeting and how they
understand their own role as news producers. Arguably AJPlus better understands the
structures and fluidity of audiences on social media than the more hierarchical structure of the
BBC. AJPlus’ approach to collaborative newswork is equally driven by the impetus to reach
large audiences but may be better characterised by the term ‘community participation’. I posit
that ‘audience participation’ deals with members of audiences as mainly disconnected
individuals that have not fully left behind the era of mass media. News organisations may
engage individuals but it takes place only as a one-to-one interaction between the user and the
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news organisation. Community participation on the other hand acknowledges the
interconnectedness of potential audience members and the capacity for those deemed
connected, knowledgeable and authoritative inside particular networks to widely distribute
news content that passes their muster. Audiences are fluid and Al Jazeera appropriates this
fluidity, recognising that there are influential groups around specific topics that can help
amplify AJPlus news content that resonates with them. The objective is not primarily to build
an audience around AJPlus, but to insert themselves into ‘ready-made’ audiences. The power
deferred to non-elites are substantially different with the second approach that requires a
deeper integration of non-accredited sources in the newswork. The community, which is
usually knowledgeable on the subject matter, has to recognise its role and voice in the
newswork. By El Katatney’s own admission, AJPlus favours undercovered topics, where
online communities can fill a gap and more easily achieve a status of authority thanks to a
lack of alternative sources. It is easy to see how agenda-setting power is harder to achieve on
topics that are widely and frequently covered and a range of accredited sources cater for the
routines and practices that journalists are most at ease with.

The most popular use of social media-sourced material is in breaking news scenarios.
Technology has enhanced the variety and quality of news content available but changed little
in terms of source power. Long-established norms and news values determine what
constitutes newsworthiness. Editors found it difficult to define how users can gain their
attention despite perceiving collaboration in newswork as important — for audience building
or otherwise. Fulfilling the requirements of professional values and practices such as
authenticity was brought up as a way to ensure content was not disregarded outright. Yet
ways to influence the editorial agenda was not defined or even considered an important
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aspect of collaborative newswork. This suggests limited scope for journalists to critically
engage with professional practices where collaboration is concerned. The interviews suggest
that interactivity between journalists and users is tightly managed and formalised, with users
usually treated less as participants or collaborators and more as sources. Source power may
have been affected but gatekeeping practices continue to mirror those used in the past.
Participation in a more collaborative and egalitarian way is mostly seen taking place outside
of the mainstream news flow, in the alternative news environment created on social media
platforms. When journalists are speaking of audience participation in news reporting, it is
shown to be a controlled and formalised interaction that enables sourcing of content from
afar. Perhaps, as news organisations compete in the alternative news environment on social
media platforms, the true audience participation is in how news products are distributed and
contextualised by users.

All of the interviewees considered the question of guidelines in a solely practical sense that
would help journalists apply routines, processes and ethics, and that would in turn
professionalise interactive newsgathering for them. All three interviewees were also broadly
in agreement about the type of practices that needed formalising and the methods that were
being applied – be it through guidelines or training – showing that journalists are coming
together to establish their role collectively in managing audience participation. This role is
defined primarily by existing routines although emphasis on practices and values slightly
varied.
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9. Conclusion
At the outset, this research aimed to examine how journalists and news editors manage the
collaborative newswork with non-journalists through social media and the challenges this
posed to them. It soon became apparent that journalists’ diminishing role as exclusive
providers of news has created a seismic disruption to the industry, one that the professional
community is mobilising to counteract. The mass entry of non-journalists to major
information distribution platforms and the manifestation of two-way mass communication
has seen journalists attempt to assert not just their relevance but also their authority. The loss
of exclusivity both in news production and in control over the means of news dissemination
has undoubtedly thrown the profession and its institutions into crisis. Not least, the Internet
has left the entire business model on which journalism is built in disarray, with a devastating
effect on the industry’s profitability. However, in this muddle of information exchange and
collaboration, created by the Internet and turbo-charged by social media, legacy news media
remain influential in shaping news discourse39. This is true not only due to their economies of
scale in newswork, which place them at an advantage over other news producers, or their
reach through various mediums that extend beyond digital media, such as broadcast and print.
It is also true because in an otherwise fragmenting news environment they are the closest we
have to an overarching public sphere. Although their privileged position as news providers
has become contested, mainstream news media is still largely accepted as providing the
‘townhall’ for public discourse. This is demonstrably the case as media exposure remains
sought after by power elites and activists alike. I agree with Browne (2018) that while the
39

Normative approaches and professional practices in newswork are also often internalised by citizen

journalism, especially where structures mirror those in professional organisations. (Lindner, 2017)
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promise of the Habermasian public sphere remains unfulfilled (and is perhaps unachievable),
it presents an ideal to strive for. There is I believe, the need for a place where voices meet,
though I do not maintain that they must reach a common way of seeing. An agonistic model
of democracy (Mouffe, 2005) does not place the same expectation on the media to build
consensus. Opposing viewpoints may never be reconciled, nor is that the aim. In this model,
democracy needs to find ways to accommodate irreconcilable view points, or risk becoming
hegemony by consensus. If mainstream journalism’s perception of what democracy should
achieve is limited by the striving for consensus, the value of plurality is necessarily put into
question – not only the plurality of voices but the plurality of approaches to covering those
voices. Nevertheless, as a space, mainstream news media remain the institutions we have to
try and tangibly manifest this aim in the real world and are therefore worth preserving.

The new news discourse that emerged from the networked nature of news production is
attempting to bridge the divide between professionalism and amateurism in newswork by
absorbing collaboration into journalistic norms (Hujanen 2016). But it also does so by
reasserting professional authority. In fact, I argue that this news discourse is perhaps above all
concerned with boundary work. The findings of my research suggest that collaborative
newswork often takes place between journalists in the western news organisations studied
here. Where it does not, non-elite contributors are not necessarily sought out for the value of
their newswork but the value of them (and people like them) as audience. Even where
non-journalists are sourced specifically for their newswork, it is often explicitly framed
within the logic of professional routines to legitimate their contributions. In order to validate
the amateur’s newswork, this framing has to be done by professional journalists creating a
very clear hierarchy that places journalists at the top. The stamp of approval that has to be
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given by professionals not only creates a hierarchy between them and those they collaborate
with but makes the journalist indispensable in the process. At the same time that
collaboration has become a journalistic convention, professional norms and routines have
been adapted and used to define legitimate collaboration that is sanctioned by the
professional community.

Nevertheless, the case studies have shown a significant divergence between the three news
organisations in how they approach networked journalism. The BBC used social media
content extensively to promote their own reporters as well as other elite journalists, while
France 24 used it primarily to source professional journalists from other news organisations
and expert sources. The expectation laid out in the methodology that France 24 would present
more fringe sources was not borne out significantly in the research. The migrant crisis
included some extreme right voices emerging, while the BBC presented no such voices.
However, original messages among citizen sources were very limited across France 24 texts.
The Media Watch programme during the Greek case study involved high levels of opining
and commentary, but overall France 24 did not substantially differ from that seen at the other
news organisations. Meanwhile Al Jazeera most consistently used social media to source
non-journalist and non-elite sources. This suggests fragmentation among news media in how
to tackle collaboration. The approaches appear to be influenced by media models and
cultures. One might argue this indicates diversity across the news landscape, but on the other
side it also suggests a lack of shared vision with regard to what collaborative newswork
should look like in practice. While in interviews they each claimed collaborative
newsgathering as an important journalistic practice for themselves, it was the mere adoption
of collaboration as convention that appeared common denominator among the professional
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community. Consensus on how, or to what end, collaboration takes place seemed mostly
absent. The interviews and case studies showed that collaborative newsgathering has been
integrated into journalistic norms (i.e. the watchdog role, facilitating public discourse through
diversity and inclusivity, objectivity, etc) as well as professional routines. But how each
organisation approached this integration into norms and practices (ie. who they collaborated
with and how this was framed) appears to be shaped largely by how they understand their
role as journalists, which is influenced by the respective media traditions and cultures. Yet,
the focus did not only differ between news organisations but showed a degree of change
across case studies which also indicated weak internal coherence in each organisation’s
approach. Collaboration could be borne out of necessity in some cases, and not in others, and
this influenced its nature – as the case study on the Syrian conflict showed. This chimes with
the assertion that normative approaches to journalism are extremely difficult to ring fence and
are subject to rapid changes, which calls the idea of a claim to professionalism itself into
question. Lewis (2015) calls for a more interdisciplinary approach to explore boundary work,
acknowledging the rhetoric, practice and the objects around and through which boundaries
are drawn. Such a holistic view of boundary work creates space to analyse the different
mechanisms and approaches to boundary work from different angles and creates a richer
picture of how the profession asserts exclusivity as journalists and imposes authority even as
digital news practices are integrated.

For example, while the polemic around collaborative newsgathering in a professional context
was strong from each news organisation during the interviews, the adoption of Twitter as the
main platform where collaboration was performed favoured specific dynamics in this
interaction. Journalists claimed to endow social media-sourced content with journalistic value
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by stamping their own processes on it. There were numerous examples of user-generated
content used to underscore the professional nature of journalism. It was used to promote
professional journalists as, for example, seen in the BBC and France 24 coverage of the
Greek referendum; to highlight deviant practices such as in the coverage of the actions of the
Hungarian camerawoman in the case study of the migrant crisis; to legitimise non-journalistic
material through journalistic norms as seen extensively in the Aleppo case study across all
three news organisations; to act as public forum for discussion with The Stream hosting
citizen discussions; and also to broaden the number of news sources for newswork – the
reports on Palestinian pen seller, the huge pool of journalists in Brussels sharing each other’s
insights during the negotiations on the Greek loan, and the majority of sources from Aleppo
itself, to name just a few. All in all, this suggests that professionals understand their role to
have a very strong gatekeeping component, which is expressed in the way they collaborate
and how they legitimise or delegitimise their sources. Non-journalists, especially non-elite
ones, have little opportunity to define networked journalism. Arguably a more empowered
position was only granted to non-elites in the formats that Al Jazeera used. This is likely to
have been the case as they were quite structured and formulaic in their collaboration through
The Stream and AJPlus, which carved out a distinct space for non-elites.

The research defined three research questions in the methodology. Each case study and the
interviews attempted to deal with these questions. Therefore, I want to largely avoid repeating
these case-specific conclusions here, but rather produce a more removed perspective. It is
difficult to address the questions separately as they inevitably overlap in places. Although I
have attempted to deal with them individually as far as possible. The conclusion seems more
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coherent when bringing the questions together as an overall analysis of gatekeeping in
networked journalism.

RQ1: Is social media sourcing affecting the power relationships between primary and
secondary definers?

RQ2: How do professional journalists create and articulate professional boundaries in the
participation by non-authoritative citizen voices/audiences?

RQ3: What mechanisms do professional journalists use to maintain their gatekeeping role?

One of the most striking findings of this research is the blurring between primary and
secondary definers. Secondary definers, meaning journalists, appear to act like traditional
primary definers, assuming roles of authority and expertise in analysis and commentary.
Professionals could achieve a degree of celebrity among peers. For example, the Greek
referendum case study showed that the ‘right kind’ of journalist could have significant clout
in gaining access to Western elite mainstream news media. This journalist was usually part of
the professional elite themselves. So journalists did not necessarily go to power elites for
information but sourced information from their peers, both bolstering each other’s reputation
through promotion of each other’s newswork, and fostering an interpretive community40.
There are obvious reasons for this in terms of journalistic conventions, as professionals are

40

To put the findings in the Greek referendum case study in context, political reporting has long been

characterised by ‘pack journalism’ (McNair, 2012) and the data suggests that journalists appropriate
social media to continue this practice virtually.
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keen to appear removed from power elites and as gatekeepers to their spin. Of course, power
elites also continued to act as primary definers for journalists, but the networked journalism
that resulted cannot be easily put down to the sole (or even primary) framing and
agenda-setting of these sources. It could be argued that journalists closed ranks to safeguard
their value of autonomy and relied on each other as individually autonomous journalists to
build what they might understand as an autonomous community. Social media has not only
revolutionised the communication flow between audiences and news organisations, but also
the communication flow between media professionals, and this is being used by them to
assert influence and authority. The resulting journalist community is clearly also perceived as
hostile, or at least unaccommodating, by outsiders – politicians from less influential European
Union countries used Twitter extensively to speak to the public about the Greek loan
negotiations – and this is obvious in how their gatekeeping is side-stepped with the help of
social media. While some newsmakers, who presumably feel supported by the journalist elite,
choose to primarily speak through the news media, others do not. Yanis Varoufakis’
resignation is a case in point. Aware of the framing power of journalists (and his own ability
to circumvent it), Varoufakis chose to publish his own resignation as Greek finance minister
to a mass audience rather than speak to and through international news media. Most notably,
he did so in English. In the Greek case study, ‘sense-making’ and analysis was carried out
extensively by BBC journalists and some other journalists, while France 24 relied heavily on
accredited expert sources – traditional primary definers – but also journalists. Hall et al.
(1978) may have once welcomed journalists assuming greater power in the relationship with
power elites. Writing in the 1970s, he might have seen journalists’ role as stand-in citizens
being given greater autonomy and importance. However, the persisting marginalisation of
non-elite voices in sourcing, interaction, and collaboration through a medium that lends itself
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to greater inclusion, means the journalistic community is revealed to be mainly concerned
with its struggle for its own elitist position. Certainly, social media has not been the leveller it
once promised to be in mass news media and inclusion of non-elites, especially by political
correspondents, is not a priority (Molyneux and Mourão, 2019; Nuernbergk, 2016). With the
exception of journalists’ increased visibility through the support of their community, sourcing
practices have not changed substantially. I would argue that especially at a time where the
concept of professionalism has come under intense scrutiny, journalists have an interest in
maintaining the status quo, emphasising their supposed authority and falling back on their
reliance on power elites, rather than opening up to more diverse collaborative newswork. In
the Greek case study, both BBC and France 24 fell back on their reliance on power elites,
even in their social media sources. The texts from the refugee crisis showed a more varied
picture, where the BBC relied heavily on their own and other journalists, while France 24
limited the level of social media-sources overall. Since power elites already have privileged
access to the news media, they continued to be heavily represented regardless.

In the case studies I highlighted the reliance on primarily English-speaking sources, which,
given the news stories, were arguably not always the most informative or representative of
voices. For example, by relying on only English-speaking sources in the coverage of the
Greek debt crisis, these testimonies may not have provided a particularly authentic view of
what ordinary Greeks thought or communicated to one another in their social networks. It
arguably highlights how these sources were attempting to speak to a global community. The
news organisations’ use of them perhaps illustrates how journalists, broadly speaking, choose
those who are accessible to them, which suggests that collaboration can be focused on the
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discourse of contemporary newswork than the qualitative impact that participation can have
in broadening newswork.

While plurality and inclusiveness is certainly a journalistic norm, it can be argued that in a
news environment where newswork is no longer necessarily controlled by journalists,
non-elites pose a greater threat to professionalism than elites. Journalists’ continued relevance
in news production with regards to power elites is self-evident, as they fall back on engrained
ideological justifications for their profession as gatekeepers against power elites and political
spin – encapsulated in the well-worn expression of ‘holding power to account’. In other
words, power elites are not challenging professional journalism’s raison d’etre. However,
amateurs engaged in newswork are. Ordinary people, such as eyewitnesses, recording news
events and publishing their material online, do so too. The notion that journalists’ work must
provide the basis of an informed citizenry has arguably become much harder to defend when
ordinary people themselves can and do carry out some of this work. Even routines of
fact-checking and verification, both of which are usually invoked with regard to eyewitness
material, do not require a journalist per se. ‘Fact-checking’ projects such as snopes.com and
factcheck.org have mushroomed and so-called fact-checkers do not necessarily think of
themselves as journalists. What was always considered a self-evident journalistic practice,
primarily carried out by the journalist and then their sub-editors, has been revamped as a new
occupation of sorts to tackle what has been dubbed ‘fake news’, ‘misinformation’, or
‘information disorder’. Ironically, dealing with misinformation has even become a
semi-academic pursuit in recent years despite journalism’s aim to claim the area of
verification for themselves, while public bodies and political entities are also trying to enter
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this field (Poynter 2018). Beyond doubt, fact-checking is used in boundary work in
journalism, but even there it is contested as an exclusive domain of journalism.

The objectivity norm is also difficult to use as a defence when there is no overt bias, though
objectivity is often the go-to norm when dealing with any activism. Boundary work to
distinguish professional newswork from that by non-elite actors can be tricky because there is
just no one-size-fits-all approach, and acts of journalism are carried out by non-journalists
(Allan 2013). As non-elite sources can be the trickiest for journalists to distinguish
themselves from, boundary work can be as basic as distinguishing between those who have
authority and those who do not through inclusion and exclusion from newswork – meaning
that non-elite sources that encroach on the newswork of journalists too much are sidelined
where there is not an overwhelming need to include them. As the case studies showed, Al
Jazeera did the most to deviate from this hierarchy, showing that they understood part of the
purpose of their professionalism as providing a broad forum. However, this was always
clearly signposted, with a division between straight up news reporting, which (except in the
Aleppo case study) comprised little social media content, and news content that was
especially tailored to social media. This is significant because there was still boundary work
that was communicated through the different news products. AJPlus and The Stream news
products were far more likely to comprise social media-sourced content, as opposed to
coverage on the main website aljazeera.net. In addition, the news products that were focused
on social media content were couched in the idea of inclusivity and facilitating public debate,
which are themselves journalistic norms. The convention of collaboration the way Hujanen
(2016) described it was perhaps most closely represented there, with the journalist managing
the chaos of citizen debate.
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There are exceptional circumstances where access might be impossible, such as seen in the
Aleppo case study. There, the public audience was exposed to high levels of legitimising of
non-journalists through journalistic boundary work, even though they may not have been in
keeping with journalistic norms and practices with regard to independence, impartiality and
even autonomy. However, the defence of professionalism was asserted in tandem with the
reliance on non-journalists’ newswork. It is likely that by doing so, news organisations
undermined their exclusivity as news providers through a short-term trade-off for the benefit
of keeping production costs down and their own correspondents safe. The aggressive pursuit
of journalists, not only by the Syrian regime but also by opposition fighters, must be
understood as a battle for controlling the news narrative. And this was a battle that was
decidedly won by the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad across the three news
organisations – though to different extents across the news outlets. These sources were able to
become primary definers of the Syrian conflict in much of the coverage, but were also
secondary definers through their activity as news producers in their localities. In fact, part of
the legitimising of their newswork by professional journalists was in promoting them as
taking on journalistic practices, therefore partly integrating them into the journalistic
community.

The way the three news organisations managed participation by non-elites was perhaps the
most diverse out of all the source groups, ranging from near exclusion to appearing to embed
newswork with particular communities. The BBC appeared to be mainly concerned with
reaffirming the power relationship between journalists and non-elite voices. Non-elite and
audience participation in newswork was condensed into the same thing, which meant that
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BBC news editors were primarily interested in involving their global audience in order to
foster brand loyalty. There was a sense that audience participation was integrated because it
made business sense. In the case studies, collaborative newswork with non-elites was often
mainly about engaging the BBC audience and not necessarily about exploring new voices to
produce more multifaceted coverage of the news event. Collaboration with non-elites in
newswork was very low except for the Aleppo coverage, where a high level of legitimating
was carried out by the BBC. Al Jazeera’s reasoning for how it managed participation by
non-elites was also partly built around audience reach, but rather than claiming a particular
audience for itself, it tried to harness the existing audience for a particular news topic. It
recognised the fluidity in news consumption, and the ‘influencers’ and communities at the
centre of particular news content on social media. To capitalise on the audiences built around
these communities, more parity between journalists and amateurs was needed. France 24 on
the other hand used non-elite sources often to simply source the content of other mainstream
news media, so that the original input of these sources was virtually non-existent. The outlet
was perhaps the most consistent in excluding non-elite sources from newswork, and even in
the Aleppo case study took the most removed approach to such sources. While France 24
Observers gave non-elites a much more prominent role in collaborative newswork, it was not
found to have had any relevance to the case studies. Its own news agenda existed in parallel
to the mainstream news agenda. This perhaps also limited how explicit the newswork needed
to be in terms of showing boundary work, as collaboration with non-elite users did not bleed
into the main news output. It was presented as a specialised form of newswork that was
physically removed from the bulk of the journalism produced at France 24. At least in these
case studies it was not a driver in agenda-setting routines, with no integration into the
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mainstream news cycle. The relevant and topical newswork of the day remained firmly in the
hands of journalists.

It is probably no coincidence that Twitter has emerged as the social media platform of choice
for most journalists. The professional networked community can be perhaps one of the most
powerful gatekeeping tools available to journalists, while at the same time appearing to be in
the thick of the collaborative newswork. Out of all the platforms available for networked
journalism, it was the one that was relied on the most, and this is no coincidence. Many
prolific journalist tweeters cultivate their ‘following’ to ‘follower’ ratio. The number of users
they follow – often in the low thousands and sometimes in the hundreds – are those that they
deem important enough to listen to. For them, Twitter provides two-way communication but
they hold a megaphone and have highly selective hearing. Social media (usually Twitter) for
journalists is largely not a place to listen and watch but a place to speak and be heard. The
microblog as a platform for news and opinion makers to put information out was also pointed
out by BBC Editor Mark Frankel, only underlining how journalists’ are most comfortable in a
space that replicates the sourcing practices they are used to. English writer and producer
Charlie Brooker once likened Twitter to a video game, summing it up: ‘It’s a massive online,
multiplayer RPG in which you choose an avatar and you act out a persona loosely based on
your own in order to gain followers” (Channel 4 News 2013). The observation is perhaps a
little tongue-in-cheek – in keeping with Brooker’s own public persona – but there is truth to
it. Twitter is a tool by which most journalists chase audiences based on their image and
strategic networks of collaboration. When collaboration happens it is usually expected to
happen with the ‘right’ people. Anyone outside of this might provide a ‘scoop’ but is not
brought into the collaborative relationship beyond that. I would add that if you were to view
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Twitter as a game, it is not just each man for himself – on the contrary, tied into it is a
necessary element of community building which can benefit the community overall. The
professional networked community can be perhaps one of the most powerful gatekeeping
tools available to journalists. Carlson (2018) has written about journalism’s objectivity norm
as a commitment to remaining external to the political process in order to occupy the
“symbolic communicative center of democratic society” and has called on journalists to
advocate the social value of this norm. I am inclined to agree, but believe that such
externality should also require journalists to exist outside the echo chambers of their own
networks. I would argue that in networked journalism among the professional elite, the idea
of externality has been often abandoned. Indeed, the use of the concept of filter bubbles to
berate audiences and defend professional journalism is, arguably, illogical – given the blind
spot that consists around the filter bubble of networked journalists themselves. It can be
argued that the social media echo chambers created and inhabited by journalists exist
primarily to reinforce their professional authority, but given the loss of control over
newswork as a whole, the question is whether they are largely self-affirming (even
self-deceiving) about the state and status of the profession. The more the journalist elite
fosters its own community, the less it is able to connect with the wider public. Given that the
role of stand-in citizen has become somewhat obsolete for journalists, they need to reimagine
their role in different terms. Instead of chasing the self-perception of acting as stand-in
citizen, perhaps it is time to foster a new role as link between citizens and journalism’s
institutions.
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